



















































The present project draws a comparison between the literature and thought of Hasidic Rabbi 
Nachman of Braslav (1772–1810) and Argentine writer and public intellectual Jorge Luis Borges 
(1899–1986). It is organized around two components of their writing—a discursive self-
positioning at “the edge” of tradition and a “cabbalistic” stylization of their narratives. The 
dissertation contextualizes these components within late eighteenth century Enlightenment 
ideology and emancipation policies, and mid-twentieth century political ideologies of Nazism 
and Fascism, respectively. The dissertation is bookended by a close comparative reading of their 
stories. It finds that each in his moment is greatly implicated in questions of resituating Jews and 
Judaism within broader society, and argues that the effort to aesthetically represent the changing 
social location of Jews is linked to their understanding of their respective literary projects more 
broadly. Finally, the study illuminates their shared conceptualization of modern Judaism as a 
literary model. The dissertation’s broader intervention in the filed of early modern and modern 
literature relates to the dynamic of rupture and continuity that is so central to categorizations of 
modern writing. It demonstrates that the fault lines of the rupture from tradition, vis-à-vis which 
modern literature has been constructed, was already present—poetically and discursively—in the 
“tradition” from which it purportedly departs. By combining the study of diverse geographies, 
histories, languages, cultures and genres, the present study articulates a comparative frame that 
challenges conventional categorizations of modern writing.	 
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medium	of	storytelling.	The	manner	 in	which	 the	 plot	 and	 structure	 of	 the	 tales	weave	



























the	king’s	assistant	is	R.	Nachman	himself.26	Along	 this	 line	 of	 “cabbalistic”	references	























































Beyond	the	problematic	literary	implications	of	such	a	claim,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 R.	 Nachman’s	
tales	 this	 interpretative	assumption	is	simply	unjustifiable	on	several	counts.	First,	it	 is	





























But	what	does	 the	lack	of	an	ending	produce	in	a	story?	This	 reading	 has	 drawn	 our	
attention	 away	 from	questions	 regarding	 the	 art	form	of	 storytelling	 and	 literature.	



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































	 	 	 Borges:	No.	I	read	a	book	called	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism.22	
	
In	discussing	the	theme	of	Borges	and	Cabbala-as-mediated-by-Scholem	we	would	do	well	
to	first	note	the	extent	to	which	Scholem	conditioned	Borges’	possibilities	of	alluding	to	
Cabbala.	Borges	did	not	know	any	cabbalists,	and	his	primary	source	of	cabbalistic	texts	
was	the	citations	he	encountered	in	Scholem’s	books.	Borges’	array	of	cabbalistic	
characters	and	concepts	reads	like	a	table	of	contents	for	some	imaginary	volume	on	
“Major	Trends	in	Scholem’s	Writings	on	Mysticism.”	In	fact,	the	few	times	Borges	cites	
original	sources	in	connection	with	cabbalistic	topics,	the	quotes	are	taken	from	quotes	
Scholem	offers	of	these	sources.23	“Selection	and	abbreviation	themselves	constitute	a	kind	
of	commentary,”24	Scholem	states	in	the	first	pages	of	his	lectures.	And	indeed,	from	
citations	of	Sefer	Yetsira,	to	the	Talmud,	to	the	doctrine	of	the	Sefirot	and	the	Zohar,	the	
influence	of	Scholem’s	commentary—bibliographic	and	conceptual—on	Borges’	references	
																																																								
22	This	exchange,	which	we	might	legalistically	term	“leading	the	witness”,	is	quoted	in:	Christ,	"Jorge	Luis	
Borges,	the	Art	of	Fiction	No.	39."	
23	E.g.	the	entry	“Un	Golem”	in:	Jorge	Luis	Borges	and	Adolfo	Bioy	Casares,	Cuentos	Breves	Y	Extraordinarios	
(Antologia)	(Buenos	Aires:	Editorial	Raigal,	1955).	is	a	direct	(translated)	quote	from	Sanhedrin	65b.	The	
same	is	true	of	the	entry	“the	Golem”	in:	Jorge	Luis		Borges	and	Margarita	Guerrero,	Manual	De	Zoología	
Fantástica	(Mexico:	Fondo	de	Cultura	Económica,	1957).,	which	contains	an	extensive	quote	of	the	mention	of	
a	Golem	in	Sanhedrin	65b.	There	is	no	mention	of	Scholem	in	either,	but	this	source	is	repeatedly	quoted	
throughout	the	5th	chapter	of:	Gershom	Scholem,	On	the	Kabbalah	and	Its	Symbolism	(New	York:	Schocken	
Books,	1965).,	titled	“The	Idea	of		the	Golem”.	[I	have	consulted	Borges’	copy	of	this	book,	with	his	
annotations	in	the	back	pages,	in	his	personal	library	at	the	Fundación	Internacional	Jorge	Luis	Borges	in	
Buenos	Aires.	I	found	Chapter	5	to	be	(the	only	one)	thoroughly	annotated.	–YL]		
24	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism,	3.	
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to	Cabbala	is	marked.				
	
What	might	appear	to	be	bibliographic	incidentals	become	interpretive	considerations	
when	we	observe	that	scholars	who	have	written	on	Borges	and	Cabbala	have	relied	on	
Scholem	(at	least)	as	much	as	Borges	did	to	authorize	their	definition	and	delimitation	of	
what	they	refer	to	as	“The	Cabbala.”	If	fact,	it	is	hard	to	find	a	single	citation	of	a	cabbalistic	
text	in	any	of	the	existing	work	on	Borges	and	Cabbala	that	is	not	cited	as:	“Quoted	by	
Scholem	in…”25	What	is	thus	presented	as	a	clear	indication	of	cabbalistic	influences	on	
Borges—”Borges	utilizes	cabbalistic	notions,	employs	exegetical	elements,	and	cites	names	
and	texts	that	directly	refer	to	this	theme”26—is	in	fact	only	the	demonstration	of	a	
correlation	(bibliographic	and	tropological)	between,	on	the	one	hand,	what	Borges	read	
and	what	Scholem	wrote—a	correlation	that,	one	suspects,	is	always	partially	implied	in	
the	act	of	citation—and	on	the	other	hand,	between	Borges’	source	of	authority	on	the	
Cabbala	and	his	commentators’	source	of	authority	on	the	topic.27							
	
When	research	on	Borges	and	Cabbala	hits	upon	this	correlation,	then,	it	only	serves	to	
perpetuate	the	deferral	of	the	question	of	Borges’	Jewish	inheritance.	In	an	illustrative	
article	on	the	topic,	in	which	Borges	is	presented	as	greatly	“indebted	to	Kabbalistic	
																																																								
25	Consider,	for	instance,	that	references	to	Scholem	take	up	29	out	of	65	footnotes	in:	Alazraki,	"Borges	and	
the	Kabbalah.",	or	that	the	two	writers	most	widely	referred	to	by	Sosnowski	are	Borges	and	Scholem,	each	
receiving	an	equal	number	of	11	bibliographic	entries	in:	Sosnowski,	Borges	Y	La	Cábala:	La	Búsqueda	Del	
Verbo.	Though	they	certainly	do	not	attest	to	the	nature	of	the	analysis,	nor	to	its	exceptional	quality	(these	
are,	after	all,	the	two	most	prominent	researchers	in	the	field	of	Borges	and	Cabbala),	these	numbers	indicate	
the	substitution	of	“Kabbalah”	(or	“Cábala”)	for	what	might	more	accurately	be	named	“Scholem.”				
26	Borges	Y	La	Cábala:	La	Búsqueda	Del	Verbo,	13.	My	translation	–	YL	
27	The	central	works	on	Borges	and	the	Cabbala,	which	I	refer	to	throughout	this	chapter,	were	written	by	
scholars	with	knowledge	of	Cabbala	that	goes	well	beyond	the	couple	of	Scholem	books	that	Borges	read.	But	
the	reliance	on	Scholem	that	these	same	scholars	exhibit,	in	bibliographic	citation	and	in	the	identification	of	
tropes,	suggests	that	for	them	as	for	Borges	Scholem	serves	to	authorize	their	knowledge	of	the	Cabbala.	This	
mirroring	of	Scholem’s	function	as	a	rhetorical	invocation	of	authority	is	the	methodological	problem	at	hand.			
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conceptions,”28	this	debt	soon	turns	out	to	be	“regardless	of	the	accuracy	of	his	
understanding	of	its	doctrine.”29	And	yet,	regardless,	it	is	a	debt	that	is	always	qualified	by	
the	phrase	“as	understood	by	Borges.”30	Quite	an	odd	structure	of	debt	or,	at	any	rate,	of	
recognizing	an	inheritance.	How	are	we	to	understand	this	debt	to	conceptions,	regardless	
of	any	accuracy	in	understanding	them,	and	that	might	only	exist	in	as	far	as	it	was	
understood	by	Borges	to	exist?	One	suggestion	has	been	that	“[Borges’]	art	is	Kabbalistic	in	
a	sense	defined	by	Borges	himself	in	his	essay	‘A	Vindication	of	the	Kabbalah.’”31	I	would	
like	to	offer	a	less	tautological	(less	than:	we	consider	Borges’	writing	to	be	cabbalistic,	
because	it	is	cabbalistic	in	the	sense	Borges	himself	means	when	he	says	his	writing	is	
cabbalistic)	account	of	what	the	concern	with	“cabbalistic”	means	in	the	context	of	Borges’	
writing.	
	
A	first	observation	towards	engaging	this	question	is	to	note	that,	for	Borges	as	for	the	
academic	study	of	Cabbala,	mysticism	and	its	phenomena	are	tropes.	In	relying	on	Scholem	
for	his	knowledge,	Cabbala	is	mediated	for	Borges	in	important	ways	by	the	academic	
intellectual-historical	lens.	This	certainly	predetermines	the	conditions,	under	which	
Borges	acquires	his	knowledge.	Mediated	by	academic	study,	key	elements	of	Cabbala	such	
as	ecstatic	experiences	and	a	functional	(if	not	metaphysical)	distinction	between	exoteric	
and	esoteric	knowledge—two	examples	that	feature	extensively	in	Borges’	handling	of	
																																																								
28	Virginia	Gutierrez	Berner,	"Mystical	Laws;	Borges	and	Kabbalah,"	CR:	The	New	Centennial	Review	9,	no.	3	
(2010):	137.	
29	Ibid.,	138.	
30	Ibid.,	139.	
31	Alazraki,	"Kabbalistic	Traits	in	Borges'	Narrative,"	78.	
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Cabbalistic	themes32—are	entirely	absent	from	Borges’	encounter	with	(Scholem’s	study	
of)	Cabbala.	After	all,	Scholem	is	not	himself	a	cabbalist.	He	does	not	instruct	his	reader	in	
the	attainment	of	ecstatic	experiences,	nor	does	he	maintain	a	functional	distinction	
between	exoteric	and	esoteric	knowledge.	He	certainly	reports	these	to	be	key	elements	of	
Cabbala,	but	the	academic	lens	blurs	the	possibility	of	clearly	distinguishing	between	the	
key	elements	of	Cabbala	and	the	key	terms	in	the	investigation	of	Cabbala.	That	is,	the	lived	
experiences	and	concerns	of	cabbalists	become	tropes	in	the	writing	of	cabbalistic	studies.		
	
A	second	observation	is	that	in	all	of	the	research	on	Borges	and	Cabbala	the	standard	of	
proof	that	is	the	indication	of	influence—what	I	have	proposed	to	call	“correlation”—
involves	a	comparison	between	a	story	by	Borges	and	a	doctrinal	text	of	Cabbala	(which	is	
always	available	to	the	researcher	in	fragments,	predetermined	by	Scholem’s	choice	of	
citations).33	The	demonstration	that	in	stories	such	as	“The	God	Script”	or	“The	Aleph”	
Borges	speaks	of	ecstatic	revelation	the	same	way	Moses	Cordovero	or	Abraham	Abulafya	
do,	substitutes	for	Borges’	persistent	reference	to	Scholem	as	a	source	of	authority	for	his	
own	writings	a	claim	to	some	“cabbalistic	influence,”	the	nature	of	which	remains	
unarticulated	not	for	esoteric	reasons,	but	precisely	because	it	is	taken	to	exist	“regardless	
of	the	accuracy	of	[Borges’]	understanding	of	its	doctrine.”34		
																																																								
32	See	for	example	Sosnowski’s	detailed	analysis	of	Borges’	story	“The	God	Script”	in:	Sosnowski,	Borges	Y	La	
Cábala:	La	Búsqueda	Del	Verbo,	62-72.	
33	The	reader	to	whom	this	may	seem	an	over-generalizing	statement	is	invited	to	search	any	of	the	
bibliographic	references	cited	here	for	an	example	to	the	contrary.	Though	citations	include	numerous	
references	to	the	works	of	major	researchers	in	the	field,	as	well	as	to	several	younger	scholars,	the	reader	
will	find	this	generalization	is	rather	something	of	an	“industry	standard.”	Sosnowski	is	unique	in	quoting	
more	extensively	from	traditional	Jewish	texts	(especially	the	Talmud),	but	the	structure	of	presenting	stories	
by	Borges	alongside	doctrinal	texts	of	Cabbala,	presented	through	Scholem’s	understanding,	still	holds.	
34	Gutierrez	Berner,	"Mystical	Laws;	Borges	and	Kabbalah,"	138.	Borges	encountered	the	figures	of	Abulafia	
and	Cordovero	in	the	4th	chapter	and	5th	and	6th	chapters,	respectively,	of:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	
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“It	is	important	to	outline	fields:	Borges	is	not	a	philosopher,	nor	a	theologian,	nor	a	
cabalist,	nor	an	historian:	He	is	a	maker	of	fictions,”35	states	Sosnowski	quite	decidedly.	As	
we	will	see	presently,	turning	to	Borges’	own	writings	on	Cabbala,	Borges	understands	
speculative	metaphysics	to	be	a	fictional	endeavor	as	well.	Must	one	choose,	then,	between	
being	a	cabbalist	and	a	maker	of	fictions?	“Kabbalistic	speculation	[…]	are	in	the	last	resort	
ways	of	escaping	from	history	rather	than	instruments	of	historical	understanding,”36	says	
Scholem.	Though	perhaps	such	demarcation	is	too	decided	for	the	continual	blurring	of	
fields	and	genres	that	Borges	offers,	what	this	important	outline	should	suggest	is	that,	in	
our	attempt	to	offer	the	proper	regard	to	Borges’	understanding,	we	would	do	well	to	shift	
our	focus	from	“The	Cabbala”	and	“the	cabbalists”—as	objects	that	can	be	accurately	(or	
inaccurately)	understood—to	the	adjective	“cabbalistic”—a	modification	and	authorization,	
the	nature	of	which	we	are	here	exploring,	and	that	can	be	attributed	to	other	objects,	such	
as	Borges’	writing.		
	
Discussing	the	Jewish	imaginaries	in	Borges’	fiction,	Evelyn	Fishburn	goes	as	far	as	to	state	
that	“each	of	[Borges’	stories	with	a	Jewish	connection]	is	connected	with	one	or	other	
aspect	of	Cabbala.”37	To	go	beyond	bibliographic	and	tropological	correlations	then,	we	
should	explore	the	role	of	these	“cabbalistic”	tropes	in	Borges’	writing	as	a	narratological	
element.	One	way	to	do	so	would	be	to	read	Borges’	stories	alongside	other	“cabbalistic	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Mysticism.	Scholem	seems	to	be	the	first	book	Borges	mentions	reading	on	the	Cabbala	that	mentions	these	
figures	in	any	detail.		
35	Sosnowski,	"El	Verbo	Cabalístico	En	La	Obra	De	Borges,"	36.	My	translation	–	YL	
36	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism,	20.	
37	Evelyn	Fishburn,	"Borges,	Cabbala	and	"Creative	Misreading","	Ibero-Amerikanisches	Archiv	14,	no.	4	
(1988):	407.	
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stories”	(such	as	R.	Nachman’s	tales).	This	I	intend	to	take	up	in	full	in	the	final	chapter	of	
the	present	study.	For	the	moment	we	will	follow	our	current	line	of	questioning	further	
and	ask:	if	Borges	was	not	himself	a	mystic;	if	the	relation	between	the	cabbalistic	tropes	in	
Borges’	stories	and	these	same	tropes	in	the	cabbalistic	texts	quoted	by	Scholem	is	always	
predetermined	to	be	reduced	to	“correlation”	by	recognizing	them	as	citations;	if	
definitions	of	R.	Nachman’s	tales	as	“cabbalistic”	rely	on	assumptions	that	(though	we	have	
disputed	some	of	them	in	the	previous	chapter,	nonetheless)	could	never	be	applied	to	
Borges;	how,	then,	do	we	account	for	the	persistence	of	cabbalistic	tropes	in	his	writing,	
and	what,	then,	makes	his	stories	“cabbalistic”?		
		
Keeping	in	mind	that	for	Borges,	referencing	Scholem	is	a	way	to	authorize	his	Judaic	
inheritance,	and	that	“cabbalistic”	is	the	narratological	attribute	of	a	set	of	tropes	he	is	
(representing	himself	as)	thus	inheriting,	we	might	begin	to	answer	these	questions	by	
asking,	how	does	Scholem	represent	“cabbalistic	expression,”	and	its	relation	to	narrative?	
One	aspect	of	Scholem’s	project	in	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism38	is	precisely	to	
consolidate	an	overarching	mythical	universe,	within	which	mystical	and	narrative	
speculations	upon	redemption	have	taken	place.	“The	whole	of	Aggadah	can	in	a	way	be	
regarded	as	a	popular	mythology	of	the	Jewish	universe,”39	he	explains.	And	for	the	
Cabbalists,	“Aggadah	is	not	just	a	dead	letter.	They	live	in	a	world	historically	continuous	
with	it.”40	This	continuity	between	myth	and	history	produces	an	inescapable	tension	
between	the	internal	experience	of	a	redemption	narrative	and	the	external	political-
																																																								
38	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism.	And	see	also:	"Rememption	through	Sin,"		(1937).	
39	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism,	31.	
40	Ibid.	
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historical	conditions.	For	Scholem,	this	tension	is	a	focal	point	for	the	intellectual	history	of	
Jewish	mysticism’s	major	trends.	“The	Jewish	mystic	lives	and	acts	in	perpetual	rebellion	
against	a	world	with	which	he	strives	with	all	his	zeal	to	be	at	peace.”41	For	all	their	variety	
of	religious	experience,	Jewish	mystics	cannot	avoid	this	paradoxical	existence,	Scholem	
observes.		
	
This	tension,	continues	Scholem,	“is	responsible	for	the	profound	ambiguity	of	[the	
mystic’s]	outlook,	and	it	also	explains	the	apparent	self-contradiction	inherent	in	a	great	
many	Kabbalistic	symbols	and	images.”42	That	is,	the	inherent	appearance	of	self-
contradiction	is	the	product	the	conventional	conflation	of	a	redemption	narrative	with	an	
historical	narrative—a	convention	that	is,	for	Scholem,	the	hallmark	of	“cabbalistic	writing.”	
One	of	the	major	trends	Scholem’s	study	identifies	is	the	intense	expression	of	this	
contradiction	as	a	gap.	When	Borges	says	he	tries	to	write	“cabbalistic	stories”	we	should	
understand	that	he	attempts	to	write	stories	that	appropriate	the	tropes	identified	by	
Scholem	as	cabbalistic,	for	the	purposes	of	facilitating	the	expression—in	a	story	of	his	
own—of	the	inherent	tension	of	his	own	existence	(and	its	narrative	sublimation	as	a	gap)	
between	Argentina	and	Europe.	
	
What	Borges	finds	in	Scholem,	then,	is	double.	First	is	the	ability	to	handle	the	Cabbala	in	a	
non-devotional,	academic	manner.	That	is,	to	explore	the	rich	worlds	of	the	cabbalists	as	
tropes.	Second,	and	in	so	doing,	he	identifies	the	conditions	of	authorship	that	would	allow	
one	(the	intellectual)	to	approximate	this	metaphysical	realm	without	entering	into	
																																																								
41	Ibid.,	34.	
42	Ibid.	
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theological	speculations.	That	is,	to	enter	the	narrative	realm	of	a	Godless	metaphysics.43	But	
while	Scholem	sees	such	speculations	as	an	escape	from	history—”Kabbalistic	speculation	
[…]	are	in	the	last	resort	ways	of	escaping	from	history	rather	than	instruments	of	
historical	understanding,”44—which	produces	the	tension	inherent	to	the	cabbalist’s	social	
existence,	Borges	interprets	this	tension	as	particularly	expressive	of	his	social	historical	
moment.	
	
Interestingly,	someone	who	rather	insightfully	perceived	this	relation	Borges	develops	to	
Cabbala	was	Scholem	himself.	Aizenberg	wrote	Scholem	directly	to	ask	what	he	thought	of	
the	theme	“Borges	and	the	Cabbala.”	She	quotes	part	of	Scholem’s	reply:	“Borges	is	a	writer	
of	considerable	power	of	imagination	[who]	does	not	claim	to	represent	a	historical	reality,	
but	rather	an	insight	into	what	the	Cabbalists	would	have	stood	for	in	his	own	
imagination.”45	An	imaginative	representation	of	an	imaginative	representation,	then,	is	the	
proper	relation	Scholem	identifies	between	Borges	and	the	Cabbala.	He	seems	to	have	
incisively	captured	both	the	great	affinity	Borges	maintains	to	the	“cabbalistic”	and	his	
abysmal	difference	from	“The	Cabbala.”		
																																																								
43	Eric	Jacobson’s	definition	of	“Metaphysics”	in	Scholem’s	writing	might	be	instructive	here:	“I	have	taken	to	
the	term	metaphysics	to	highlight	the	basic	nature	of	the	thinking	addressed	in	this	study:	it	is	a	highly	
speculative	philosophy	of	fundamental	questions	regarding	politics	and	theology,	drawing	on	a	near	
scholastic	aptitude	for	categorical	analysis	and	Talmudic	rigor	[…]	In	this	way	it	is	in	fact	a	philosophy	of	
divine	as	well	as	profane	questions.”	While	this	has	more	to	do	with	readership	than	authorship,	we	might	say	
Borges	sees	the	same	potential	for	expressing	such	concerns	in	narrative	form.	See:	Eric	Jacobson,	
Metaphysics	of	the	Profane:	The	Political	Theology	of	Walter	Benjamin	and	Gershom	Scholem	(New	York:	
Columbia	University	Press,	2003),	5.	
44	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism,	20.	
45	The	Aizenberg–Scholem	correspondence	is	cited	in	part	by	Aizenberg,	and	available	in	full	at	the	Gershom	
Gerhard	Scholem	Archive	in	the	National	Library	of	Israel.	See:	Aizenberg,	The	Aleph	Weaver:	Biblical,	
Kabbalistic	and	Judaic	Elements	in	Borges,	86	ff.2.	In	the	same	letter,	Scholem	offers	an	example	of	his	own	
overstepping	of	historiography	into	the	realm	of	imagination	and	interpretation,	referring	to	his	“Ten	
Unhistorical	Aphorisms	on	Kabbalah.”	These	have	been	noted	in	the	introduction	to	the	section.	See:	Scholem,	
Zehn	Unhistorische	Sätze	Über	Kabbala.	For	a	discussion	of	this	text	in	English,	see:	Biale,	"Gershom	Scholem's	
Ten	Unhistorical	Aphorisms	on	Kabbalah:	Text	and	Commentary."		
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As	we	have	seen	in	the	introduction	to	this	section,	for	both	Scholem	and	Buber	“cabbalistic”	
raises	the	question	of	rupture	and	continuity,	with	regards	to	history	and	tradition	
(respectively).	These	questions	are	certainly	part	of	Borges’	broader	concerns	with	
Argentine	tradition	and	literature.	However,	the	authority	of	a	past	history	or	tradition	is	of	
far	less	concern	to	Borges	than	is	his	effort	to	authorize	himself,	in	the	present.	For	Borges,	
“the	Judaic”	is	a	point	of	departure	for	Argentine	literature.	What	such	departure	means,	
and	how	it	appears,	will	be	the	topic	of	the	next	section.	For	the	remainder	of	the	present	
chapter,	the	question	will	be	reading	the	nature	of	this	“cabbalistic”	gap	as	a	point	of	
departure,	from	which	one	is	authorized	to	depart	as	an	author.	
	
A	Vindication	of	the	Author	
	
Borges’	two	collections	Ficciones	(1944)	and	El	Aleph	(1949)	mark	the	stabilization,	if	not	
canonization,	of	his	narrative	voice.	These	include	many	stories	with	Hasidic	and	
cabbalistic	tropes.	Some	are	more	obvious,	like	the	visions	of	the	ein	sof	in	“The	Aleph”	and	
“The	God	Script,”	or	the	mention	of	books	such	as	Sefer	Yezirah,	Biography	of	the	Baal	Shem,	
History	of	the	Hasidic	Sect	in	“Death	and	the	Compass”	and	“The	Secret	Miracle.”	Some	have	
required	more	interpretive	work	to	appreciate,	such	as	the	person	behind	the	veil	in	“The	
Approach	to	al	Mu’tasim,”	or	the	Golem-like	creation	in	“The	Circular	Ruins.”	Much	has	
been	written	about	these	“cabbalistic	stories”	in	Borges’	writing	and	the	bibliography	of	the	
present	chapter	refers	to	many	of	those	fine	studies.		
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However,	what	interests	me	here	is	not	so	much	the	identification	of	these	tropes.	I	would	
like	rather	to	ask	about	Borges’	reflections	on	the	use	of	these	tropes	as	tropes.	It	is	
doubtful	the	mentions	of	a	vision	of	the	ein	sof,	or	the	creation	of	a	Golem,	are	connected	to	
any	mystical	practices	Borges	might	have	taken	up	as	a	result	of	reading	Buber	or	Scholem.	
And	(although	some	suggest	otherwise46)	it	is	equally	unlikely	that	Borges	(in-spite	of	his	
appearance	as	an	Argentine	intellectual)	was	in	fact	a	Hasidic	rabbi.	It	is	clear	that	he	takes	
up	these	tropes,	which	he	encounters	in	Buber	and	Scholem’s	writing,	and	makes	use	of	
them	to	weave	the	fictions	he	is	renowned	for.	In	the	rest	of	the	present	chapter,	I	would	
like	to	demonstrate	the	role	of	Cabbala	and	Hasidism	in	articulating	Borges’	notion	of	
authorship.		
	
Such	reflections	were	not	absent	from	Borges’	writing	during	those	same	years,	in	which	he	
composed	his	fictions.	While	the	use	of	Hasidic	and	cabbalistic	tropes	as	narrative	elements	
is	evident	in	Ficciones	and	El	Aleph,	his	essays	on	literature—one	of	his	most	persistent	
preoccupations	is	with	the	role	and	activity	of	the	author—also	make	reference	to	his	
readings	of	Buber	and	Scholem	and	the	ideas	expressed	(to	him	through	them)	in	Hasidism	
and	Cabbala.	What	I	would	like	to	highlight	here	is	that	Borges	makes	reference	to	their	
writings	both	tropologically,	that	is,	in	the	narrative	expressions	of	his	social	historical	
position,	and	intellectually	in	his	essays	reflecting	upon	this	position	and	its	literary	
possibilities.	This	utility	of	“the	Judaic”	in	formulating	thoughts	on	intellectual	questions	of	
writing	and	authorship	is	evident	in	his	discussions	of	the	Cabbala	as	early	as	his	1932	
																																																								
46	Block	de	Behar	references	recollections	of	Borges’	lectures,	where	“people	did	not	go	to	a	lecture:	they	went	
to	mass.”	See:	Block	de	Behar,	"Antecedents	of	an	Unexpected	Poetic	Affinity:	Jorge	Luis	Borges	as	Reader	of	
Martin	Buber,"	192.	
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essay	“Una	Vindicación	de	la	Cábala.”47	
		
This	was	the	first	of	two	essays	Borges	published	that	devote	themselves	to	“The	Cabbala.”	
They	were	published	nearly	five	decades	apart;	“Una	Vindicación	de	la	Cábala”	in	1932	and	
“La	Cábala”	in	1977.48	In	1932,	well	before	Scholem’s	major	works	had	been	published,	
what	is	pertinent	to	our	argument	is	the	relevance	Borges	already	identified	in	the	Cabbala	
for	explaining	his	own	activities	as	an	author.		Scholem’s	works	would	come	a	decade	or	
two	later	to	expand	and	reinforce	this	relevance.	
	
It	is	certainly	true	that	Borges	identifies	in	cabbalistic	interpretive	practices	what	Alazraki	
calls	“possible	alternatives	to	the	reading	of	a	text.”49	But	these	alternatives	are	only	the	
“technical	side	of	Kabbalism.”50	They	are	operations	limited	to	the	extraction—through	
endless	interpretation—of	a	plurality	of	meanings	from	the	perfect	text	that	is	the	Bible.	
Ingenious	as	they	may	have	been,	Borges	is	not	as	concerned	with	the	cabbalists	and	their	
operations	as	might	first	appear.	What	interests	Borges	is	what	the	applicability	of	such	
technical	operations	implies	about	the	authorship	of	the	text.	He	already	signals	as	much	in	
the	opening	lines	of	his	“Vindication	of	the	Cabbala,”	where	he	introduces	his	interest	in	the	
theme	(as	is	often	the	case	with	Borges’	essays)	rather	disingenuously.	
Neither	the	first	time	it	has	been	attempted,	nor	the	last	time	it	will	fail,	this	
																																																								
47	Originally	published	in:	Jorge	Luis	Borges,	Discusión	(Buenos	Aires:	M.	Gleizer,	1932).	See:	Obras	Completas,	
1923-1972	(Buenos	Aires:	Emecé,	1976),	209-12.	Translated	as	“A	Defense	of	the	Kabbalah”	in:	Selected	Non-
Fictions,	83-86.	
48	Originally	published	as:	"La	Cábala,"	La	Opinión1977.	and	collected	in:	Siete	Noches	(Mexico	D.F.;	Buenos	
Aires:	Fondo	de	Cultura	Economica,	1980).	See:	Obras	Completas,	1975-1985	(Buenos	Aires:	Emecé,	1989),	
267-75.	Translated	as	“The	Kabbalah”	in:	Seven	Nights,	trans.	Eliot	Weinberger	(New	York:	New	Directions	
Pub.	Corp.,	1984),	76-84.	
49	Alazraki,	"Kabbalistic	Traits	in	Borges'	Narrative,"	78-79.	
50	Ibid.,	78.	
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defense	is	distinguished	by	two	facts.	One	is	my	almost	complete	ignorance	
of	the	Hebrew	language;	the	other,	my	desire	to	defend	not	the	doctrine	but	
rather	the	hermeneutical	or	cryptographic	procedures	that	lead	to	it.51	
	
Among	the	procedures	Borges	enumerates	there	are	“the	methodical	substitution	of	certain	
letters	of	the	alphabet	for	others,	the	sum	of	the	numerical	value	of	the	letters,	etc.”52	It	is	
clear	why,	to	some	researchers,	such	procedures	have	implied	an	interest	in	“alternatives	
to	reading.”	However,	this	opening	paragraph	is	somewhat	misleading.	“According	to	
Gershom	Scholem,”	explains	Alazraki,	“‘none	of	these	techniques	of	mystical	exegesis	can	
be	called	Kabbalistic	in	the	strict	sense	of	the	word…’”53	implying	that	Borges’	“vindication”	
might	not	actually	be	concerned	with	the	Cabbala,	but	rather	with	a	set	of	technical	
procedures.	Borges	might	not	have	known	this	in	1932,	well	before	himself	reading	these	
lines	in	Scholem.		
	
However,	what	I	have	just	cited	are	the	opening	lines	from	the	second	(1957)	edition	of	
Discussion	(the	collection	that	includes	this	essay),	which	has	since	then	been	the	version	to	
appear	in	all	reprints	and	collections,	and	which	any	reader	looking	up	this	essay	will	
encounter.54	Noting	that	the	opening	paragraph	of	this	essay	in	the	first	(1932)	edition	was	
slightly,	but	importantly,	different	than	what	was	just	cited,	only	adds	to	the	curious	nature	
of	Borges’	opening	statement.		Here	is	how	Borges	explains	the	two	facts	that	distinguish	
																																																								
51	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	83.	My	emphasis	-	YL	
52	Ibid.	
53	Cited	in	Alazraki,	"Kabbalistic	Traits	in	Borges'	Narrative,"	78,	ff.2.	as:	“Gershom	Scholem,	Major	Trends,	loc.	
cit.”	
54	This	edition	is	also	the	first	volume	of	Borges	to	include	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	(the	central	
text	we	will	discuss	in	chapter	3).	The	text	of	this	lecture	had	appeared	previously	only	in:	Borges,	"El	Escritor	
Argentino	Y	La	Tradición."	
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his	vindication	from	other	failed	attempts	in	the	first	(1932)	version	of	this	essay.	
One	is	my	splendid	innocence	of	the	sacred	language;	another	is	the	
attenuating	circumstance	that	I	do	not	want	to	vindicate	the	doctrine,	nor	its	
mechanism,	but	rather	the	general	principle	they	postulate.55	
	
In	this	first	version	Borges	states	he	does	not	want	to	vindicate	the	doctrine,	nor	the	
mechanism	of	the	Cabbala.	What	he	proposes	is	to	understand	the	general	principle,	the	
postulate	of	the	Cabbala.	It	would	seem	that	after	reading	Scholem,	Borges	edited	the	
introduction	to	his	essay	so	that	it	would	state	an	interest	in	the	techniques	(about	which	
Alazraki	cites	Scholem	stating	that	they	are	not	actually	“Cabbalistic”)	rather	than	the	
“general	principle”	of	the	Cabbala.	This	is	not	a	surprising	revision,	when	we	realize	this	
change	only	enhances	the	two	departures	that	follow	Borges’	initial	statement	of	interest	
(in	both	editions),	and	which	guide	the	essay	towards	its	concern	with	conceptions	of	
authorship	rather	than	procedures	of	readership.	
	
	The	infinite	interpretability	of	Scripture,	which	would	be	the	justification	for	developing	
such	cryptographic	procedures,	is	concluded	from	the	dogma	that	sees	in	Scripture	“an	
absolute	text,	where	the	collaboration	of	chance	is	calculated	at	zero.”56	That	is,	believing	
the	Bible	to	be	perfectly	and	absolutely	interpretable	would	lead	to	developing	these	
alternative	techniques	of	reading.	Borges	glosses	over	what	will	be	a	central	point	of	his	
essay—his	reversal	of	this	logic—rather	casually,	stating	his	“desire	to	defend	not	the	
																																																								
55	Discusión,	71.	My	emphasis	-	YL	
56	Selected	Non-Fictions,	86.	
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doctrine	but	rather	the	hermeneutical	or	cryptographic	procedures	that	lead	to	it.”57	That	is,	
the	fact	that	interpreting	the	Bible	through	such	“alternative”	techniques	is	able	to	yield	
meaning,	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	it	is	a	“perfect	text.”	The	second	departure	from	
Borges’	stated	intention	comes	when,	in	spite	of	declaring	his	interest	in	method	rather	
than	doctrine,	for	the	rest	of	the	essay	he	proceeds	to	consider	only	the	doctrine	of	a	
perfect	book	and	never	again	mentions	any	interpretive	technique.	“Thus	one	may	justify	
the	dogma,”58	he	concludes	after	some	discussion.		
	
To	make	sense	of	these	reversals	we	might	note	that	this	early	essay	already	marks	Borges’	
consistent	interest	in	Cabbala	as	a	narrator	(rather	than	an	interpreter),	as	well	as	an	
understanding	of	Cabbala	that	will	shape	his	future	reading	of	Scholem.	After	stating	his	
justification	of	the	dogma	of	a	perfect	book,	he	passes	to	discuss	its	exemplary	narrative,	
“the	one	that	interests	me	now	is	Genesis:	the	subject	matter	of	the	Kabbalah.”59	This	
generalization	about	the	Cabbala	(the	Cabbalists	took	the	entire	Bible,	many	texts	of	the	
Talmud	and	even	other	cabbalistic	writings,	as	their	subject	matter)	should	not	surprise	us.	
After	all,	Borges	is	not	a	historian	or	researcher	of	the	Cabbala.	What	he	signals	here	is	his	
narratological	preoccupation,	that	what	he	has	in	mind	when	he	speaks	of	the	dogma	of	a	
“perfect	book”	or	an	“absolute	text”	is	a	narrative,	a	story.	
	
“The	Kabbalists	believed	[…]	in	the	divinity	of	that	story,	in	its	deliberate	writing	by	an	
																																																								
57	Ibid.,	83.	My	emphasis	-	YL	
58	Ibid.,	84.	
59	Ibid.,	85.	
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infinite	intelligence.	The	consequences	of	such	an	assumption	are	many.”60	One	such	
consequence,	we	might	suspect,	is	the	development	of	cryptographic	procedures.	These,	
however,	are	of	no	concern	to	Borges,	who	will	in	fact,	in	a	final	departure,	insist	on	the	
implications	of	his	original	statement:	procedures	lead	to	dogma.	Thus,	the	consequences	
he	speaks	of	do	not	relate	to	the	practice	of	reading	so	much	as	they	do	to	an	understanding	
of	the	various	(human)	practices	of	narrating.	It	is	the	idea	of	an	infinite	intelligence	
narrating	a	story	that	appeals	to	Borges.		
	
Borges	provides	three	examples	of	human	writing	in	order	to	explain	(vindicate)	what	he	is	
drawn	to	in	the	Cabbala.	First,	the	journalistic	text,	as	an	example	of	prosaic	writing,	is	
concerned	very	little	with	form.	What	it	seeks	to	communicate	is	its	content.	Its	form	is	
therefore	subject	to	arbitrary	results.	In	prosaic	text,	he	explains,	“the	length	and	sound	of	
the	paragraphs	are	necessarily	accidental.	The	contrary	occurs	in	poetry,	whose	usual	law	
is	the	subjection	of	meaning	to	euphonic	needs.”61	Poetry,	as	the	opposite	example,	is	
primarily	concerned	with	form.	Its	content	is	therefore	subject	to	arbitrary	results.	Neither	
poetry	nor	prose	defines	the	kind	of	authorship	that	cabbalistic	doctrine	identifies	in	the	
stories	of	Genesis.	Precisely	because	the	collaboration	of	chance	in	their	composition	is	
measurable,	they	do	not	lend	themselves	to	the	techniques	of	infinite	interpretation.	The	
applicability	of	these	techniques	is	the	identifying	mark	of	the	doctrine’s	veracity.	This	
doctrine	has	direct	narratological	implications	for	Borges,	who	comes	here	to	his	most	
striking	suggestion	of	this	essay:			
Let	us	consider	a	third	writer:	the	intellectual.	In	his	handling	of	prose	[…]	or	
																																																								
60	Ibid.	My	emphasis	-	YL	
61	Ibid.	
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of	verse,	he	has	certainly	not	eliminated	chance,	but	he	has	denied	it	as	much	
as	possible,	and	restricted	its	incalculable	compliance.	He	remotely	
approximates	the	Lord,	for	Whom	the	vague	concept	of	chance	holds	no	
meaning.62		
	
Borges’	vindication	of	the	Cabbala	is	the	vindication	of	a	doctrine,	through	which	one	can	
explain	the	role	of	the	intellectual-narrator	as	an	approximation	of	God-as-storyteller.	“Let	
us	imagine	now	this	astral	intelligence,	dedicated	to	manifesting	itself	[…]	in	written	
words,”63	proposes	Borges,	ambiguously	omitting	the	subject	of	“this	intelligence.”	In	this	
analogy	Borges	is	not	the	cabbalist,	who	must	develop	alternatives	to	reading	in	order	to	
plumb	the	meaning	of	a	perfect	text.	He	is	its	author.		
	
Already	in	this	early	essay,	with	its	early	references	to	Cabbala,	it	is	the	role	of	the	
intellectual	that	Borges	is	concerned	with.	A	role	that,	through	the	writing	of	stories,	
desires	to	approximate	“the	Lord,	the	perfected	God	of	the	theologians,	Who	sees	all	at	once	
[…]	not	only	all	the	events	of	this	replete	world	but	also	those	that	would	take	place	if	even	
the	most	evanescent—or	impossible—of	them	should	change.”64	In	his	divine	
approximation,	the	intellectual-narrator	explores	alternatives	to	“this	world,”	through	the	
speculation	upon,	and	narration	of,	its	evanescent	or	impossible	variations.	The	
intellectual-narrator	“who	sees	all	at	once”	is	able	to	resolve	the	inherent	appearance	of	
self-contradiction,	which	Scholem	has	identified	in	“cabbalistic	writing,”	by	sublimating	it	
																																																								
62	Ibid.	
63	Ibid.	
64	Ibid.	
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into	a	doctrine	of	infinite	interpretability.	
	
For	Borges	“cabbalistic”	thus	becomes	the	modifier	of	both	a	narrative	and	a	narratological	
project;	that	of	the	astral	intelligence	Borges	wishes	to	approximate	as	narrator,	and	that	of	
identifying	those	tropes	that	provide	for	the	expression	of	“this	world”	social	conditions	by	
stories	of	an	“astral	intelligence.”	It	may	be	true,	as	Alazraki	suggests,	that	“Borges	
challenges	the	reader	to	activate	all	his	resources,	to	become	himself	a	cabbalist,”65	so	to	
speak.	But	this	is	only	a	further	indication	of	Borges’	difference	from	the	cabbalists.	For	
Borges,	the	adjective	“cabbalistic”	is	far	more	importantly	a	modifier	of	the	authorial	
function	than	of	any	mechanism	of	analysis.	In	this	important	sense	(which	we	have	seen	
Scholem	himself	recognize	in	Borges	a	few	pages	ago)	Borges	should	be	understood	as	a	
“cabbalistic	narrator”	rather	than	a	cabbalistic	interpreter.	And	“cabbalistic	stories”	should	
be	understood	here	as	indicating	a	certain	set	of	tropes	at	the	disposal	of	the	intellectual-
narrator.	
	
Scholem’s	effect	on	Borges’	understanding	of	authorship	is	marked	as	late	as	the	collection	
Siete	Noches,	which	presents	seven	lectures	Borges	gave	over	the	summer	of	1977.	In	
several	of	these	Borges	returns	to	the	idea	of	Scripture	as	infinitely	interpretable,	both	in	
order	to	discuss	its	implications	and	to	distinguish	it	from	Western	concepts	of	“classical	
literature.”	In	two	lectures	that	mention	this	understanding	of	Scripture,	Borges	attributes	
the	evolution	of	the	idea	to	sources	that	again	betray	his	familiarity	with	Scholem’s	work.	
Thus	in	his	lecture	“The	Divine	Comedy”	he	states:		
																																																								
65	Alazraki,	"Kabbalistic	Traits	in	Borges'	Narrative,"	92.	
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We	should	mention	here	Scotus	Erigena,	who	said	that	Scripture	is	a	text	that	
encloses	infinite	meanings	and	that	can	be	compared	with	the	iridescent	
plumage	of	a	peacock.	The	Hebrew	Cabbalists	maintained	that	Scripture	has	
been	written	for	each	one	of	the	faithful.66					
And	again	in	his	lecture	“Poetry”:		
The	Irish	pantheist	Scotus	Erigena	said	that	the	Sacred	Scripture	encloses	an	
infinite	number	of	meanings	and	compared	it	with	the	iridescent	plumage	of	
a	peacock.	Centuries	later	a	Spanish	cabbalist	said	that	God	made	the	
Scriptures	for	each	one	of	the	people	of	Israel	and	as	a	consequence	there	are	
as	many	Bibles	as	there	are	readers	of	the	Bible.67		
And	this	association	was	suggested	by	Scholem,	for	whom	the	prominent	Christian	Neo-
Platonist	Scotus	Erigena	is	an	important	source	for	the	Origins	of	the	Kabbalah.68		
	
Borges’	1977	collection	also	includes	the	lecture	titled	“La	Cábala,”	in	which	he	revisits	the	
theme	of	his	1932	essay.	In	this	lecture	Borges	is	no	longer	concerned	with	the	mechanisms	
and	procedures	of	cabbalistic	interpretation.	“Cabbalistic”	indicates	a	quality,	expressed	
here	as	a	doctrine,	which	is	“alien	to	the	Western	mind.”	This	is	how	Borges	introduces	his	
topic:	“The	diverse,	and	occasionally	contradictory,	teachings	grouped	under	the	name	of	
the	Kabbalah	derive	from	a	concept	alien	to	the	Western	mind,	that	of	the	sacred	book.	We	
have	an	analogous	concept	the	classic	book.”69	
																																																								
66	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1975-1985,	208.	
67	Ibid.,	254.	
68	Gershom	Scholem,	Origins	of	the	Kabbalah,	trans.	Allan	Arkush	(Philadelphia;	Princeton:	Jewish	Publication	
Society	;	Princeton	University	Press,	1987).	
69	Borges,	Seven	Nights,	76.	
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The	difference	is	important	for	Borges,	whose	intellectual-narrator-approximating-God	
should	not	be	understood	as	an	author	of	some	“classical”	literature.	Such	“classical”	books	
are	“seen	as	something	changeable	[…]	studied	in	historical	fashion	[…]	placed	within	a	
context.	The	concept	of	a	sacred	book	is	something	entirely	different.”70	Borges	is	circling	
the	point	that	the	“cabbalistic	story”	he	is	after	maintains	a	distance	from	history,	from	
social	context—not	a	chronological	distance	but	an	affective	distance.	“I	am	not	dealing	
with	a	museum	piece	from	the	history	of	philosophy.	I	believe	the	system	has	an	
application:	it	can	serve	as	a	means	of	thinking,	of	trying	to	understand	the	universe.”71	
This	understanding,	for	Borges,	is	first	and	foremost	an	understanding	of	writing	and	
authorship.	Cabbalists	speculate	upon	what	Borges	wants	to	approximate,	as	something	
that	can	be	approximated—”the	author.”	
By	declaring	that	the	universe	is	the	work	of	a	deficient	Divinity,	one	whose	
fraction	of	Divinity	approaches	zero,	of	a	god	who	is	not	the	God.	Of	a	god	
who	is	a	distant	descendant	of	God.	I	don’t	know	if	our	minds	can	function	
with	words	as	vast	and	as	vague	as	God	or	Divinity	[…]	But	we	can	
understand	the	idea	of	a	deficient	Divinity,	one	who	must	make	this	world	
out	of	shoddy	materials.72		
	
The	materials	of	the	world,	the	Cabbalists	teach	us,	are	words.	A	being	whose	divinity	is	
reduced	to	zero,	creating	a	world	of	shoddy	materials,	of	words—which	are,	mystically,	
																																																								
70	Ibid.	
71	Ibid.,	80.	
72	Ibid.,	82.	
	
	91	
infinitely	interpretable.	This	is	very	much	what	Borges	wants	to	approximate	with	the	
intellectual-narrator.	The	intention	is	the	same:	to	create	a	narrative,	a	world,	in	which	the	
fraction	of	divinity	is	reduced	to	zero,	but	which	is	nonetheless	powerfully	metaphysical—a	
Godless	metaphysics.	
	
Picking	up	on	these	tropes	authorizes	Borges	to	write	his	own	Argentine	present.	However,	
Scholem’s	interest	lies	ultimately	in	the	Cabbalists	as	readers,	not	in	the	divine	energies	
Borges	seeks	to	approximate	as	author.	While	the	academic	study	of	“cabbalistic	writing”	
does	suggest	to	Borges	the	possibility	of	writing	a	kind	of	Godless	metaphysics,	ultimately,	
removing	God	from	the	metaphysical	discussion	removes	the	very	authority	Borges	desires.	
It	is	in	Buber	and	his	account	of	Hasidism	that	Borges	encounters	discussions	of	
authorship—in	the	context	of	the	broader	question	about	tradition	and	its	
discontinuities—through	which	Borges	will	characterize	the	desired	divine	approximation	
in	more	particular	human	terms.	
	
Writing	Within	the	Gap	
	
Borges’	1952	collection	Otras	Inquisiciones	compiles	over	a	decade	of	essayistic	reflections	
on	literature.	Half	of	the	texts	included	in	the	collection	were	published	in	the	major	daily	
newspaper	La	Nación	between	1941	and	1952.	Perhaps	the	most	famous	of	these	is	“Kafka	
and	his	Precursors.”73	This	collection	marks	the	accumulation	of	Borges’	thought	on	
literature	and	writing,	and	is	in	many	ways	the	contemporaneous	theoretical	counterpart	
																																																								
73	Originally:	"Kafka	Y	Sus	Precursores,"	La	Nacion,	August	19,	1951.	Reprinted	in	1952	in	Otras	Inquisiciones.	
See:	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	631-775.		
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to	his	two	major	story	collections	of	the	same	period	Ficciones	and	El	Aleph.	Together	with	
the	publication	of	many	of	Borges’	most	notable	essays	on	literature—”The	Argentine	
Writer	and	Tradition”	is	a	prime,	though	by	no	means	unique,	example—the	first	half-
decade	of	the	1950s	is	also	marked	by	the	appearance	of	multiple	references	to	Buber’s	
writings	and	thought.	Thus	Block	de	Behar	states	that,	“without	leaving	aside	Borges’	own	
claims,	it	is	possible	to	notice	strong	traces	of	Buber’s	thought,	inseparable	from	an	
imagination	which	became	the	Borgesian	jurisdiction	par	excellence,	a	sort	of	literary	
extraterritoriality	which,	if	not	his	discovery	or	his	invention,	still	remains	his	conquest.”74			
	
Borges	was	acquainted	with	Buber’s	writing	during	his	teenage	years	in	Geneva.75		In	1938	
he	decried	the	ideological	revision	of	The	History	of	German	National	Literature	by	A.	F.	C.	
Vilmar	under	the	Third	Reich,	and	particularly	the	exclusion	of	a	long	list	of	prominent	
writers	such	as	Heine,	Kafka	and,	further	down	the	list,	Martin	Buber.76	“There	is	not	one	
that	in	all	honesty	should	be	excluded	from	a	history	of	German	literature.	The	
(unreasonable)	reasons	for	this	manifold	silence	are	evident:	most	of	those	eliminated	are	
Jewish.”77	In	the	decade	after	World	War	II,	Borges	began	to	express	his	appreciation	of	the	
multifaceted	contribution	of	Buber’s	intellectual	projects	to	an	understanding	of	his	own	
concerns	with	literature	and	writing.	Borges’	late	1940s	and	early	1950s	references	to	
Buber	certainly	correspond	to	the	wave	of	Buber’s	own	post-war	publications,	among	
which	are	some	of	the	most	notable	of	his	works.	
																																																								
74	Block	de	Behar,	"Antecedents	of	an	Unexpected	Poetic	Affinity:	Jorge	Luis	Borges	as	Reader	of	Martin	
Buber,"	184.	
75	“In	1916	[…]	in	Geneva	a	young	Borges,	seventeen	years	of	age,	translated	from	German	into	Spanish,	the	
story	“Jerusalem”	which	Buber	had	included	in	the	book	Die	Legende	des	Baalschem.”	See:	ibid.,	185.	
76	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	200.	
77	Ibid.,	201.	
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Buber	introduced	his	readers	to	the	legends,	tales	and	stories	of	Hasidism	in	many	volumes	
dating	back	to	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century,	but	he	offers	his	most	
comprehensive	conceptual	introduction	to	the	theme	in	his	1948	book	Hasidism.	Already	in	
the	very	first	pages	of	this	book,	Buber	explains	that	“legend	is	our	main	source	for	
understanding	[Hasidism],	and	its	theoretical	literature	comes	only	after	its	legend.	The	
theoretical	literature	is	the	gloss,	the	legend	is	the	text.”78	This	privileging	of	narrative	as	a	
source	for	understanding	the	movement	and	expressing	the	in-between	existence	Buber	
ascribes	it,	is	instructive	for	our	understanding	of	what	Borges	takes	up	in	Buber’s	writings,	
and,	in	some	cases,	directly	translates	for	his	own	readership.	
	
“In-between-ness”	is	a	central	motif	in	Buber’s	depiction	of	European	Jews	in	general	and	
the	Hasidic	movement	in	particular.	In	between	East	and	West,79	in	between	tradition	and	
modernity,	in	between	God	and	the	world,	these	are	the	tensions	of	Jewish	existence	Buber	
presents	in	his	book.	Hasidism,	he	argues,	attains	a	unique	synthesis	of	these.	“The	
separation	of	‘living	in	God’	from	‘living	in	the	world’	is	overcome	in	the	hasidic	message,	
and	a	true,	concrete	unity	takes	its	place.”80	This	unity	is	not	without	its	internal	tensions,	
and—importantly,	both	to	Buber’s	project	as	well	as	to	Borges’	intellectual	narrator—these	
are	expressed	in	the	legends	and	tales	of	the	Hasidim.			
	
																																																								
78	Buber,	Hasidism,	3.	
79	See:	Vom	Geist	Des	Judentums	(Leipzig:	K.	Wolff,	1916).	Especially	chapter	1,	“Das	Geist	des	Orients	und	das	
Judentum,”	where	Buber	identifies	the	Jews	as	Mittlervolk,	an	in-between	people	that	mediate	between	Orient	
and	Occident.		
80	Hasidism,	103.	
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Thus	perceived,	Hasidism	offered	Buber	a	model	for	his	own	cultural	project.	“Hasidism	
helped	Buber	to	realize	two	objectives:	to	foster	a	model	for	the	new	or	rather	renewed	
Jewish	consciousness	envisioned	by	cultural	Zionism	[…]	and,	concomitantly,	[…]	the	
creation	of	a	distinctive	Jewish	modernism,”81	explains	Martina	Urban,	in	her	contextual	
analysis	of	Buber’s	work.	There	are	two	sides	she	recognizes	to	Buber’s	project.	On	the	one	
hand,	from	the	very	beginning,	Buber’s	publications	of	Hasidic	legends	and	tales	“were	
considered	contributions	to	these	larger	efforts	to	overcome	assimilation	in	favor	of	
acculturation.”82	On	the	other	hand,	“Buber	was	part	of	a	larger	effort	of	restructuring	
Jewish	memory	and	reconstructing	Jewish	identity	through	the	creation	of	new	forms	of	
culture	in	the	Diaspora.”83	Buber	desired	to	promote	acculturation	without	assimilation,	
which	would	lead	to	a	non-political,	non-isolationist	form	of	collective	identity.		
	
Thus	Buber	can	be	seen	to	offer	Borges	a	conceptualization	of	the	in-between	space,	in	
which	his	contemporary	Jews	are	productively	yet	immovably	located.	He	does	so	by	
suggesting	there	is	a	culture	to	be	developed	(or	renewed)	that	exists	only	in	the	space	
between	undesired	assimilation	and	inaccessible	tradition.	Buber’s	audience,	states	Urban,	
“no	longer	shared	the	same	cultural	and	symbolic	landscape	inhabited	by	traditional	
Judaism.”84	While	at	the	same	time,	not	arriving	at	a	conclusion	that	would	involve	
withdrawal	from	the	cultures,	into	which	these	modern	Jews	had	been	acculturated.	This	
dynamic	clearly	echoes	in	Borges’	concerns	with	the	cultural	relation	between	Argentina	
																																																								
81	Martina	Urban,	Aesthetics	of	Renewal:	Martin	Buber's	Early	Representation	of	Hasidism	as	Kulturkritik	
(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2008),	4.	
82	Ibid.,	10.	
83	Ibid.	
84	Ibid.,	9.	
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and	Europe	(which	we	will	take	up	the	next	chapter).	For	the	present,	the	point	to	
emphasize	is	that	Buber	fills	this	in-between	space	with	the	rich	cultural	tradition	of	
Hasidic	narrative.	In	filling	this	space,	Buber	too	must	tackle	the	questions	of	authorship	
and	tradition	that	Borges	is	most	concerned	with	in	his	own	reflections	on	literature	at	the	
time.	
Through	the	aesthetic	mode	of	representation	Buber	adopted,	he	sought	to	
address	the	challenge	faced	by	synchronic	transmission.	He	well	realized	that	
the	“chain	of	tradition”	or	diachronic	transmission	had	been	broken.	The	
modern	acculturated	Jew	no	longer	shared	the	same	cultural	and	symbolic	
landscape	inhabited	by	traditional	Judaism.	To	fill	this	vacuum	and	recreate	a	
sense	of	Jewishness,	Buber	sought	to	reestablish	a	new	mode	of	
transmission.85	
	
Urban’s	analysis	helps	us	identify	the	point	at	which	Borges	takes	up	Buber’s	thought	in	his	
own	reflections	upon	writing	and	the	Argentine	intellectual.	“By	making	retelling	and	not	
literal	or	faithful	translation	the	mode	of	representation,	Buber	sanctions	moderate	
decontextualization	[…]	Hence,	retelling	is	a	form	of	synchronic	transmission.”86	This	is	a	
practice	Borges	too	had	already	taken	up	in	his	collection	Historia	Universal	de	la	Infamia87	
and	in	various	stories,	from	“Pierre	Menard,	Author	of	the	Quixote”	to	“The	Gospel	
According	to	Mark.”	It	is	here	that	we	begin	to	see	Buber’s	influence	on	Borges	as	
intellectual	narrator.	De-contextualization	as	a	form	of	appropriating	literary	tropes,	and	
																																																								
85	Ibid.	
86	Ibid.,	22.	
87	Jorge	Luis	Borges,	Historia	Universal	De	La	Infamia,	Colección	Megáfono	(Buenos	Aires:	Editorial	Tor,	1935).	
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re-contextualization	as	the	inscription	of	tradition	into	the	question	of	Argentine	letters,	
are	the	points	at	which	the	space	of	social	existence	is	mirrored	by	a	question	of	literary	
tradition.	In	a	series	of	texts	from	this	period	of	Buber’s	influence,	Borges	conceptualizes	
this	mirroring.								
	
Borges’	concern	with	the	activities	of	the	intellectual	narrator	lead	him	to	a	particular	
image	of	the	space	from	within	which	he	might	operate.	The	image	appears	in	several	of	
Borges’	texts	from	the	post-war	period	and	is	taken	from	Between	Man	and	Man,88	a	book	
Borges	read	and	thoroughly	annotated.89	One	passage	Borges	notes	reads:	
We	enter	a	strange	room	of	the	spirit,	but	we	feel	as	if	the	ground	we	tread	is	
the	board	on	which	a	game	is	being	played	whose	rules	we	learn	as	
we	advance,	deep	rules	which	we	ponder,	and	must	ponder,	but	which	arose	
and	which	persist	only	through	a	decision	having	once	been	reached	to	play	
this	intellectual	game,	and	to	play	it	in	this	very	way.	And	at	the	same	time,	it	
is	true,	we	feel	that	this	game	is	not	arbitrarily	chosen	by	the	player,	but	he	is	
under	necessity,	it	is	his	fate.90		
	
The	room	of	the	spirit	is	detached	from	the	outside	world.	This	de-contextualized	space	
nonetheless	maintains	unimaginable	ties	to	other	players.	In	Buber’s	Tales	of	the	Hasidim91	
Borges	finds	tales	that	relate	such	de-contextualized	spaces,	whose	connection	to	the	
																																																								
88	Martin	Buber,	Between	Man	and	Man,	trans.	Ronald	Gregor-Smith	(London	&	New	York:	Routledge,	2002).	
89	See:	Laura	Rosato,	Germán	Álvarez,	and	Nacional	Biblioteca,	Borges,	Libros	Y	Lecturas	:	Catálogo	De	La	
Colección	Jorge	Luis	Borges	En	La	Biblioteca	Nacional	(Buenos	Aires:	Ediciones	Biblioteca	Nacional,	2010),	70-
72.	For	further	detail	see	Appendix	I	to	the	chapter.	
90	Buber,	Between	Man	and	Man,	195-96.	
91	Tales	of	the	Hasidim:	The	Early	Masters.	
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broader	context	turns	out	to	have	been	powerfully	understated.	Borges	translated	two	such	
tales	for	his	1955	collection	Cuentos	Breves	y	Extraordinarios.92	The	tales	are	“A	Transaction”	
and	“Upsetting	the	Bowl.”93	In	both	tales,	an	action	by	Hasidic	rabbis	that	seems	at	first	
disconnected	from	their	social-political	context	turns	out	to	have	been	affecting	the	very	
heart	of	decision-making	in	the	emperor’s	court.	Whereas	the	English	titles	focus	on	the	
occurrence	within	the	Hasidic	court,	Borges’	translation	of	the	titles	(the	only	place	he	
takes	creative	liberties	in	the	translation	of	these	tales)	refocuses	them	on	what	Borges	is	
interested	in,	the	manner	in	which	these	supposedly	context-less	events	extend	from	
arbitrariness	to	fate.	The	first	is	thus	titled	“The	Accused,”	for	the	accusation	against	God	
heard	by	the	tribunal	of	Hasidic	rabbis,	and	the	second	“The	Distraction”	or	“The	neglect,”	
for	the	consequence	the	Rabbi’s	actions	have	in	the	emperor’s	court,	causing	a	distraction	
that	ultimately	leads	him	to	neglect	his	edict	against	the	Jews.		
	
This	“strange	room	[in]	which	a	game	is	being	played	whose	rules	we	learn	as	we	advance”	
appears	more	explicitly	in	two	other	essays	of	the	period;	“Kafka	and	His	Precursors”	and	
“History	of	the	Echoes	of	a	Name,”94	both	of	which	were	included	in	Otras	Inquisiciones.	In	
“Kafka	and	His	Precursors,”	Borges	revisits	T.	S.	Eliot’s	“Tradition	and	the	Individual	Talent,”	
and	the	idea	that	the	present	modifies	the	past.	He	states	as	much	in	a	footnote	appended	
to	the	closing	lines	of	the	essay.	“The	fact	is	that	each	writer	creates	his	precursors.	His	
work	modifies	our	conception	of	the	past,	as	it	will	modify	the	future.”95	What	Borges	adds	
																																																								
92	Borges	and	Bioy	Casares,	Cuentos	Breves	Y	Extraordinarios	(Antologia).	
93	Buber,	Tales	of	the	Hasidim:	The	Early	Masters,	258-59.	
94	Originally:	Jorge	Luis	Borges,	"Historia	De	Los	Ecos	De	Un	Nombre,"	Cuadernos	del	Congreso	por	la	libertad	
de	la	cultura	15	(1955).	It	was	added	to	the	1960	edition	of	Otros	Inquisiciones,	see:	Obras	Completas,	1923-
1972,	631-775.		
95	Selected	Non-Fictions,	365.	
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to	Eliot’s	idea	in	this	essay	is	that	a	modification	of	the	past	can	include	the	retroactive	
creation	of	a	tradition	in	which	an	author	operates.	And	this	tradition	can	be	as	
idiosyncratic	as	the	writer’s	individual	talent.	Thus,	in	Borges’	account,	Kafka	has	created	
an	unlikely	literary	tradition	of	precursors	spanning	Zeno	and	Aristotle,	Han	Yu	(“a	prose	
writer	of	the	ninth	century,”96	Borges	tells	us),	Kierkegaard,	Robert	Browning,	Leon	Bloy	
and	Lord	Dunsany.	The	randomness	of	these	precursors	serves	both	to	create	a	comic	
effect	to	Borges’	analysis	of	Kafka,	and	to	suggest	a	much	more	far	reaching	conclusion.	
That	is,	by	simply	writing,	a	writer	from	no	identifiable	tradition	constantly	creates	the	
tradition	within	which	he	operates,	through	constant	and	unknowable	links	he	creates	to	
his	precursors.	
	
One	such	precursor	Borges	suggests	for	Kafka	is	Robert	Browning’s	poem	“Fears	and	
Scruples.”97	This	poem,	which	Borges	returns	to	twice	in	the	course	of	his	essay,	is	not	only	
itself	a	precursor	to	Kafka,	but	it	is	also	itself	a	discussion	of	what	it	means	to	create	one’s	
precursor.	Borges	summarizes	the	poem	thus:	
A	man	has,	or	thinks	he	has,	a	famous	friend.	He	has	never	seen	this	friend,	
and	the	fact	is	that	this	friend	has	never	been	able	to	help	him,	but	he	knows	
that	the	friend	has	very	noble	qualities,	and	he	shows	others	the	letters	his	
friend	has	written.	Some	have	doubts	about	his	nobility,	and	handwriting	
experts	declare	the	letters	to	be	fake.	In	the	last	line,	the	man	asks:	“What	if	
																																																								
96	Ibid.,	363.	
97	Published	in:	Robert	Browning,	Pacchiarotto	and	How	He	Worked	in	Distemper:	With	Other	Poems	(London:	
Smith,	Elder	&	Co.,	1876).	
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this	friend	happened	to	be	–	God?”98	
		
The	epistolary	relationship	between	the	man	and	his	friend	exists,	so	is	suspected,	entirely	
within	the	man’s	own	library.	The	only	certainty	in	the	poem	is	that	the	man	writes	letters	
to	his	friend.	Even	the	friend’s	replies,	some	suspect,	may	be	fake.	In	the	final	line,	the	man	
wonders	whether	his	elusive	friend	might	be	God.	In	this	elusiveness	Borges	identifies	
Browning’s	poem	as	a	precursor	not	only	to	Kafka	but	also	to	another	text,	which	at	first	
glance	may	seem	entirely	absent	from	this	essay.	That	is	Buber’s	“strange	room	of	the	
spirit,”	which	we	have	already	cited	from	Between	Man	and	Man.	In	his	thorough	
annotations	to	this	last	volume,	Borges	indicates	his	own	chain	of	associations,	leading	
from	Buber’s	text	back	to	Browning’s	poem	and	forward	again	to	Kafka.	The	link	becomes	
clearer	a	page	after	what	we	have	already	cited,	when	Buber	writes:	
Life	is	not	lived	by	my	playing	the	enigmatic	game	on	a	board	by	myself,	but	
by	my	being	placed	in	the	presence	of	a	being	with	whom	I	have	agreed	on	no	
rules	for	the	game	and	with	whom	no	rules	can	be	agreed	on.99		
		
Buber’s	suggestion	that	the	other	player—who	we	never	meet	and	whose	existence	we	
only	contrive	from	the	fact	that	a	game	is	in	play—is	God,	leads	Borges	to	Browning’s	poem,	
in	which	the	same	is	suggested	by	the	protagonist	after	a	lifetime	of	correspondence	with	
an	absent	other.	This	room	of	the	spirit	in	which	the	game	is	blindly	played	is	also	
reminiscent	of	the	room,	in	which	the	idiosyncratic	actions	of	the	Hasidic	masters	proved	
part	of	an	ongoing	“game”	that	finally	influences	God	to	change	the	emperor’s	mind	in	the	
																																																								
98	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	364.	
99	Buber,	Between	Man	and	Man,	197.	
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story	Borges	translates	as	“The	Accused.”	This	association	is	certainly	due	to	the	
comprehensive	manner	in	which	Buber’s	project	builds	on	Hasidism	as	overcoming	“the	
separation	of	‘living	in	God’	from	‘living	in	the	world.’”100	And	yet,	overcoming	this	
separation	does	not	lead	Hasidism	(as	Buber	sees	it)	to	recognize	an	overlap	of	these	two	
realms.	Rather,	it	sublimates	this	gap	into	the	space	from	which	the	Hasidic	rabbi	operates,	
plays	the	“enigmatic	game.”		
	
What	Browning	adds	to	this	is	the	suggestion	that	the	“moves”	in	this	game	are	made	by	
writing.	The	game	between	the	man	and	his	elusive	friend	is	a	game	of	letters.	The	elusive	
friend	that	might	be	God,	God	that	might	be	a	friend,	is	one	side	of	a	dialogue.	The	
elusiveness	of	what	is	beyond	the	space	we	live	in,	along	with	the	inevitability	of	our	
contact	with	it,	these	are	of	the	essence	to	understanding	the	dialogue	that	is	Jewish	
tradition,	Buber	teaches.	This	ongoing	dialogue	began	between	God	and	Moses	in	a	moment	
of	evasion,	which	Borges	takes	up	in	“History	of	the	Echoes	of	a	Name.”												
			
“Isolated	in	time	and	in	space,	a	God,	a	dream	and	a	man	who	is	mad,	and	who	does	not	
ignore	it,	repeat	an	obscure	declaration;	to	relate	and	to	weigh	these	words,	and	their	two	
echoes,	is	the	aim	of	this	page.”101	Borges	is	referring	to	the	episode	in	the	third	chapter	of	
Exodus	where,	as	he	concisely	summarizes	it,	“Moses,	author	and	protagonist	of	the	book,	
asked	God	for	His	name,	and	He	tells	him:	I	Am	that	I	Am.”102	This	phrase	has	many	echoes	
in	subsequent	generations,	proposes	Borges,	but	only	two	interpretations.		
																																																								
100	Hasidism,	103.	
101	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	750.	
102	Ibid.	
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The	first	interpretation	understands	God’s	reply,	“I	Am	that	I	Am,”	as	an	“ontological	
affirmation,”	Borges	explains.	In	its	translation	as	“I	Am	that	I	Am,”	it	affirms	God	as	the	
essence	of	existence,	the	prime	being.	This	is	the	interpretation	that	persists	in	the	various	
translations	it	has	received,	“multiplied	by	human	languages—Ich	bin	der	ich	bin,	Ego	sum	
qui	sum,	I	am	that	I	am.”103	It	is	true	of	everywhere	this	name	echoes	in	its	multiple	
translations.	The	first	such	eco	Borges	references	is	a	line	from	Shakespeare’s	All’s	Well	that	
Ends	Well:	“simply	the	thing	I	am	shall	make	me	live.”104	These	are	“words	that	reflect	[…]	
those	others	that	the	divinity	said	on	the	mountain,”105	Borges	concludes,	conflating	two	
central	moments	in	Buber’s	thought;	God’s	name	at	the	burning	bush	and	the	encounter	
between	Moses	and	God	on	the	mountain.		
	
The	second	interpretation	of	these	words	is	Buber’s.	It	sees	God’s	response	as	an	evasion.	
This	phrase	is	not	a	name	at	all.	It	is	God’s	attempt	to	avoid	the	question.	
Others	have	understood	that	the	reply	eludes	the	question	[…]	Martin	Buber	
indicates	that	Ehyeh	asher	ehyeh	can	also	be	translated	as	I	Am	what	I	will	be	
or	as	I	shall	be	where	I	shall	be.	Moses,	following	the	Egyptian	magicians,	
would	have	asked	God	for	His	name	in	order	to	have	Him	in	his	power;	God	
would	have	answered,	in	fact:	Today	I	speak	with	you,	but	tomorrow	I	can	re-
dress	myself	in	any	form,	even	in	forms	of	oppression,	of	injustice	and	of	
																																																								
103	Ibid.,	751.	
104	Borges	returns	to	this	same	coupling	of	Buber	and	Shakespeare	in	a	later	poem	titled	“The	Thing	I	Am”,	in:	
Historia	De	La	Noche	(Buenos	Aires:	Emece,	1977).		
105	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	751.	
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adversity.	This	we	read	in	Gog	und	Magog.106		
	
In	these	lines,	Borges	paraphrases	an	entire	paragraph	from	Buber’s	lecture	“The	Faith	of	
Judaism.”107		
Not	“I	am	that	I	am”	as	alleged	by	the	metaphysicians—God	does	not	make	
theological	statements—but	the	answer	which	his	creatures	need,	and	which	
benefits	them:	“I	shall	be	there	as	I	there	shall	be”	(Ex.	3:14).	That	is:	you	
need	not	conjure	me,	for	I	am	here,	I	am	with	you;	but	you	cannot	conjure	me,	
for	I	am	with	you	time	and	again	in	the	form	in	which	I	choose	to	be	with	you	
time	and	again;	I	myself	do	not	anticipate	any	of	my	manifestations;	you	
cannot	learn	to	meet	me;	you	meet	me,	when	you	meet	me.108	
	
In	Borges’	footnote	to	these	lines	from	“History	of	the	Echoes	of	a	Name”	he	ties	Buber’s	
understanding	of	Hasidism	back	to	the	“strange	room	of	the	spirit,”	stating:	“Buber	(Was	Ist	
der	Mensch?	1938)	writes	that	to	live	is	to	enter	a	strange	room	of	the	spirit,	whose	floor	is	
a	board	on	which	we	play	an	inevitable	and	unfamiliar	game	against	a	changing	and	
sometimes	terrifying	adversary.”109	Borges	does	not	elaborate	on	this	connection	as	he	
perceives	it.	But	he	suggests	an	interpretation	of	Buber’s	novel	Gog	und	Magog,110	which	is	
in	line	with	the	understanding	of	Hasidism	he	finds	in	Buber	more	broadly.	The	Hasidic	
master,	occupying	this	room	of	the	spirit,	is	forced	to	contend	with	a	terrifying	adversary.	
																																																								
106	Ibid.	
107	This	lecture	was	delivered	in	1928	and	reprinted	in:	Martin	Buber,	Israel	and	the	World:	Essays	in	a	Time	of	
Crisis	(Schocken	Books,	1948).		The	same	appears	in:	Konigtum	Gottes	(Berlin:	Schocken,	1932).	
108	The	Writings	of	Martin	Buber,	261.	Emphasis	in	the	original.	
109	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	751,	ff.1.	
110	Martin	Buber,	Gog	Und	Magog:	Eine	Chronik	(Heidelberg:	Schneider,	1949).	
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The	ambiguity	that	surrounds	this	adversary	in	the	novel—taking	the	form	of	Napoleon,	
but	suggesting	a	divine	agent—the	harbinger	of	indistinguishability	between	oppression	
and	redemption—is	the	elusiveness	Borges	identifies	as	the	second	echo	of	God’s	name.					
				
The	ambiguity	of	the	interlocutor,	addressee,	referent—this	is	the	condition	of	writing	that	
Buber	conceptualizes	for	Borges,	basing	himself	on	interpretations	of	the	Hasidic	
movement	and	the	dialogical	nature	of	Jewish	faith.	Borges	takes	this	a	step	further	in	his	
quest	for	a	productive	position	to	occupy	in	his	own	search	for	a	tradition.	The	act	of	
writing	already	produces	infinite,	unlikely,	innumerable	and	inexhaustible	references	to	
unknown	precursors	who	deterministically	emerge	as	such	in	the	moment	of	writing.	
Writing	from	within	the	“strange	room	of	the	spirit,”	not	knowing	the	rules	of	this	game,	
which	obligate	one	to	make	reference	to	something	outside	this	space,	without	
understanding	the	effects	of	such	reference—at	one	moment	creating	a	precursor,	at	
another	causing	the	emperor	to	cancel	his	edict—this	is	how	one	begins	to	write	without	
departing,	in	a	poetics	of	intransitivity.	
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Section	One:	
Conclusion	
	
In	concluding	this	section,	let	us	return	to	Said,	and	his	exception	of	Borges	from	his	study:	
“Except	for	Borges’	Aleph	(which	is	an	image	of	beginning	and	of	engulfment)	no	modern	
image	for	the	end	of	writing	a	text	can	be	anything	but	ironic	(Yeats...),	or	apologetic	and	
pontifical	(Gide...),	or	evasive	(Eliot).”1	The	view	from	under	the	king’s	table,	like	from	
under	the	staircase	in	a	Buenos	Aires	suburb,	is	the	view	from	an	impossible	point	of	
departure.	These	are	not	images	of	“the	end	of	writing	a	text,”	but	of	the	impossibility	of	its	
beginning.	As	such,	they	are	exterior	to	Said’s	project.	
It	is	worth	pursuing	a	little	further	such	notions	of	‘exteriority’	and	‘in-
betweenness’	[says	Said].	They	describe	a	transformation	that	has	taken	
place	in	the	working	reality	of	the	self-conscious	writer.	He	can	no	longer	
accept	[...]	a	place	in	a	continuity	that	formerly	stretched	forward	and	
backward	in	time.	Already	Eliot	had	understood	that	‘tradition’	was	an	
achievement	for	the	few,	not	the	possession	of	all.	Perhaps,	also,	today’s	
writer	is	less	comfortable	with	the	unadorned	fact	of	precedence	[...]	and	
perhaps	he	can	no	longer	know	what	it	means	to	stand	in	a	direct	line	of	
descent.2	
	
What	Said	identifies	as	the	predicament	of	“today’s	writer,”	Borges	has	identified	as	the	
author’s	approximation	of	what	has	always	been—since	the	mystical	creation	of	the	world	
																																																								
1	Said,	Beginnings:	Intention	and	Method,	261.	
2	Ibid.,	8-9.	
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through	letters—the	predicament	one	enters	into	by	writing.	The	intellectual-narrator,	like	
the	text	he	writes,	only	forms	their	“unadorned	fact	of	precedence”	retroactively.	They	are	
not	after	and	before	other	texts	but	side	by	side	with	them,	in-between	other	books,	side	by	
side	or	in-between	other	precursors.	The	place	under	the	table,	for	which	R.	Nachman	
prepares;	Borges’	room	of	the	spirit,	in	which	writing	and	authorship	inescapably	
approximate	a	deficient	Divinity—these	impossible	points	of	departure	are	themselves	
only	side	by	side	or	in-between	history.		
	
However,	Said’s	project	in	Beginnings	is	certainly	also	an	historical	one,	an	attempt	“to	
describe	the	immense	effort	that	goes	into	historical	retrospection	as	it	set	out	to	describe	
things	from	the	beginning,	in	history.”3	For	someone	laying	under	the	staircase	seeing	the	
Aleph,	or	under	the	king’s	table	believing	he	is	a	turkey,	someone	already	engulfed	in	
permanent	parabasis,	“to	describe	things	from	the	beginning”	has	nothing	to	do	with	
retrospection	and	everything	to	do	with	speculation.	The	point	of	departure	is	the	
inaccessibility	of	a	prior	moment,	of	a	“history”	and	thus	of	an	origin.	And	yet—with	the	
inaccessibility	of	a	history	at	the	beginning,	as	the	point	of	departure—one	must	
nonetheless	depart.	Having	outlined	the	intransitivity	of	R.	Nachman	and	Borges’	position,	
we	will	see	in	the	next	section	that	a	reconfiguration	of	their	relation	to—and	location	vis-
à-vis—“tradition”	served	as	an	attempt,	nonetheless,	to	depart.			
	
	 	
																																																								
3	Ibid.,	xii.	
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Section	Two:	The	Trouble	with	Tradition	
	
Borges	(interjects):	I	believe	I	owe	something	to	all	the	books	I	
have	read,	and	no	doubt	to	many	I	have	not	read	but	which	have	
reached	me	through	others.	That	is	what’s	called	tradition,	no?		
I	have	interrupted	you,	forgive	me...1	
	
In	the	introduction	to	the	previous	section,	I	stated	that	the	consolidation	of	the	object	“The	
Cabbala”	marked	the	discursive	construction	of	a	break	that	would	be	central	to	the	
category	of	Modern	Hebrew	Literature.	The	site	of	this	constitutive	break	is	the	
problematic	of	“tradition”—the	object	vis-à-vis	which	this	break	is	configured.	The	1970s	
readers	of	R.	Nachman	and	Borges,	attempting	to	bridge	the	gap	between	categories	of	
literature	and	tradition	through	the	identification	of	“cabbalistic	stories,”	are	one	aspect	of	
the	reception	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	share.	Concomitant	with	the	effort	to	locate	their	
stories	in	terms	of	this	break	is	the	tendency	to	locate	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	themselves	
as	figures	“at	the	edge”	of	this	break.	I	have	already	cited	the	1906	preface	to	Buber’s	
German	translation	of	The	Tales	of	Rabbi	Nachman:		
Rabbi	Nachman	of	Bratzlav,	who	was	born	in	1772	and	died	in	1810,	is	
perhaps	the	last	Jewish	mystic.	He	stands	at	the	end	of	an	unbroken	
tradition,	whose	beginning	we	do	not	know.2		
	
																																																								
1	"Jorges	Luis	Borges:	Córdoba,	Invierno	Del	85,	Meses	Antes	De	Su	Muerte,"	PluralJan.	1989.	All	translations	
from	Spanish	are	mine,	unless	otherwise	indicated,	-YL.	
2	Buber,	The	Tales	of	Rabbi	Nachman,	3.	
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Tradition	as	an	unbroken	chain	that	is	now	broken	is	the	problematic	through	which	Buber	
will	express	his	ideas	about	Jewish	modernism	and	renewal.	This	tradition	has	an	end,	at	
which	its	final	figure	stands	as	the	end.	Buber’s	depiction	would	suggest	R.	Nachman	stands	
at	the	same	location	vis-à-vis	tradition	as	does	the	stargazing	king	vis-à-vis	the	monarchic	
order—at	the	end	moment,	at	the	edge	of	a	break	from	which	no	return	is	possible	for	“us,”	
for	Buber	and	his	readers.3	Joseph	Weiss,	one	of	Scholem’s	closest	students	and	a	pillar	of	
early	Braslav	research,	also	depicts	R.	Nachman	as	a	figure	"at	the	very	limit,	at	the	limit	of	
Judaism,	whom	the	fascination	of	the	limit	and	what	lies	beyond	it	has	overtaken."4	For	
Weiss,	“Judaism”	is	the	name	for	the	tradition,	upon	the	edge	of	which	R.	Nachman	stands.		
	
For	Buber,	the	importance	of	locating	R.	Nachman	as	“the	last,”	at	“the	end,”	relates	to	his	
efforts	to	present	R.	Nachman	as	an	important	figure,	from	which	a	cultural	renewal	of	
Judaism	can	begin.	As	Martina	Urban	explains,	Buber’s	focus	on	R.	Nachman	is	part	of	an	
effort	“to	foster	a	model	for	the	new	or	rather	renewed	Jewish	consciousness	envisioned	by	
cultural	Zionism	[…]	and,	concomitantly,	[…]	the	creation	of	a	distinctive	Jewish	
modernism.”5	The	renewal	would	begin	by	looking	back	over	a	gap	between	Buber	and	R.	
Nachman,	the	recognition	of	which	would	be	constitutive	of	Jewish	modernism.	Buber	
stands	at	the	other	side	of	the	break,	identifying	R.	Nachman	as	a	point	of	departure	for	a	
new	Jewish	consciousness—a	consciousness	of	having	broken	from	tradition,	a	break	that	
is	the	very	point	of	departure	for	this	new	consciousness.	
																																																								
3	For	more	on	Buber’s	readers	and	the	context	in	which	he	represents	R.	Nachman	as	the	marker	of	a	break	
from	tradition,	see:	Urban,	Aesthetics	of	Renewal:	Martin	Buber's	Early	Representation	of	Hasidism	as	
Kulturkritik.	Scholem	too	represents	the	moment	of	this	break,	but	more	broadly,	in	the	title	of	his	lecture	
“Hasidism,	the	final	phase,”	in:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism,	Nineth	Lecture			
4	Joseph	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav	(Yerushalayim:	Mosad	Byalik,	1974),	99.	
5	Urban,	Aesthetics	of	Renewal:	Martin	Buber's	Early	Representation	of	Hasidism	as	Kulturkritik,	4.	
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Buber’s	concern	with	ends	and	beginnings	in	R.	Nachman’s	location	vis-à-vis	tradition	
recalls	his	own	representation	of	ends	as	beginnings.	It	is	also,	in	part,	informed	by	R.	
Nachman’s	self-positioning	“at	the	edge”	as	well,	in	statements	such	as:	“here	we	are	now	at	
the	limit	and	edge	of	Israel	where	the	limit	of	Israel	ends,	for	everything	has	a	limit	and	an	
end.”6	Representations	by	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	of	themselves	“on	the	edge”	will	be	the	
central	texts	of	this	section.	To	begin	to	make	sense	of	such	self-positioning,	we	need	to	
consider	the	temporal	aspect	of	“the	edge,”	which	Buber	and	Roskies	clearly	imply,	as	well	
as	the	spatial	sense	that	R.	Nachman	here	alludes	to,	and	which	we	will	see	explicated	more	
clearly	in	chapter	4.	This	double	representation	of	the	edge,	as	temporal	and	spatial,	is	
where	we	will	begin	to	discuss	R.	Nachman’s	self-location	vis-à-vis	the	site	of	“tradition.”					
	
In	the	reception	of	Borges	too,	“the	edge”	has	played	an	important	role	in	the	discourse	of	
locating	Borges	and	his	writing.	Here	too	we	will	find	the	edge	denotes	both	a	spatial	
relation—drawing	upon	questions	of	center	and	periphery,	the	relations	between	a	post-
colony	(Argentina)	and	the	European	center—and	a	temporal	relation,	where	it	draws	on	
questions	of	post-colonial	history	and	literature.	In	both	senses,	“the	edge”	from	which	
Borges	writes	is	configured	as	a	question	of	his	relation	to	“tradition,”	or	a	lack	thereof.	
	
In	her	book	Jorge	Luis	Borges:	A	Writer	on	the	Edge,7	Beatriz	Sarlo	explains,	“[Borges	is]	a	
marginal	[figure]	making	use	of	all	cultures	[…]	From	the	margin,	Borges	is	able	to	place	his	
literature	in	dialogue,	as	among	equals,	with	Western	literature.	He	made	of	the	margin	an	
																																																								
6	Sternhartz,	Chayey	Moharan,	195.	
7	Sarlo,	Jorge	Luis	Borges:	A	Writer	on	the	Edge.	Translated	as:	Borges,	Un	Escritor	En	Las	Orillas.	
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aesthetic	principle.”8	Sarlo	does	not	pass	inadvertently	from	“the	edge”	to	“the	margin.”	
This	transition	encompasses	her	argument	about	Borges,	that	he	encounters	“the	limit”	of	
Buenos	Aires	as	a	binary	demarcation	between	civilization	and	barbarism,	between	urban	
and	rural	epistemologies,	on	the	one	side,	while	on	the	other	side,	a	binary	demarcation	
between	Argentina	and	Europe,	the	post-colony	and	the	traditions	of	the	colonizer.	What	
Borges	does,	states	Sarlo,	is	to	“inscribe	a	literature	at	the	limit.”9	Through	this	inscription,	
Borges	breaks	apart	the	binary	epistemologies	of	“the	edge”	and	creates	a	space	in-
between	the	oppositions,	from	which	he	will	write	an	Argentine	literature	that	is	fully,	
paradoxically	invested	with	both	the	particularity	of	Argentina	and	the	universality	of	
Europe.10	In	this	sense,	Borges’	positioning	in	the	margin	is	a	defining	trope	for	students	of	
literature	studying	the	relation	between	the	Argentine	lack	of	literary	tradition	(other	than	
that	of	the	former	colonizer)	and	their	embeddedness	(by	virtue	of	their	colonial	past)	in	
the	tradition	of	European	literature.	
	
What	takes	place	in	the	space	of	the	Borgesian	“margin,”	Sarlo	adds,	is	not	marginalization,	
not	the	devaluation	of	its	occupants,	but	rather	their	constitution	as	alternatives.	This	is	
Borges’	basic	operation	in	Argentine	culture:	introducing	alternatives—to	the	canon,	to	
reading,	to	tradition.	“The	Judaic”	plays	an	important	role	in	Borges’	articulation	of	this	
opening	of	the	limit	into	an	in-between	position.	When	Borges	depicts	Jews	as	marginal	in	
Europe	he	doesn’t	mean	it	is	the	sense	of	“unimportant,”	or	“excluded	from	the	centers	of	
cultural	production.”	Quite	to	the	contrary.	Figures	such	as	Spinoza	and	Heine—who	
																																																								
8	Borges,	Un	Escritor	En	Las	Orillas,	4.	All	translations	from	Spanish	are	my	own	unless	otherwise	indicated	–	
YL.	
9	Ibid.,	20.	
10	Borges	declares	such	intentions	as	early	as	his	first	book	of	essays,	Borges,	El	Tamaño	De	Mi	Esperanza.	
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Borges	identifies	as	quintessentially	Judaic11—are	so,	in	his	mind,	precisely	because	of	their	
importance	as	European	figures.	What	draws	Borges	to	such	figures	is	their	existence	as	an	
alternative	within	the	hegemonic	culture.		
	
“Marginality”	is	the	term	for	this	“position	vis-à-vis	Europe”	that	has	by	now	become	
commonplace	in	Borges	research,	as	designating	the	relation	between	Argentina	and	
Europe.	This	is	perhaps	in	response	to	Sarlo’s	book,	which	has	laid	out	the	intellectual	
framework	for	identifying	the	margin	as	a	position	quintessentially	Borgesian.	Subsequent	
scholarship	in	Latin	American	Jewish	Studies—in	drawing	attention	to	the	role	Borges’	
understanding	of	Judaism	played	in	his	articulation	of	this	position—has	retrojected	a	
direct	analogy	to	what	is	then	accepted	as	an	equally	quintessential	Jewish	position.12	
Evelyn	Fishburn	exemplarily	states	that,	in	his	lecture	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition,”	
“Borges	puts	forward	the	idea	that	Jews	have	played	such	an	important	role	in	their	
relationship	to	Western	culture	precisely	because	of	their	position	of	marginality.”13	
Commenting	on	the	same	essay,	and	in	the	same	terms,	Erin	Graff	Zivin	restates	Borges’	
argument:	“The	Argentine,	as	a	marginal	citizen	of	the	West,	is	actually	more	capable	of	
innovation	because	of	his	simultaneous	status	as	insider	and	outsider.	In	order	to	
																																																								
11	These	two	are	mentioned	in	many	texts,	but	perhaps	most	importantly	in	the	context	of	their	belonging	to	
“the	Judaic,”	he	mentions	Heine	in:	"Yo,	Judío."	And	Spinoza	in	two	poems—“Spinoza”	and	“Baruch	Spinoza”—
published,	respectively	in	1964	and	1976.	See:	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	930.		And:	Obras	Completas,	
1975-1985,	151.	
12	The	exception	to	this	statement,	which	has	greatly	inspired	the	present	study,	is	Edna	Aizenberg’s	
persistent	understanding	of	“Jewish	marginality”	as	a	literary-aesthetic	principle	in	Borges’	writing,	and	not	
as	a	socio-historical	statement.	Even	when	Borges	seems	to	be	making	a	statement	of	the	latter	kind.	See:	
Edna	Aizenberg,	Books	and	Bombs	in	Buenos	Aires:	Borges,	Gerchunoff,	and	Argentine-Jewish	Writing	(Hanover:	
University	Press	of	New	England,	2002),	Ch.	7.	
13	Evelyn	Fishburn,	"Reflections	on	the	Jewish	Imaginary	in	the	Fictions	of	Borges,"	Variaciones	Borges,	no.	5	
(1998):	152.	
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substantiate	his	argument	further,	Borges	turns	to	the	figure	of	the	‘Jew’	in	Western	
culture.”14		
	
I	would	like	at	the	outset	to	signal	some	reservations	about	such	statements.	First,	one	of	
the	main	goals	of	the	present	study	is	to	investigate	how	this	position	is	perceived,	
occupied,	engaged	and	given	narrative	form	(by	Jews	and	Argentines	alike).	I	will	therefore	
bracket	any	premature	implication	of	a	self-evident	“Jewish	marginality.”	I	want	to	keep	
this	position,	this	opening	of	“the	edge”	into	an	in-between	location	in	focus	here	as	an	
aesthetically	and	discursively	constructed	space	of,	and	relation	to,	“tradition.”	In	other	
words,	when	Borges	speaks	of	Jews	as	“marginal,”	we	should	not	assume	this	designation	
has	a	facile	referent.	Understanding	the	constitution	of	this	“Jewish	model”	(as	Aizenberg	
has	termed	it)	will	require	an	understanding	of	the	many	interlocutors	Borges	engages,	
their	intellectual	context	and	the	way	in	which	Borges	reads	and	misreads	their	
implications.	Along	these	lines	of	investigation	we	will	also	end	up	asking	if,	for	the	(mostly	
Eastern	European)	Jews	Borges	has	in	mind,	“marginality”	was	ever	the	kind	of	self-
positioning	that	Borges	has	fashioned	it	into.		
	
While	there	may	be	compelling	research	that	demonstrating	Sarlo’s	understanding	of	“the	
margin”	as	an	aesthetic	principle	for	Borges,	this	does	not	simply	translate	into	an	aesthetic	
principle	of	Jewish	letters.	It	is	certainly	my	intention	to	make	the	argument	that	R.	
Nachman	negotiated	his	position	vis-à-vis	the	problematic	of	tradition	through	a	similar	
transition	from	“the	edge”	to	an	in-between	space.	And,	that	R.	Nachman	constructs	this	
																																																								
14	Erin	Graff	Zivin,	The	Wandering	Signifier	:	Rhetoric	of	Jewishness	in	the	Latin	American	Imaginary	(Durham:	
Duke	University	Press,	2008),	11.	
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space	in	both	the	social	and	aesthetic	terms	of	Jewish	thinkers	at	the	turn	of	the	eighteenth	
century.	But	this	argument	needs	to	be	made,	not	glossed	by	an	analogy	Borges	only	hints	
at.	As	I	proceed	to	use	these	words—in-between,	margin,	edge—my	intention	is	not	to	offer	
them	as	an	explanation	but	as	a	trigger	for	recurring	and	persistent	questions	about	
location,	identification	and	difference.	I	find	Sarlo’s	argument	about	turning	“the	edge”	into	
a	“margin”	a	very	productive	lens	through	which	to	understand	R.	Nachman	as	well,	since	it	
poses	the	question	of	a	relation	to	tradition	in	topographical	terms	that	engage	this	relation	
on	multiple	levels—geographical,	social,	aesthetic	and	epistemological.	
		
The	second	reservation	I	have	regarding	statements	such	as	Fishburn	and	Zivin’s	relates	to	
defining	a	role	for	“the	Jews”	in	Borges’	endeavor.	I	prefer	to	use	Aizenberg’s	term	“the	
Judaic”	(“lo	judío”)	as	referent	to	the	object	Borges	comparatively	engages,	as	he	reflects	
upon	its	relation	to	the	Argentine	writer	and	his	tradition.	I	do	so	in	order	to	leave	open	the	
question	of	Borges’	idiosyncratic	identification,	prioritization	and	selection	of	themes	
related	to	“the	Jews,”	in	his	conceptualization	of	“the	Judaic.”	That	is	to	say,	if	we	discover	
certain	tensions	between	Borges’	representation	of	“Jewish	marginality”	and	our	historical	
knowledge	of	“the	Jews,”	we	will	bracket	it	for	now,	as	it	is	precisely	the	representation	of	
marginality	that	I	am	interested	in.		
	
I	don’t	want	to	ask	if	Jews	were	marginal	or	not,	at	the	edge	or	not,	but	rather,	first,	how	
Borges	represents	this	position	he	ascribes	Jews,	and	then	ask	in	what	way	this	can	
illuminate	certain	aspects	of	R.	Nachman’s	self-positioning.	The	former	concerns	will	be	
discussed	in	chapter	3.	The	latter	will	be	the	topic	of	chapter	4,	where	we	will	find	R.	
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Nachman	concerned	with	similar	questions	of	difference	between	an	edge	and	an	in-
between	that	lays	beyond,	and	his	self-positioning	in	these	terms.	How	do	R.	Nachman	and	
Borges	represent	this	location	“at	the	edge,”	and	its	opening	onto	an	in-between	space,	a	
“margin”?	How	is	this	opening	articulated	in	their	writing?	We	will	see	that	for	both	R.	
Nachman	and	Borges	this	is	a	complex	location,	equally	geographic	and	social,	discursive	
and	political,	aesthetic	and	literary—an	edge	that	is	being	discovered,	an	in-between	that	is	
still	in	the	making.		
	
What	is	at	stake	in	the	differentiation	between	edge	and	margin?	The	question	is	what	
happens	when	one	reaches	“the	end,”	that	impossible	departure,	and	nonetheless	departs?	
Where	does	one	end	up?	Outside,	in-between,	straddling	a	limit?	These	topographical	
metaphors	are	as	central,	for	both	R.	Nachman	and	Borges,	to	the	representation	of	geo-
political	forces	as	they	are	to	the	representation	of	socio-political	forces,	and	even	
theological	and	epistemological	forces,	in	relation	to	which	they	are	respectively	defining	
themselves	and	their	location.	
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Chapter	3:	
Locating	“The	Judaic”	in	Borges	
	
In	1951	Borges	gave	a	lecture	in	the	Colegio	Libre	de	Estudios	Superiores	titled	“The	
Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition.”1	This	would	become	one	of	his	best-known	discussions	of	
the	question	of	Latin	American	literature	and	its	place	vis-à-vis	what	he	perceived	as	“the	
European	tradition.”	This	lecture	is	also	an	important	discussion	of	the	social	position	and	
role	of	the	intellectual	writer.	In	this	lecture,	Borges	maintains	an	ongoing	reference	to	two	
texts.	The	first	is	already	implied	in	the	name	of	the	lecture.	It	is	T.	S.	Eliot’s	essay	
“Tradition	and	the	Individual	Talent.”2	The	second	reference	is	to	Thorstein	Veblen’s	article	
“The	Intellectual	Pre-Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe,”3	which	Borges	names	explicitly	
only	towards	the	end	of	the	lecture.	The	former	is	invaluable	in	understanding	Borges’	
thoughts	about	the	chances	of	identifying	or	inventing	an	Argentine	literary	tradition,	and	
the	place	it	would	have	in	the	world	of	letters.	The	latter	reference	is	essential	to	
understanding	the	way	Borges’	representation	of	the	relation	between	Jewish	intellectuals	
and	“their	tradition”	informs	his	self-positioning	as	a	writer	and	intellectual.	As	Edna	
Aizenberg	notes,	“Borges’	application	of	a	‘Jewish	model’	to	the	Latin	American	situation	is	
his	own,	but	the	model	he	employs	is	borrowed	from	another	thinker	[…]	the	North	
American	Thorstein	Veblen.”4		
	
																																																								
1	Borges,	"El	Escritor	Argentino	Y	La	Tradición."	
2	T.	S.	Eliot,	Selected	Essays	(London:	Faber	and	Faber,	1934),	13-22.	
3	Thorstein	Veblen,	"The	Intellectual	Pre-Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe,"	Political	Science	Quarterly,	34,	
no.	1	(Mar.,	1919).	
4	Aizenberg,	Borges,	El	Tejedor	Del	Aleph	Y	Otros	Ensayos:	Del	Hebraìsmo	Al	Poscolonialismo,	53.	
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The	first	part	of	this	chapter	will	discuss	“The	Argentina	Writer	and	Tradition”	and	its	two	
inter-textual	references,	Eliot	and	Veblen.	I	will	elaborate	upon	the	particular	similarities	
Borges	identifies	between	the	Judaic	and	the	Argentine	situation.	From	there	I	will	proceed	
to	discuss	his	idea	that	these	similarities	imply	a	shared	position	and,	therefore,	the	
possibility	that	a	certain	way	of	acting	within	this	position	(which	has	proven	propitious	
for	the	modern	formation	of	the	Judaic)	will	serve	Argentine	writers	as	well.	The	chapter	
will	conclude	by	asking	about	the	mutually	constitutive	nature	of	“the	Jew”	and	“the	
Intellectual.”	
	
Tradition:	The	Historical	Sense	
	
In	his	1917	essay	“Tradition	and	the	Individual	Talent,”	Eliot	deals	with	the	proposed	
opposition	between	a	writer’s	talent	and	a	writer’s	operation	within	a	literary	tradition.	
Saying	a	writer	is	“traditional,”	he	explains,	is	seen	as	“some	pleasing	archaeological	
reconstruction,	[a]	comfortable	reference	to	the	reassuring	science	of	archaeology.”5	
Tradition	is	perceived	as	disconnected	from	the	writing	of	literature	in	the	present.	On	the	
other	hand,	he	continues,	when	“we	praise	a	poet,	upon	those	aspects	of	his	work	in	which	
he	least	resembles	anyone	else	[…]	we	pretend	to	find	what	is	individual,	what	is	the	
peculiar	essence	of	the	man.”6	Eliot	does	not	so	much	contest	this	opposition	between	the	
imitation	of	archaic	forms	and	the	absolute	individualism	of	literary	innovation.	Rather,	he	
argues	against	the	historical	scheme	such	an	opposition	might	suggest;	that	tradition	is	a	
																																																								
5	Eliot,	Selected	Essays,	13.	
6	Ibid.,	14.	
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thing	of	the	past,	an	archeological	artifact,	while	talent	is	a	thing	of	the	present,	a	total	
break	from	tradition.	
	
Against	such	a	scheme	Eliot	proposes	“the	historical	sense.”7	For	the	talented	writer	the	
past	and	the	present	are	simultaneous.8	“The	whole	of	the	literature	of	Europe	from	Homer	
and	within	it	the	whole	of	the	literature	of	[one’s]	own	country	has	a	simultaneous	
existence	and	composes	a	simultaneous	order.”9	Tradition	is	a	thing	of	the	present	and	
talent	consists	of	forming	an	innovative	relationship	to	it,	Eliot	argues.	“The	historical	sense”	
does	not	undo	chronology,	but	literature	is	able	to	alter	it.		
What	happens	when	a	new	work	of	art	is	created	is	something	that	happens	
simultaneously	to	all	the	works	of	art	which	preceded	it.	[We]	will	not	find	it	
preposterous	that	the	past	should	be	altered	by	the	present	as	much	as	the	
present	is	directed	by	the	past.10	
Yet	Eliot	presumes	a	natural,	uncritical	link	between	tradition	and	a	history	from	which	the	
writer	originates.	His	discussion	does	not	address	the	case	of	a	writer	who	does	not	have	a	
clear	sense	of	“the	literature	of	[his]	own	country,”11	for	whom	the	question	of	tradition	
remains	undetermined.	In	order	to	be	part	of	a	simultaneous	order	in	the	present,	for	such	
an	order	to	allow	the	alteration	of	the	past	by	means	of	the	present,	there	must	be	a	past,	
one’s	tradition	must	first	be	clearly	identified.	What	of	Latin	American	writers	such	as	
																																																								
7	Ibid.	
8	This	idea	is	also	expressed	by	Martin	Buber	in:	Martin	Buber,	I	and	Thou,	trans.	Ronald	Gregor	Smith	(New	
York:	Charles	Scribner's	Sons,	1937).	For	Buber,	the	simultaneousness	of	past	and	present	exists	in	moments	
of	dialogue.	We	have	seen	Borges	mention	Buber’s	“dialogue”	as	a	form	of	writing,	when	we	discussed	his	
readings	of	Buber	in	chapter	2.	
9	Eliot,	Selected	Essays,	14.	
10	Ibid.,	15.	
11	Ibid.,	14.	
	
	117	
Borges,	whose	tradition	may	not	be	(or	has	not	been)	identifiable?	
	
The	lacuna	in	Eliot’s	article—the	problem	of	a	writer’s	relation	to	tradition	when	it	is	
undefined	or	possibly	non-existent,	when	a	writer	is	not	able	to	uncritically	recognize	or	
even	presume	his	tradition—concerned	Borges	for	much	of	the	first	decade	of	his	career.	In	
fact,	Sarlo	states,	“the	first	thing	Borges	does	is	invent	a	cultural	tradition	for	this	ex-centric	
place	that	is	his	country.	This	aesthetic	and	ideological	operation	runs	through	his	work	in	
the	twenties	and	the	first	half	of	the	thirties,	until	Historia	Universal	de	la	Infamia.”12	From	
his	very	first	publications	Borges	not	only	set	out	to	invent	the	missing	tradition	(as	Sarlo	
has	pointed	out)	but	also	attempted	a	more	theoretical	reflection	upon	the	problem	and	
imagined	solutions	to	the	lack	of	a	properly	Argentine	tradition.13		
	
As	early	as	his	1926	book	El	Tamaño	de	mi	Esperanza14	he	states	that,	since	Argentina	does	
not	have	a	tradition,	his	aim	is	to	invent	one.		
There	are	no	legends	in	this	land,	and	not	a	single	ghost	walks	our	streets.	
That	is	our	dishonor	[…]	Buenos	Aires	is	a	country,	and	we	must	find	for	it	
the	poetry,	the	music,	the	painting,	the	religion,	and	the	metaphysics	
appropriate	for	its	grandeur.	This	is	the	full	extent	of	my	hope	(el	tamaño	de	
																																																								
12	Sarlo,	Borges,	Un	Escritor	En	Las	Orillas,	4.	All	translations	from	Spanish	are	my	own	unless	otherwise	
indicated	–	YL.	
13	Borges’	efforts	did	change	over	the	course	of	the	late	thirteen	and	early	forties.	His	early	efforts	were	to	
“invent”	a	tradition	while	his	latter	efforts	were	to	think	about	the	relation	of	this	tradition	to	the	European	
one.	For	a	discussion	of	Borges’	response	to	WWII,	see:	Aizenberg,	"Postmodern	or	Post-Auschwitz,	Borges	
and	the	Limits	of	Representation."	For	a	discussion	of	Borges’	intellectual	circle	and	activity	from	the	twenties	
to	the	Peronist	Era,	see:	Annick	Louis,	Borges	Ante	El	Fascismo	(Bern;	Oxford:	Peter	Lang,	2007).			
14	Borges,	El	Tamaño	De	Mi	Esperanza.	Reprinted	as:	El	Tamaño	De	Mi	Esperanza	(Barcelona:	Seix	Barral,	
1994).	The	essay	for	which	the	book	was	named,	was	translated	in:	On	Argentina,	ed.	Alfred	Mac	Adam	and	
Suzanne	Jill	Levine	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	2010),	45-48.	Previous	to	this	essay	collection	of	1926	Borges	
had	published	two	books	of	poetry.	This	was	his	first	book	of	essays.	It	was	not	included	in	his	Complete	
Works.	In	fact,	it	was	not	reprinted	again	until	after	his	death	in	1994.		
	
	118	
mi	esperanza).15		
	
Borges	then	goes	on	to	reject	what	were	considered	properly	Argentine	cultural	traditions	
at	the	time.	
I	want	neither	progressivism	nor	criollismo	[…]	The	first	means	subjecting	
ourselves	to	being	almost-North-Americans	or	almost-Europeans,	a	
tenacious	being	almost-others.	The	second,	once	a	word	for	action	[…]	is	
today	a	word	for	nostalgia	(the	slack	appetite	for	the	countryside).	Not	much	
fervor	in	either.16			
Borges	does	not	want	to	imitate	others,	nor	does	he	want	to	encourage	nostalgia	for	the	
rural	culture	of	nineteenth	century	Argentine	ranchers.	These	are	both	options	he	will	
reject	more	comprehensively	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	as	well.	The	former	
he	will	call	“play	at	being	European”17	and	the	latter	“Gauchesco	poetry.”18	But	in	the	mid-
1920s	he	did	not	yet	formulate	the	comprehensive	argument	of	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	
Tradition.”	Nor,	does	it	seem,	is	there	any	hint	of	perceiving	the	Judaic	as	a	model	for	
dealing	with	this	question.	
	
In	the	prologue	to	his	1930	book	Evaristo	Carriego19	he	muses	of	his	childhood	
neighborhood:	“What	was	that	Palermo	like	or	what	would	it	have	been	beautiful	if	it	had	
been	like?	To	these	questions	this	book	attempted	to	reply,	less	documentary	than	
																																																								
15	On	Argentina,	47.	
16	Ibid.	Borges	alludes	here	to	his	first	book	of	poetry.	See:	Fervor	De	Buenos	Aires:	Poemas	(Buenos	Aires:	
Impr.	Serrantes,	1923).	
17	Selected	Non-Fictions,	425.	
18	Ibid.,	420.	
19	Evaristo	Carriego	(Buenos	Aires:	M.	Gleizer,	1930).	
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imaginative.”20	The	subjunctive	conditional	Borges	uses	in	this	question	places	the	past	in	a	
counterfactual	tense.	For	Argentina	there	is	no	answer,	outside	of	an	imagined	one,	for	the	
question	of	being	rooted	in	a	past.	Borges	must	invent	this	past	that	is	counterfactual.	This	
inventive	effort	is	what	Sarlo	has	identified	in	his	literary	works	of	the	time.	I	am	not	
concerned	with	discussing	these	literary	works	as	anything	more	than	background	here.21	
My	intention	is	to	track	a	series	of	reflections	upon	this	question	that	lead	Borges	to	its	
most	emblematic—and,	I	will	demonstrate,	altered—articulation	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	
and	Tradition.”		
	
A	few	pages	later	in	Evaristo	Carriego	Borges	modifies	his	counterfactual	tone.		
I	affirm—without	affected	fear	nor	imaginative	love	of	paradox—that	only	
new	countries	have	a	past;	that	is	to	say,	an	autobiographical	memory	of	it;	
that	is	to	say,	have	a	living	history.	If	time	is	successive,	we	should	recognize	
that	where	there	is	greater	density	of	events,	more	time	flows	and	that	the	
most	abundant	is	that	of	this	inconsequential	side	of	the	world	[…]	Time—a	
European	emotion	of	men	whose	days	are	numerous,	and	as	its	vindication	
and	crown	[sic.]—is	of	greater	imprudent	circulation	in	these	republics	[…]	
Here	we	are	of	the	same	time	as	time.22		
	
There	are	two	points	in	which	this	passage	is	consistent	with	Eliot.	First,	in	order	to	invent	
																																																								
20	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	101.	[Emphasis	added	–YL.]	
21	For	further	discussion	of	Borges’	early	works	see:	Sarlo,	Borges,	Un	Escritor	En	Las	Orillas.	Graciela	
Montaldo,	"Borges:	Una	Vanguardia	Criolla,"	in	Yrigoyen	Entre	Borges	Y	Arlt:	1916-1930,	ed.	Graciela	Montaldo	
(Buenos	Aires:	Contrapunto,	1989).	Sylvia	Molloy,	Signs	of	Borges,	trans.	Oscar	Montero	(Durham:	Duke	
University	Press,	1994).	
22	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	107	ff.2.	
	
	120	
the	content	of	an	Argentine	tradition,	Borges	must	also	affirm	the	existence	of	a	past	within	
which	such	an	invention	will	be	manifest.	In	these	lines,	Borges	is	conceptualizing	a	
properly	Argentine	past,	which	maintains	a	tension	with	the	kind	of	universal	history	he	
will	later—as	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”—identify	as	the	locus	(or	lack)	of	
Argentine	tradition.	Second,	in	this	passage	Borges	maintains	that	such	a	properly	
Argentine	past	is	essential	for	the	existence	of	a	properly	Argentine	tradition.	It	is	an	
attempt	to	identify	what	Eliot	describes	as	the	historical	sense	of	the	literature	of	his	own	
country,	understood	as	the	concomitant	idiosyncrasy	of	a	country’s	history	with	the	
idiosyncrasy	of	its	literary	tradition.	The	point	of	departure	from	Eliot’s	argument	is	in	a	
surprising	competitive	note	added	here	to	the	discussion.	For	the	first	time	in	his	writing,	
Borges	represents	“the	past”	as	a	zero	sum	game;	either	it	is	the	case	that	Europe	has	a	past,	
full	of	nationally	bound	idiosyncratic	literary	traditions,	or	it	is	that	only	the	new	countries	
of	the	Americas	have	a	past	at	all.	Borges	clearly	opts	for	the	latter	when	he	states	“here	we	
are	of	the	same	time	as	time.”23	
	
Several	years	later,	in	a	1933	essay	titled	“La	Eternidad	y	T.S.	Eliot,”24	Borges	quotes	
extensively	from	Eliot’s	essay,	explaining	the	idea	of	the	“historical	sense”	by	identifying	
“the	concepts	[Eliot]	attempts	to	consolidate	or	avoid.”25	These,	Borges	explains,	are	the	
ideas	of	“progress”	and	“classicism.”		
One	[concept	Eliot	wishes	to	avoid]	is	the	idea	of	progress	[…]	Indefinite	
progress	makes	of	every	book	the	draft	of	a	successive	book:	a	condition	that,	
																																																								
23	Ibid.	
24	Originally:	"La	Eternidad	Y	T.	S.	Eliot,"	Poesía	1,	no.	3	(1933).	Collected	in:	Textos	Recobrados,	1931-1955	
(Buenos	Aires:	Emece	Editores,	2001),	49-52.	
25	Textos	Recobrados,	1931-1955,	50.	
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while	it	borders	on	the	prophetic,	is	foolish	and	rudimentary	as	well.26			
	
The	contrary	hypothesis,	that	of	the	classics,	is	much	more	inept	[…]	On	the	
one	hand	it	affirms	that	erudition	and	refined	work	are	the	conditions	of	art;	
on	the	other,	that	[the	classics]	have	a	secret	and	lasting	significance.27		
	
In	this	first	direct	engagement	with	Eliot’s	essay,	Borges	already	signals	the	limitation	of	
the	“historical	sense”	in	that,	in	its	attempt	to	reconcile	the	motions	of	history,	it	is	entirely	
predicated	upon	a	definition	of	that	very	term,	to	which	the	Latin	American	writer—
individually	talented	as	she	or	he	may	be—has	no	access.	There	is	a	tension	between	the	
idea	that	a	writer	is	constantly	progressing,	improving,	innovating	upon	his	precursors,	and	
the	thought	that	the	farther	he	gets	from	his	precursors	the	farther	he	gets	from	the	source	
of	his	own	tradition.	Borges’	observation	is	that	to	be	caught	within	such	tensions	of	
historical	tradition,	one	must	first	be	caught	within	an	historical	tradition.		
	
After	signaling	the	inapplicability	of	Eliot’s	attempted	reconciliation	to	his	own	
circumstances,	Borges	also	identifies	the	implications	of	Eliot’s	thesis	for	the	possibility	of	a	
Latin	American	literary	tradition.						
I	come	to	the	thesis	formulated	by	Eliot	[…]	It	does	not	propose	to	challenge	
the	accumulated	classical	order,	nor	promise	its	clients	a	talisman	that	
foretells	glory	[…]	The	influence	of	the	present	upon	the	past	–	is	of	a	literal	
																																																								
26	Ibid.	
27	Ibid.,	51.	
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veracity,	though	it	may	seem	relativist	mischief.28	
Juan	de	Castro	demonstrates	the	manner	in	which	Borges’	selective	and	edited	citations	of	
Eliot’s	essay	emphasize	the	idea	of	the	present	changing	the	past	over	other,	more	central,	
arguments	and	proposals	Eliot	makes	in	the	essay.	Borges’	citation	presents,	“in	a	way	
more	concise	and	vigorous	than	Eliot’s	original,	the	arguments	that	justify	this	notion.”29	
This	essay	is	also	an	early	source	for	the	thoughts	Borges	develops	in	“The	Argentine	
Writer	and	Tradition,”	where	“the	idea	that	Borges	encountered	in	‘Tradition	and	the	
Individual	Talent,’	of	the	influence	of	the	present	upon	the	past,	had	become	a	new	
proposal	about	literary	history.”30		
	
It	seems	natural	to	insert	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	into	the	argument	Borges	
was	building	in	his	essays	between	1926	and	1933.	This	would	explain	why	starting	with	
the	second	edition	of	his	1932	essay	collection	Discusión,31	published	in	1957,	“The	
Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	was	added	to	the	volume.	Nevertheless,	there	are	
important	differences	in	this	final	articulation	of	the	problem	of	Argentine	tradition.	Most	
obviously,	the	context	had	changed	dramatically.	As	Annick	Louis	puts	it:	“The	decade	of	
the	1920s	was	a	golden	age	for	cultural	and	literary	journals	[…]	The	thirties,	on	the	other	
hand,	are	marked	by	crisis,	politicization	and	polarization	of	the	media	and	the	intellectuals	
																																																								
28	Ibid.,	52.	
29	Juan	E.	de	Castro,	"De	Eliot	a	Borges:	Tradición	Y	Periferia,"	Iberoamericana	VII,	no.	26	(2007):	11.	Castro	
suggest	this	early	engagement	with	Eliot	“could	be	read	as	a	draft	of	‘Kafka	and	His	Precursors’”	(ibid.,	9.),	in	
which	Borges	will	push	this	thesis	to	its	limits.	We	will	return	to	this	later	essay	by	Borges	in	chapter	4.	
30	Ibid.,	13.	
31	Borges,	Discusión.	
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while	power	was	violently	redistributed.”32	The	1920s	saw	the	liberal	governments	of	
Hipólito	Yrigoyen	and	Marcelo	T.	Alvear,	but	in	September	of	1930	Yrigoyen	was	
overthrown	in	a	military	coup	by	General	José	Uriburu,	who	effectively	kicked	off	what	has	
been	known	as	“The	Infamous	Decade”	in	Argentine	history.	Moreover,	by	the	early	1950s	
when	Borges	delivered	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	as	a	lecture	at	the	Colegio	
Libre	de	Estudios	Superiores—an	intellectual	hub	of	anti-Peronist	sentiment—World	War	
II	had	left	its	mark	on	Argentina	and	the	country	was	half	a	decade	into	the	populist	rule	of	
Juan	Domingo	Perón.33				
	
Questions	of	national	tradition	had	received	greater	importance	in	the	context	of	a	
conservative	nationalist	movement	that	had	now	gained	substantial	political	power	in	the	
country.	In	this	context,	we	should	understand	the	1951	lecture	as	an	opportunity,	in	which	
Borges	revisits	his	earlier	thoughts	on	the	question	of	Argentine	tradition	and	attempts	to	
re-articulate	them	as	a	commentary	on	the	political	moment	in	which	it	was	delivered.	His	
points	of	reference	for	what	he	previously	rejected	as	“progressivism”	and	“criollismo”	
become	references	to	ideas	he	encountered	in	more	contemporary	intellectual	circles.	Thus	
																																																								
32	Louis,	Borges	Ante	El	Fascismo,	21.	For	more	on	Argentine	intellectual	circles	in	the	1930s,	as	well	as	Borges’	
public	intellectual	activity	in	the	‘30s	and	‘40s,	see:	Maria	Teresa	Gramuglio,	Nacionalismo	Y	Cosmopolitismo	
En	La	Literatura	Argentina	(Rosario,	Argentina:	Editorial	municipal	de	Rosario,	2013).		
33	Edna	Aizenberg	goes	as	far	as	to	argue:	“without	the	confluence	of	Hitler,	the	collapse	of	the	Western	order	
as	he	knew	it,	the	national-fascist	revolution	in	his	own	Argentina,	and	the	torture,	sodomy,	rape,	and	mass	
executions,	the	so-so	poet	and	sharp-tongued	essayist	would	not	have	become	‘Borges.’”	(Aizenberg,	""I,	a	
Jew":	Borges,	Nazism	and	the	Shoah,"	339.)	We	will	return	to	the	topic	of	Borges	and	WWII	in	the	next	
chapter	on	Borges,	but	much	of	what	has	been	written	on	this	topic	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	current	
discussion.	For	further	discussion	see:	Books	and	Bombs	in	Buenos	Aires:	Borges,	Gerchunoff,	and	Argentine-
Jewish	Writing.	Especially	chapters	7,	8	&	9.	For	more	on	Borges	and	WWII	see:	Annick	Louis,	"La	Adhesión	a	
La	Realidad	:	Las	Ficciones	De	Borges	Durante	La	Segunda	Guerra	Mundial,"	in	El	Enigma	De	Lo	Real:	Las	
Fronteras	Del	Realismo	En	La	Narrativa	Del	Siglo	Xx,	ed.	Genevieve	Fabry	and	Claudio	Canaparo	(Oxford;	New	
York:	Peter	Lang,	2007);	"Borges	Y	El	Nazismo,"	Variaciones	Borges	4	(1997).	
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“progressivism”	becomes	“play	at	being	European,”34	a	reference	to	Eduardo	Mallea’s	
celebrated	1937	book	Historia	de	una	Pasión	Argentina,35	and	“criollismo”	becomes	the	
“Argentine	cult	of	local	color,”36	a	reference	to	the	Peronist	intellectuals	a	decade	later	and	
to	official	state	versions	of	Argentine	tradition.	
	
Moreover,	in	his	1951	lecture,	Borges	moves	away	from	the	necessity	of	having	a	properly	
Argentine	tradition.	Unlike	in	El	Tamaño	de	mi	Esperanza	and	Evaristo	Carriego,	where	his	
solutions	are	trying	to	pull	such	a	tradition	from	imagination,	from	conjecture	or	from	the	
past,	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	he	goes	through	the	extent	options	for	
Argentine	traditions	and	eventually	questions	the	very	necessity	of	having	ones	“own”	
tradition.	Thus	from	the	very	start	of	the	lecture,	Borges	announces	his	skepticism	about	
the	existence	of	“the	problem	of	the	Argentine	writer	and	tradition.”37	In	the	discussion	that	
follows	he	breaks	down	this	“appearance,	a	simulacrum,”38	as	he	terms	it,	into	the	two	
questions	Eliot	deals	with	as	well.	But	Borges	rephrases	the	questions,	so	as	to	apply	
specifically	to	the	case	of	the	Argentine	writer:	(1)	what	is	the	Argentine	writer’s	tradition?	
and,	(2)	what	should	be	the	Argentine	writer’s	proper	attitude	towards	his	tradition?		
	
By	calling	it	a	“pseudo-problem,”	Borges	attempts	to	adopt	the	easy	tone	with	which	Eliot	
answers	the	first	question.	Naturally,	the	Argentine	writer’s	tradition	is	“the	whole	of	the	
literature	of	Europe	from	Homer	and	within	it	the	whole	of	the	literature	of	[one’s]	own	
																																																								
34	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	425.	
35	Eduardo	Mallea,	Historia	De	Una	Pasión	Argentina	(Buenos	Aires:	Sur,	1937).	Translated	as:	History	of	an	
Argentine	Passion,	trans.	Myron	Lichtblau	(Pittsburgh,	PA:	Latin	American	Literary	Review	Press,	1983).	
36	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	423.	
37	Ibid.,	420.	
38	Ibid.	
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country.”39	The	simulacrum	of	a	problem	arises	for	Borges	not	from	the	idea	that	there	is	in	
fact	such	a	coherent	whole,	a	body	of	work	we	might	refer	to	as	“the	whole	of	the	literature	
of	Europe.”	This	he	seems	to	take	for	granted.	The	problem	is	that	the	second	question—
namely,	what	should	be	the	Argentine	writer’s	proper	attitude	towards	his	tradition?—
produces	the	entanglement	of	this	“coherent	whole”	with	the	suggestion	that	there	is	a	
particularly	Argentine	literary	tradition	in	the	first	place.	That	is,	the	particular	Argentine	
tradition	and	the	universal	European	tradition	are	coterminous,	and	are	thus	
indistinguishable	from	one	another.	Identifying	the	particular	Argentine	tradition	is	not	
possible	because	its	very	particularity	is	a	simulacrum.	“My	skepticism	is	not	related	to	the	
difficulty	or	impossibility	of	resolving	the	problem,	but	to	its	very	existence,”40	Borges	
explains.	Eliot	does	not	consider	any	such	problem	of	particularity.	“The	literature	of	
[one’s]	own	country,”	he	states,	is	contained	within	“the	whole	of	the	literature	of	
Europe.”41	This	relationship	of	containment	is	not	an	issue	Eliot	elaborates	on.		
	
The	first	part	of	Borges’	lecture	reviews	the	various	contemporary	suggestions	as	to	what	
the	Argentine	tradition	might	be.	In	his	attempt	to	separate	the	question	whether	Argentina	
has	a	literary	tradition	from	the	question	of	its	relation	to	European	tradition,	Borges	
rejects	as	possible	answers	both	the	Gauchesque	genre	of	Argentina’s	nineteenth	century	
ranchers,	and	the	literary	tradition	of	Spain,	the	founder	of	the	Rio	de	la	Plata	colonies.	Nor	
can	he	accept	the	opinion	that	Argentina	has	no	tradition,	“that	we	Argentines	are	cut	off	
																																																								
39	Eliot,	Selected	Essays,	14.	
40	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	420.	
41	Eliot,	Selected	Essays,	14.	
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from	the	past.”42	There	is	such	a	thing	as	an	Argentine	literary	tradition,	Borges	asserts;	
one	that	is	better	perceived	if	we	do	not	confuse	its	identification	with	its	relation	to	
European	tradition.	“What	is	Argentine	tradition?	I	believe	that	this	question	poses	no	
problem	and	can	easily	be	answered.	I	believe	that	our	tradition	is	the	whole	of	Western	
culture,”43	he	states,	repeating	Eliot	but	with	a	difference.	
	
Borges	adopts	Eliot’s	idea	of	the	simultaneity	with	which	“the	whole	of	the	literature	of	
Europe”	presents	itself	to	the	writer.	In	this	manner	Borges’	answer	avoids	raising	the	
question	of	a	relation	to	the	whole.	The	Argentine	writer’s	tradition,	he	suggests,	is	the	
whole	of	European	literature.	The	appearance	of	a	pseudo-problem	begins	with	the	
attempt	to	divide	this	“whole”	into	parts,	and	continues	with	the	attempt	to	locate	“the	
Argentine	part”	within	the	whole	–	an	attempt	that	results	in	the	confusion	of	the	very	
existence	of	such	an	“Argentine	part”	with	its	existence	as	a	part	of	the	whole.			
	
After	outlining	“the	historical	sense,”	Eliot’s	essay	moves	from	“tradition”	and	“talent”	to	
“the	individual”	and	discusses	the	role	of	feelings	and	emotions	in	the	work	of	art.	He	ends	
stating	that	“this	essay	proposes	to	halt	at	the	frontier	of	metaphysics	or	mysticism.”44	
Borges	sees	no	reason	to	halt	there.	For	him	there	is	something	inherently	metaphysical	
about	the	idea	that	the	past	changes	as	a	result	of	the	present,	and	that	the	part	and	the	
whole	are	identical.	He	continues	Eliot’s	discussion	a	bit	further.	“I	believe	that	this	
problem	of	the	Argentine	and	tradition	is	simply	a	contemporary	and	fleeting	version	of	the	
																																																								
42	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	425.	
43	Ibid.,	426.	
44	Eliot,	Selected	Essays,	21.	
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eternal	problem	of	determinism,”45	he	states.	This	is	an	odd	connection	to	draw	since	the	
idea	of	determinism	is	the	opposite	of	the	idea	that	the	present	can	change	the	past.	
Determinism	holds	that	the	past	always	leads,	inevitably	and	irrevocably,	to	a	single	
possible	version	of	the	present.	Borges,	tongue	in	cheek,	explains	as	much.	
	
If	I	am	going	to	touch	this	table	with	one	of	my	hands,	and	I	ask	myself:	"Will	I	
touch	it	with	the	left	hand	or	the	right?"	and	I	touch	it	with	the	right	hand,	the	
determinists	will	say	that	I	could	not	have	done	otherwise	and	that	the	whole	
prior	history	of	the	universe	forced	me	to	touch	the	table	with	my	right	hand,	
and	that	touching	it	with	my	left	hand	would	have	been	a	miracle.	Yet	if	I	had	
touched	it	with	my	left	hand,	they	would	have	told	me	the	same	thing:	that	I	
was	forced	to	touch	it	with	that	hand.46	
	
In	Borges’	humorous	portrayal,	“the	determinists”	will	always	be	right,	since	they	are	
always	only	affirming	the	inevitability	of	the	present	a	moment	after	it	passes.	They	are	
unable	to	predict	what	will	happen,	but	as	soon	as	it	does	they	state	it	could	not	have	
happened	otherwise.	This	sort	of	logic	would	make	“the	determinists”	an	annoyingly-
always-right	bunch,	if	not	for	the	added	fact	that	(in	Borges’	depiction)	they	base	their	
claim	about	the	inevitability	of	the	present	on	the	past.	This	is	the	point	at	which	Borges	
wants	to	appropriate	the	determinist	logic	for	his	argument.	“The	same	occurs	with	literary	
subjects	and	techniques.	Everything	we	Argentine	writers	do	felicitously	will	belong	to	
																																																								
45	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	426.	
46	Ibid.	
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Argentine	tradition.”47	If	the	present	can	alter	the	past,	it	is	by	retroactively	making	the	
past	into	that	which	pre-determines	the	present.	This	retroactive	pre-determination	makes	
the	Argentine	tradition	identifiable.	The	entire	history	of	Europe	has	led	inevitably	to	the	
present	moment	in	Argentina.	Everything	Argentine	writers	do	is	retroactively	pre-
determined,	and	forms	part	of	the	simultaneous	order	that	is	Argentine	tradition.			
	
Thus	far	we	have	seen	how	Borges	successfully	brackets	the	second	question	(what	should	
be	the	Argentine	writer’s	proper	attitude	towards	his	tradition?)	in	order	to	answer	the	
first	of	his	two	questions:	What	is	the	Argentine	writer’s	tradition?	Borges	suggests	the	
Argentine	writer	has	the	whole	of	Western	culture	as	his	tradition	and	must	operate	
therein.	We	come	now	to	the	second	question:	How	ought	he	operate	within	this	vast	
“simultaneous	order”?	Taking	up	this	question	Borges	will	introduce	his	representation	of	
the	Judaic.	
	
In	his	answer	to	the	second	question,	Borges	recalls	the	article	“The	Intellectual	Pre-
Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe”	by	the	North	American	sociologist	Thorstein	
Veblen.48	Borges	summarizes	the	article:	“[Veblen]	says	that	Jews	are	prominent	in	
Western	culture	because	they	act	within	that	culture	and	at	the	same	time	do	not	feel	
bound	to	it	by	any	special	devotion.”49	Another	social	group	Borges	highlights	are	the	Irish	
within	English	culture.	“The	fact	of	feeling	themselves	to	be	Irish,	to	be	different,	was	
enough	to	enable	them	to	make	innovations	in	English	culture.	I	believe	that	Argentines,	
																																																								
47	Ibid.	
48	Veblen,	"The	Intellectual	Pre-Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe."	
49	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	246.	
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and	South	Americans	in	general,	are	in	an	analogous	situation.”50	Borges	suggests	the	
Argentines’	attitude	toward	European	tradition	should	mimic	that	of	the	Irish	and	the	Jews.	
Acting	within	it	without	feeling	bound	to	it,	and	with	a	measure	of	“irreverence,”	this	is	how	
Borges	would	like	the	Argentine	writer	to	treat	“the	whole	of	Western	culture.”	
	
Though	Borges	only	mentions	them	towards	the	end	of	the	discussion,	it	is	clear	he	sees	the	
Jews	and	the	Irish	as	examples	to	imitate,	as	cultural	groups	contained	within	Europe	that	
operate	within	it	very	successfully.	Within	the	broader	culture	of	Europe,	the	mere	“fact	of	
feeling	themselves	[…]	to	be	different,	was	enough	to	enable	them	to	make	innovations.”51	
Having	located	the	Argentine	writer	within	the	whole	of	Western	culture,	it	is	this	feeling	of	
difference	as	well	that	Borges	wishes	to	promote	among	Argentines.	Veblen’s	
understanding	of	the	success	of	Jews	in	Europe	offers	Borges	what	he	perceives	as	an	
attractive	model	of	cultural	difference.	Veblen’s	text	is	certainly	central	in	answering	the	
second	question.	However,	reading	the	article	itself,	we	will	find	it	is	equally	pertinent	to	
the	structure	of	Borges’	argument	throughout	his	entire	lecture.			
	
Though	Borges	does	not	mention	it	on	the	occasion	of	his	lecture,	the	main	concern	of	
Veblen’s	article	is	with	the	effects	of	Zionism	on	what	he	calls	“Christendom.”	In	other	
moments	Borges	connects	this	article	more	directly	to	his	own	attitude	towards	Zionism,	
but	that	is	not	his	concern	in	the	present	lecture.	In	order	to	elaborate	his	views	on	the	
effects	of	Zionism,	Veblen	attempts	to	outline	“the	conditioning	circumstances	[…]	the	
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nature	and	causes	of	Jewish	achievement	in	Gentile	Europe.”52	The	overarching	goal	of	his	
article	is	to	caution	that	the	intellectual	pre-eminence	of	Jews,	as	the	title	introduces	it,	is	
precisely	what	will	be	undone	by	the	success	of	the	Zionist	project,	which	“is	always	a	
project	for	withdrawal	upon	themselves,	a	scheme	of	national	demarkation	[sic.]	between	
Jew	and	gentile.”53		
	
It	is	not	the	project	of	demarcation	per-se	that	troubles	Veblen.	His	eventual	explanation,	
which	Borges	concisely	articulated	in	his	lecture,	is	certainly	a	scheme	of	demarcation	
between	Jews	and	non-Jews.	What	troubles	him	about	Zionism	is	that	“there	runs	through	
it	all	a	dominant	bias	of	isolation	and	in-breeding.”54	Veblen	will	attempt	to	define	the	
terms	of	the	interaction	between	Jew	and	non-Jew	that	have	been	so	productive	in	his	mind.	
The	question	regards	the	conditioning	circumstances	of	this	propitious	interaction,	
circumstances	without	which	Jewish	preeminence	will	surely	disappear.	
	
In	order	to	explain	his	predicted	outcome	of	Zionism,	Veblen	discusses	the	circumstances	
within	which	“the	Jewish	people	have	contributed	much	more	than	an	even	share	to	the	
intellectual	life	of	modern	Europe.”55	This	contribution	is	a	basic	assumption	and	point	of	
departure.	Veblen	then	proposes	a	series	of	possible	explanations	for	this	preeminence	and	
rejects	them	one	by	one.	Having	determined	in	advance	that	the	grounds	for	these	
achievements	lie	in	a	certain	mode	of	interaction—in	the	circumstances	of	Jewish	existence	
within,	and	attitude	towards,	gentile	Europe—the	explanations	Veblen	raises	and	rejects	
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are	all	possible	answers	to	a	question	rather	similar	to	Borges’	second	question:	what	is	the	
relation	to	Western	culture	that	has	been	so	advantageous	for	the	Jews?	It	is	here	that	a	
comparison	of	Veblen	and	Borges’	rejected	answers	will	illuminate	just	how	much	Borges’	
lecture	was	influenced	by	the	train	of	thought,	through	which	Veblen	explains	his	basic	
assumption	about	Jewish	contributions	to	Europe.		
	
The	first	answer	Veblen	rejects	is	that	“the	Jewish	strain	itself,	racially	speaking,	can	[…]	be	
held	to	account	for	[…]	the	pedigree	of	the	Jewish	nation.”56	In	his	lecture,	Borges	follows	
Veblen	in	rejecting	any	answer	that	does	not	assume—for	Argentines	and	Jews	both—that	
interaction	with	Europe	is	inevitable	and,	furthermore,	that	their	success	is	predicated	
upon	the	manner	in	which	they	admit	and	embrace	the	interaction.	The	answer	to	the	
(second)	question	regarding	the	Argentine	writer’s	auspicious	relation	to	Western	
tradition	cannot	be	“none.”	The	first	answer	Borges	rejects	is	the	Gauchesque	genre,	which	
attempts	to	imitate	the	poetry	of	nineteenth	century	Argentine	ranchers	(the	Gauchos).57	In	
its	particularistic	imitation	of	such	narrow	subject	matter,	the	Gauchesque	genre	would	
only	relapse	Argentine	literature	into	an	obsession	with	“local	color.”	“The	idea	that	writers	
must	seek	out	subjects	local	to	their	countries	is	also	new	and	arbitrary,”58	Borges	states.	
Worse	yet,	such	a	circumscribed	set	of	themes	and	references	produces	literature,	for	
which	one	“needs	a	glossary	in	order	to	reach	even	an	approximate	understanding.”59	
Moreover,	Borges	continues,	this	“cult	of	local	color	is	a	recent	European	cult	that	
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nationalists	should	reject	as	a	foreign	import.”60	The	quip	at	the	“nationalists”	is	a	critique	
of	his	contemporary	Peronist	intellectuals.	The	idea	of	“Argentineity”	(argentinidad)	was	
most	notably	expressed	a	decade	and	a	half	earlier	in	the	celebrated	work	of	Eduardo	
Mallea,	Historia	de	una	Pasión	Argentina.61	Mallea’s	ideas	were	picked	up	by	Peronist	
intellectuals,	who	espoused	nationalist-essentialist	views	of	Argentine	identity.	This	
essentialism	is	what	Borges	calls	an	obsession	with	local	color.	Borges’	remark,	that	the	
thought	one	must	espouse	local	color	is	an	entirely	non-local	idea,	is	a	comment	on	the	
inevitable	interaction	between	Argentina	and	Europe	and	its	results.	Argentine	“local”	
ideas	will	never	be	detached	from	the	influence	“foreign”	Europe	exerts	upon	them.62		
	
In	Veblen’s	account,	Jewish	preeminence	is	achieved	only	by	embracing	the	interaction	
with	Europe,	not	by	attempting	to	avoid	or	deny	it.	That	is,	the	preeminence	of	Jews	is	only	
realized	through	immersion	in	the	culture	from	which	they	are	to	be	differentiated.	“This	
intellectual	pre-eminence	of	the	Jews	has	come	into	bearing	within	the	gentile	community	
of	peoples,	not	from	the	outside	[…]	the	men	who	have	been	its	bearers	have	been	men	
immersed	in	this	gentile	culture.”63	
	
The	next	answer	Borges	rejects	is	the	proposition	that	a	return	to	the	historical	origins	of	
Argentina	might	produce	the	desired	tradition.	This	second	rejection	is	in	line	with	the	
progression	of	Veblen’s	argument.	As	Veblen	sees	it,	“the	Zionists	aspire	to	bring	to	full	
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fruition	all	that	massive	endowment	of	spiritual	and	intellectual	capacities	of	which	their	
people	have	given	evidence	throughout	their	troubled	history.”64	Yet	this	history	has	been	
one	of	growing	distance	between	the	Jews	and	their	“home-bred	Jewish	scheme	of	
things,”65	and	the	intellectual	capacities	Veblen	discusses	are	precisely	a	result	of	this	
distancing.	After	all,	“the	days	of	Solomon	and	the	caravan	trade	[…]	are	long	past,”66	he	
observes.	Jewish	preeminence	does	not	stem	from	a	link	to	the	“oriental	twelfth	century	
BC,”67	which	the	Zionists	wish	to	revive	in	order	to	bring	Jewish	preeminence	to	its	fullest	
fruition.	That	historical	link	is	“of	an	archaic	fashion	[…]	it	all	bears	the	date-mark,	‘B.C.’	[…]	
no	longer	of	the	substance	of	those	things	that	are	inquired	into	by	men	to	whom	the	ever	
increasingly	mechanistic	orientation	of	the	modern	time	becomes	habitual.”68	The	history	
of	Jewish	preeminence	is	a	history	of	moving	away	from	this	“B.C.”	trademark.	Therefore,	
Veblen	reasons,	any	regression	to	it	will	result	in	a	move	away	from	the	preeminence	that	
exists.	
	
The	second	answer	Borges	rejects	is	to	the	idea	that	the	Argentine	writer’s	tradition	aught	
to	be	the	literary	tradition	of	Spain.	“Argentine	history	can	unequivocally	be	defined	as	a	
desire	to	move	away	from	Spain,	as	a	willed	distancing	from	Spain,”69	he	objects.	Borges	
thus	concludes,	“the	fact	that	certain	illustrious	Argentine	writers	write	like	Spaniards	is	
not	so	much	a	testimony	to	some	inherited	capacity	as	it	is	evidence	of	Argentine	
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versatility.”70	Reading	Veblen	alongside	Borges’	lecture	highlights	the	objection	to	such	a	
“return”	to	the	historical	inheritance	of	Spanish	tradition	(or	the	days	of	King	Solomon).	
Firstly,	it	is	still	too	narrow	a	proposition	to	be	the	source	of	Argentine	tradition.	Borges	
has	already	identified	the	Argentine’s	tradition	as	the	whole	of	Western	culture.	Spanish	
tradition	is	subsumed	by	the	broader	category	he	has	already	proposed.	Secondly,	the	
“return”	implied	by	selecting	this	particular	historicity	is	in	contrast	to	the	movement	away	
from	particularistic	history.	Searching	for	an	Argentine	application	for	the	social	structure	
underpinning	Veblen’s	“Jewish	preeminence,”	Borges	is	objecting	to	the	construction	of	an	
historical	“return	to	the	source”	that	Veblen	identifies	with	Zionism.	As	we	have	stated,	the	
place	of	Zionism	as	an	opposite	solution	to	the	one	Borges	borrows	from	Veblen	is	not	
explicit	in	Borges’	lecture.	Yet	the	structure	of	the	lecture	mimics	the	flow	of	Veblen’s	
argument	both	rhetorically,	in	surveying	and	rejecting	solutions,	and	in	the	content	of	the	
solutions	being	surveyed.	
	
The	third	and	final	answer	Borges	rejects	is		
the	opinion	that	we	Argentines	are	cut	off	from	the	past;	that	there	has	been	
some	sort	of	rupture	between	ourselves	and	Europe.	According	to	this	
singular	point	of	view,	we	Argentines	are	as	if	in	the	first	days	of	creation;	
our	search	for	European	subject	matters	and	techniques	is	an	illusion,	an	
error;	we	must	understand	that	we	are	essentially	alone,	and	cannot	play	at	
being	European.71		
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To	this	opinion	Borges	opposes:	“Everything	that	has	happened	in	Europe,	the	dramatic	
events	there	in	recent	years,	has	resonated	deeply	here.	This	would	not	happen	if	we	were	
detached	from	Europe.”72	Borges	is	referring	to	the	divisive	effects	that	World	War	II	had	in	
Argentina.	Though	the	country	remained	neutral	for	most	of	the	war,	joining	the	Allies	only	
months	before	it	ended,	the	popular	press	was	rife	with	debate	over	Argentina’s	“natural”	
affiliations.73	
	
While	Borges’	objection	is	that	such	profound	affects	would	not	have	been	felt	if	Argentina	
was	detached	from	Europe,	it	also	references	the	difficulty	Argentines	have	felt	in	being	
European.	This	existence	within	Europe,	which	at	the	same	time	is	experienced	as	a	
difficulty,	segues	Borges’	lecture	into	Veblen’s	account	of	European	Jewry.	Borges	does	not	
reject	the	difficulty	that	exists	for	Argentines	when	they	“play	at	being	European.”	What	
Borges	rejects	in	this	third	answer	is	the	idea	that	this	feeling	of	difficulty	implies	
Argentines	are	cut	off	from	Europe	and	the	past.	To	the	contrary,	he	will	affirm,	as	for	the	
Jews	and	the	Irish,	the	difficulty	involved	in	this	“play”	stems	from	the	very	fact	that	it	is	
inevitable,	while	at	the	same	time	always	involves	“feeling	themselves	[…]	to	be	
different.”74		
	
By	comparing	these	rejected	answers	we	see	how	Borges’	desire	to	mimic	Veblen’s	ideas	of	
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Jewish	difference	in	Argentine	letters	entails	the	rejection	of	other	models—perhaps	
equally	feasible—which	Veblen	too	has	posited	as	ulterior	to	that	which	comprises	the	
propitious	difference	of	the	Jews.	Neither	Veblen	nor	Borges	say	it	is	impossible	to	found	an	
Argentine	literature	on	the	Gauchesque	genre	or	to	establish	a	Jewish	nation	in	isolation.	
They	only	say	that	such	solutions	would	not	be	fortuitous	to	Jews	or	Argentines.	Equally	
feasible,	both	Veblen’s	depiction	of	Zionism	and	Borges’	rejected	literary	traditions	were	
certainly	extant	solutions,	but	they	are	understood	as	models	of	isolation	rather	than	
interaction.	There	is	a	particular	social	structure	of	inclusion	and	difference	that	Borges	
sees	(through	Veblen)	in	the	Jews	of	Europe,	and	which	he	attempts	to	implement	in	the	
relation	between	Argentina	and	Europe.	But	what	is	this	social	structure,	within	which	
Jews	operate	immersed	while	feeling	themselves	to	be	different,	and	which	Borges	wants	to	
model	for	the	Argentine	writer?		
	
What	is	a	Margin?	
	
After	rejecting	inherent	traits	and	historical	origins	as	explanations,	Veblen	proceeds	to	
detail	the	existence	of	those	Jews	preeminent	in	modern	Europe.	Veblen	characterizes	this	
existence	in	two	ways.	First,	it	is	a	social	existence	“within	the	gentile	community	of	
peoples,	not	from	the	outside	[…]	immersed	in	this	gentile	culture.”75	The	basic	condition	of	
successful	Jews	in	Europe	is	that	of	immersion	in	the	surrounding	non-Jewish	culture.	
Second,	though	they	exist	within	the	culture	of	Europe,	Jews	feel	no	attachment	to	it.	“In	
their	character	of	a	Chosen	People,	it	is	not	for	them	to	take	thought	of	their	unblest	[sic.]	
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neighbors,”76	Veblen	explains.		
	
We	should	qualify	this	is	not	the	existence	of	all	Jews	in	Europe.	Borges	takes	Veblen’s	
explanation	of	individual	preeminence	to	stand	for	the	broader	Jewish	community	in	
Western	culture.	This,	however,	is	not	Veblen’s	argument.	“The	cultural	heritage	of	the	
Jewish	people	is	large	and	rich,”	Veblen	admits,	but	it	“is	also	reputed	to	have	run	into	
lucubrations	that	have	no	significance	for	contemporary	science	or	scholarship	at	large.”77	
The	group	of	Jews	“immersed	in	gentile	culture”	that	Veblen	refers	to	is	somewhat	
narrower.	It	is	only	those	Jews	that	are	able	to	remove	themselves	from	the	confines	of	
their	own	tradition	and	enter	the	gentile	culture	the	way	Veblen	has	characterized	it—as	
“immersion”—that	attain	preeminence.		
			
What	is	the	auspicious	place	of	the	Jew	in	modern	Europe?	“Losing	his	secure	place	in	the	
scheme	of	conventions	into	which	he	has	been	born,”	will	land	the	Jew	within	broader	
Western	culture.	But	intellectual	preeminence	comes	“at	the	cost,	also,	of	finding	no	
similarly	secure	place	in	that	scheme	of	gentile	conventions	into	which	he	is	thrown.”78	
“Immersion”	is	a	position	that	is	at	once	inevitable	and	unattainable	to	the	Jew	who	steps	
out	of	the	bounds	of	tradition.	“There	is	nowhere	else	to	go	on	this	quest,”79	says	Veblen.	
Thus	the	Jew	“becomes	a	disturber	of	the	intellectual	peace,	but	only	at	the	cost	of	
becoming	an	intellectual	wayfaring	man,	a	wanderer	in	the	intellectual	no-man's-land.”80	
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What	the	Jews	are	able	to	achieve	is	a	radical	break	from	all	convention	and	tradition.	This	
endows	Jews	with	those	traits	that	will	benefit	themselves	as	well	as	modern	Europe,	and	
which	are	so	central	to	modern	inquiry,	prime	among	them	“a	skeptical	frame	of	mind.”81				
	
It	is	important	to	emphasize	the	question	here	is	not	one	of	identifying	Jewish	traits,	but	of	
evaluating	them.	This	is	true	for	both	Borges	and	Veblen.	Veblen	has	argued	that	it	is	“by	
force	of	a	divided	allegiance	to	the	people	of	his	origin,	that	[the	Jew]	finds	himself	in	the	
vanguard	of	modern	inquiry.”82	Consider	this	divided	allegiance	is	also	towards	the	culture	
into	which	the	Jew	has	entered	and	within	which	he	operates.	Borges	states	as	much	too,	in	
his	paraphrasing	of	Veblen;	“they	act	within	that	culture	and	at	the	same	time	do	not	feel	
bound	to	it	by	any	special	devotion.”83	Suggestions	of	a	divided	allegiance	may	smack	of	
anti-Semitism,	and	bring	to	mind	accusations	of	the	kind	presented	against	Alfred	Dreyfus	
two	decades	before	Veblen’s	article	was	published.		
	
In	her	reading	of	Jewish	influences	on	Borges	Aizenberg	clearly	notes	this,	explaining	that	
“for	Borges,	as	for	the	Nazis,	Intellektueller	meant	Jude.”84	Indeed,	she	demonstrates,	Borges	
did	not	combat	anti-Semitism	by	rejecting	this	Jewish	stereotype,	but	by	arguing	for	its	
positive	valuation.	Borges’	polemic	against	Nazism	in	the	thirties	and	forties	did	not	so	
much	dispute	their	identification	of	Jewish	divided	allegiance	as	it	argued	that	they	had	
identified	as	undesirable	a	Jewish	traits	that	is	foundational	to	Western	culture.	To	
exemplify	this	positive	valuation,	Borges	often	refers	to	notable	Jews,	whom	he	regards	as	
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major	figures	in	Western	culture.	Having	detailed	Veblen’s	influence	on	Borges’	
understanding	of	Western	Jewry,	we	will	not	be	surprised	to	find	that	the	poetry	of	Heine	
and	the	philosophy	of	Spinoza	remain	throughout	his	life	prime	examples	of	Jewish	writing,	
and	the	names	of	Spinoza	and	Heine	are	to	Borges	almost	synonymous	with	“Jew.”		
	
For	instance,	when	accused	by	the	rightwing	publication	Crisol	in	1934	of	“Jewish	ancestry,	
maliciously	hidden,	but	poorly	dissimulated,	since	even	his	poems	have	that	Psalmist	
accent	characteristic	of	Hebrew	poetry,”85	Borges	responds:	“I	am	grateful	for	the	stimulus	
provided	by	Crisol,	but	hope	is	dimming	that	I	will	ever	be	able	to	discover	my	link	[…]	to	
Heine,	Gleizer,	and	the	ten	Sefiroth;	to	Ecclesiastes	and	Chaplin.”86	That	Chaplin’s	Judaism	
was	a	rumor	matters	little	more	than	that	Spinoza	was	excommunicated,	or	that	Heine	
converted	to	Christianity.	These	facts	only	make	them	all	the	more	exemplary	of	the	social	
position	Borges	cites	from	Veblen.	They	are	more	Jewish	than	any,	precisely	for	existing	in	
the	space	between	a	departure	from	Jewish	tradition	and	(impossible)	full	inclusion	into	
European	culture.		
	
If	Veblen’s	argument	sounds	like	a	program	for	Jewish	“secularization”	(or	modernization),	
that’s	because	it	is.	Veblen	is	explicitly	suggesting	that	(in	lieu	of	what	he	sees	as	the	
isolationist	nation-state	project	of	Zionism)	the	most	propitious	path	for	Jews	is	to	leave	
their	tradition	behind	and	embrace	inevitable	yet	unattainable	integration	into	modern	
Europe.	The	path	that	runs	along	the	space	between	a	lost	Jewish	tradition	and	an	
																																																								
85	A.H.,	"Carácter	De	Estas	Notas,"	Crisol,	Jan.	30,	1934.	
86	Borges,	Selected	Non-Fictions,	110-11.	
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inaccessible	Western	culture	“can	have,	and	already	has	had,	fortunate	consequences,”87	
(as	Borges	puts	it	to	his	Argentine	listeners).		
	
The	inevitability	of	Jewish	“immersion”	in	Western	culture	is	the	basic	assumption	of	
Veblen’s	program.	Veblen	does	not	fear	the	isolationism	of	Jews	within	the	West	will	be	
damaging	to	modern	Europe.	He	sees	this	isolation	as	impossible.	“No	unbiased	ethnologist	
will	question	the	fact	that	the	Jewish	people	are	a	nation	of	hybrids;	that	gentile	blood	of	
many	kinds	has	been	infused	into	the	people	in	large	proportions	in	the	course	of	time.	In-
deed,	none	of	the	peoples	of	Christendom	has	been	more	unremittingly	exposed	to	
hybridization,”88	he	states.	That	is	why	Veblen	perceives	the	Zionists	as	a	threat	to	the	
progress	of	Europe.	In	stark	contrast	to	the	hybridity	that	has	been	so	beneficial	to	Europe,	
the	Zionists	believe	they	“are	due	to	achieve	much	greater	things	and	to	reach	an	
unexampled	prosperity	so	soon	as	they	shall	have	a	chance	to	follow	their	own	devices	
untroubled	within	the	shelter	of	their	own	frontiers.”89	Their	aim	is	thus	double;	to	achieve	
much	greater	things	than	they	have	been	able	to	in	Diaspora,	and	to	establish	their	own	
demarcation	and	frontiers.	“It	is	not	so	much	a	question	of	what	is	aimed	at,	as	of	the	
chances	of	its	working-out,”90	Veblen	qualifies,	suggesting	we	might	read	this	not	only	as	“a	
question”	but	also	as	a	warning.			
	
This	“scheme	of	national	demarkation	[sic.]	between	Jew	and	gentile”91	threatens	to	make	
																																																								
87	Ibid.,	426.	
88	Veblen,	"The	Intellectual	Pre-Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe,"	35.	[Sic.]	
89	Ibid.,	34.	
90	Ibid.	
91	Ibid.,	33.	[Sic.]	
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visible	the	difference	between	Jew	and	gentile,	the	invisibility	of	which	is	key	to	the	second	
basic	assumption	of	Veblen’s	program,	the	assumption	that	full	integration	of	Jews	into	
Europe	is	impossible.	For	Veblen,	this	demarcation	must	remain	invisible.	His	ambition	is	
to	maximize	the	contact	between	Jews	and	gentile	culture.	The	more	contact	exists	the	
more	both	will	benefit	from	the	progress	that	will	be	achieved.	And	for	this	ambition	to	
continue	fueling	Jewish	departure	from	tradition,	immersion	must	appear	to	be	fully	
possible.	It	is	the	encounter	with	an	invisible	impossibility	that	is	a	key	element	in	
producing	the	drive	of	progress.	The	condition	of	sustainable	progress	is	precisely	the	
invisibility	of	that	same	demarcation,	which	renders	immersion	finally	impossible.		
	
What	is	at	stake	is	the	“intellectual	advance	of	Christendom,”92	Veblen	makes	clear.	The	
threat	is	that	“as	the	Jewish	people	in	this	way	turn	inward	on	themselves,	their	
prospective	contribution	to	the	world's	intellectual	output	should	[…]	fairly	be	expected	to	
take	on	the	complexion	of	Talmudic	lore.”93	As	his	argument	progresses,	Veblen	becomes	
less	concerned	with	stating	the	advantage	Jews	will	find	in	their	continued	Diaspora	
existence,	and	focuses	more	on	the	benefits	“Christendom”	has	found	in	it.	“It	is	plain	that	
the	civilization	of	Christendom	continues	today	to	draw	heavily	on	the	Jews	for	men	
devoted	to	science	and	scholarly	pursuits.”94	The	Jews	are	irreplaceable	to	European	
culture,	though	their	particular	intellectual	contribution	stems	from	their	being	un-place-
able	in	European	culture	as	well.	“There	should	be	some	loss	to	Christendom	at	large,	and	
																																																								
92	Ibid.,	38.	
93	Ibid.,	42.	
94	Ibid.,	34.	
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there	might	be	some	gain	to	the	repatriated	Children	of	Israel,”95	Veblen	finally	admits.	
	
How	does	Veblen	explain	that	the	Jews	who	are	(if	they	should	choose	to	remain)	
irreplaceable,	are	also	those	that	cannot	be	fully	placed?	It	is	a	personal	(perhaps	a	
national)	tragedy	that	fuels	Europe’s	innovators.	Christendom	is	rather	a	passive	character	
in	Veblen’s	narrative.	Its	desire	for	progress	finds	a	promising	partner	in	another’s	active	
search—for	from	the	very	first	step,	that	of	leaving	his	tradition,	the	Jew	has	been	the	
active	partner—and	enjoys	the	fruit	of	that	other’s	struggles.	What	makes	this	
entanglement	so	tragic	in	Veblen’s	account	is	that	the	reasons	it	is	impossible	for	Jews	to	
become	fully	included	in	Western	culture,	to	the	point	of	losing	all	Jewish	identification,	lie	
in	the	Jews	themselves.	The	possibility	of	gentile	resistance	to	Jewish	integration	is	only	
hinted	at	in	an	accidental	word	play,	as	he	states:	“The	most	amiable	share	in	the	gentile	
community's	life	that	is	likely	to	fall	to	[the	Jew’s]	lot	is	that	of	being	interned.”96			
	
Of	course	there	is	an	air	of	remorse	to	Veblen’s	entire	locution.	It	was	published	two	years	
after	the	Balfour	Declaration	of	1917	made	public	the	support	of	the	British	Empire	for	the	
kind	of	Jewish	“repatriation”	project	Veblen	opposed.	Though	he	focuses	more	on	the	effort	
than	on	its	predetermined	impossibility,	the	redrawing	of	the	demarcation	between	Jew	
and	gentile	has	already	been	signaled.	In	that	sense,	Veblen’s	article	can	be	read	as	
something	of	a	retrospective	as	well;	a	retrospective	to	the	great	tragedy	of	the	Jews	that	
has	fueled	modern	Europe’s	intellectual	pursuits.	As	a	retrospective,	Veblen’s	argument	
																																																								
95	Ibid.,	42.	
96	Ibid.	The	pun	is	on	the	word	“interned.”	The	most	amiable	share	may	be	a	guild	internship	or	an	internment	
camp.	
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marks	what	he	perceives	as	the	failure	of	emancipation	ideology.	The	Zionist	movement	is	
for	him	a	statement	about	the	failure	of	the	European	project	of	integration.	The	difference	
he	subsumes	in	his	argument	is	between	the	late	eighteenth	century	perception	of	Jewish	
traditionalism	as	the	opposition	to	integration	and	his	contemporary	perception	of	Zionism	
as	the	opposition	to	integration.	We	will	have	more	to	say	about	late	eighteenth	century	
perceptions	of	emancipation	ideology	by	Jewish	leaders	in	the	next	chapter.	For	the	
moment,	I	would	like	to	emphasize	the	dual	articulation	in	Veblen’s	article,	of	a	program	
and	a	retrospective,	of	the	future	and	the	past	of	what	he	calls	Jewish	“immersion.”		
	
On	an	individual	level	the	tragedy	is	being	stuck	between	a	lost	tradition	and	an	
unaccepting	broader	culture.	The	resolution	of	this	Jewish	tragedy,	Veblen	states,	would	
surely	be	tragic	for	Europe.	Neither	full	integration	nor	refusal	to	depart	from	tradition	
would	turn	Jews	into	those	intellectual	innovators	he	perceives	them	to	be.	The	ir-
resolvability	of	the	individual	Jew’s	predicament	is	what	drives	their	contribution	to	
progress	precisely	because	“there	is	nowhere	else	to	go.”97				
	
On	the	collective	level,	the	tragedy	is	the	failure	of	emancipation,	due	to	the	reluctance	of	
the	Jews	themselves	to	leave	their	tradition	behind	en	masse.	Thus	Zionism,	in	his	
argument,	is	another	moment	of	collective	refusal	to	integrate.	While	success	has	been	
individual,	failure	has	been	collective.	Veblen’s	explanation	of	Jewish	preeminence	only	
accounts	for	one	individual	at	a	time.	It	never	occurs	to	Veblen	to	ask	about	the	possibility	
of	group	existence	after	such	an	exodus	from	tradition.	He	is	writing	about	“the	Jews,”	but	
																																																								
97	Ibid.,	39.	
	
	144	
would	they	remain	“the	Jews”	after	following	through	with	his	program?	
	
A	community,	it	seems,	could	not	leave	all	its	ties	of	tradition	and	custom	behind,	and	still	
maintain	its	group	designation.	“They	are	neither	a	complaisant	nor	a	contented	lot,	these	
aliens	of	the	uneasy	feet;	but	that	is,	after	all,	not	the	point	in	question,”98	states	Veblen,	
somewhat	skirting	the	question	of	what	the	large	scale	success	of	his	suggestion	would	
mean	(or	would	have	meant)	for	Jews	as	a	group.	We	might	nonetheless	offer	an	answer:	
The	result	of	their	belonging	to	the	Jewish	group	would	become	its	cause;	the	preeminence	
attained	as	an	outcome	of	their	particular	circumstances	as	Jews	would	become	the	only	
marker	of	their	group	existence,	the	soul	source	of	any	separateness	Jews	would	maintain	
from	Europe.99	Veblen	ends	his	article	without	commenting	on	the	shifts	his	argument	
makes	between	the	individual	and	the	collective	aspects	of	integration,	nor	between	the	
present	and	the	past	efforts	at	emancipation.	
	
The	challenge	Borges	takes	on	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition,”	is	to	pick	up	where	
Veblen	left	off;	to	take	a	de-facto	explanation	for	Jewish	preeminence,	which	bases	itself	on	
their	attitudes	and	conditions	of	interaction,	and	turn	these	attitudes	and	conditions	into	a	
programmatic	approach	towards	Europe.	Borges’	lecture	signals	this	attempt	in	two	ways.	
First,	he	identifies	the	Argentine	writer’s	condition	of	acting	within	T.	S.	Eliot’s	
simultaneousness	of	western	tradition	as	the	potential	for	stimulating	the	kind	of	“divided	
allegiance”	that	Veblen	praises.	Second,	this	sense	of	difference	from	(and	lack	of	devotion	
																																																								
98	Ibid.	
99	The	question	of	whether	the	mere	memory	of	a	departure	from	tradition	can	suffice	to	form	the	basis	of	
group	recognition	will	be	taken	up	by	Rabbi	Nachman	is	his	“Tale	of	the	Maddening	Wheat”	and	“Parable	of	
the	Turkey	Prince,”	which	we	will	discuss	in	Chapter	3.			
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to)	European	tradition,	which	has	given	rise	to	Jewish	skepticism,	will,	in	Borges’	program,	
become	Argentine	“irreverence.”	
	
The	Jew’s	dual	location,	vis-à-vis	his	own	tradition	and	vis-à-vis	broader	European	culture,	
is	what	draws	Borges	to	Veblen’s	program	as	a	model	for	the	Argentine	writer.	However,	
the	unattended	shift	from	individual	to	collective	in	Veblen’s	narrative	is	unproblematically	
assumed	in	Borges’	suggestion	for	Argentina	as	well.	For	Borges,	certain	Jews	(Spinoza,	
Heine)	may	be	exemplary	of	a	location	he	has	identified	through	Veblen,	but	Borges’	ability	
to	move	from	a	Jewish	example	to	a	Jewish	model	revolves	around	the	collective	imitability	
of	this	location.	Beyond	imploring	his	audience	to	be	“irreverent”	towards	European	
tradition,	Borges	never	really	explains	how	the	individual’s	position	will	be	imitated	by	a	
collective.		
	
The	dichotomy	between	individual	immersion	and	collective	isolation	continued	to	exist	in	
Borges’	variable	attitudes	towards	Jewish	Diaspora	existence	and	the	State	of	Israel	
respectively.	This	dichotomy	is	a	paradigm	that	shapes	many	of	Borges’	writings	on	Jews	
and	Israel.	But	when	considering	the	Jewish	Diaspora	in	relation	to	the	Argentine	writer,	
Borges	generalizes	the	conditions	Veblen	lays	out,	under	which	individual	Jews	may	
become	preeminent	in	Europe,	to	apply	to	the	conditions	of	Jewish	Diaspora	existence	in	its	
entirety.	Expanding	Veblen’s	argument	from	the	individual	to	the	group	is	key	for	its	
adaptation	to	the	Argentine	condition.	After	all,	Borges	is	concerned	with	something	of	a	
national	literature	in	Argentina,	not	merely	with	the	success	of	this	or	that	individual	
writer.	However,	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	does	not	resolve	the	problem	of	
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maintaining	a	group	identity	following	such	(necessarily	individual)	immersion.100		
	
The	concern	for	the	possibility	of	Jewish	group	existence	after	a	departure	from	the	
traditional	structure	of	community	is,	for	Borges,	also	the	question	of	a	possible	Argentine	
tradition	true	both	to	their	unavoidable	inclusion	in	Europe	and	the	impossibility	of	ever	
fully	accomplishing	an	immersion	into	Western	culture.	The	expansion	of	Veblen’s	
argument	signals	Borges’	maintained	concern	for	“the	Jewish	question”	as	an	inseparable	
part	of	his	investment	in	“the	Argentine	question.”	In	Borges’	thought	and	writing,	the	State	
of	Israel	thus	becomes	representative	of	the	antithesis	of	his	program	for	Argentina,	both	in	
that	it	offered	the	opposite	outcome	to	the	desired	integration,	and	in	that	it	negated	the	
Diaspora	existence	upon	which	the	Jewish	model	he	had	adopted	from	Veblen	was	based	in	
the	first	place.101	Veblen’s	presence	in	Borges’	thought	about	Israel	remained	evident	
throughout	his	career.	In	a	1960	essay	commemorating	Mexican	writer	and	intellectual	
Alfonso	Reyes,	just	a	few	months	after	his	death,	Borges	recalls	Veblen’s	article.	
	
In	1919	Thorstein	Veblen	asked	himself	why	the	Jews,	in	spite	of	the	many	
and	notorious	obstacles	they	must	overcome,	stand	out	intellectually	in	
Europe.	If	memory	does	not	deceive,	he	ends	up	attributing	this	primacy	to	
the	paradoxical	situation,	in	which	the	Jew,	in	Western	countries,	deals	with	a	
culture	that	is	foreign	to	him	and	in	which	it	is	not	difficult	for	him	to	
innovate,	with	good	skepticism	and	with	no	superstitious	fear.	It’s	possible	
																																																								
100	This	challenge	is	one	that	greatly	concerned	R.	Nachman,	and	will	be	discussed	in	chapter	3.	
101	For	more	on	the	antithesis	of	the	Argentine	and	Israeli	national	projects,	see:	Yitzhak	Lewis,	"Borges,	
Zionism	and	the	Politics	of	Reality,"	Variaciones	Borges	35	(2013).		
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my	summary	mutilates	or	simplifies	his	thesis;	just	as	he	puts	it,	it	would	
apply	particularly	well	to	the	Irish	in	the	Saxon	sphere	or	to	us,	Americans	of	
the	North	or	of	the	South.	This	last	case	is	the	one	I’m	concerned	with;	in	it	I	
find,	or	want	to	find,	the	key	[…]	
	
We	are	heirs	to	the	entire	past	and	not	to	the	habits	or	passions	of	this	or	that	
lineage.	Like	the	Jew	of	Veblen’s	thesis,	we	deal	with	European	culture	with	
no	excess	of	reverence.102						
	
While	Borges’	answer	largely	repeats	his	argument	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition,”	
it	also	states	more	explicitly	the	expansion	of	Veblen’s	argument	from	individual	
circumstances	to	group	identity.	“Like	the	Jew	of	Veblen’s	thesis,	we	deal	with	European	
culture,”103	Borges	summarizes,	abstracting	“The	Jew”	enough	so	as	to	stand	for	the	“we”	
that	is	Argentina,	and	forgetting	it	is	only	modern	Europe	Veblen	talks	about.104	In	a	much	
later	interview	from	1978	Borges	will	recall	Veblen	again.	This	time	also	omitting	the	fact	
that	it	is	the	Jews	of	Europe	Veblen	was	talking	about.	
	
Diamant:	When	you	think	of	Israel	today,	do	you	consider	it	a	natural	
extension	of	the	Jewish	People	of	the	Bible?	
	
Borges:	I,	truthfully,	am	not	a	Zionist,	but	I	want	to	explain	in	what	sense.	
																																																								
102	Jorge	Luis	Borges,	"Alfonso	Reyes,"	Sur	264	(1960):	1.	
103	Ibid.	
104	Veblen	doesn’t	talk	about	pre-modern	social	conditions	and	the	implication	is	that	Jewish	preeminence	
was	not	extent	before	modern	times.	
	
	148	
Some	time	ago	I	read	a	very	nice	article	by	Veblen	about	the	intellectual	
superiority	of	Jews.	Note	it’s	not	about	a	racial	superiority,	but	rather	
intellectual.	And	this	is	due	–	he	explains	–	to	the	fact	that	every	Jew	has	two	
cultures,	two	traditions:	his	tradition	and	the	tradition	of	the	place	in	which	
he	was	born.	And	that’s	what	makes	them	much	richer.	I	fear	Israel	today	will	
be	a	country	like	all	others.	Obviously	that	shouldn’t	matter	too	much,	since	it	
is	a	very	small	country,	there	will	always	be	Jews	in	the	world	that	will	be	
more	important	than	the	Israelis.105			
	
Borges	answers	the	question	quite	directly.	What	is	evident	is	that	the	programmatic	
aspect	of	Veblen’s	argument	remained	with	him	throughout	his	career,	as	does	the	
association	between	Veblen’s	article	and	his	understanding	of	Zionism.	While	Borges’	
answers	still	make	no	reference	to	the	possibility	of	group	existence	that	Veblen’s	
argument	may	or	may	not	allow	for	Diaspora	Jewry,	Veblen’s	argument	does	remain	central	
to	Borges’	attitude	toward	Judaism	as	well.	As	Aizenberg	notes,	when	Borges	tells	his	
interviewers	that	he	regrets	not	being	Jewish,	or	that	his	books	are	“profoundly	Judaic,”	he	
is	referring	largely	to	the	Jew	and	the	Judaism	of	Veblen.106		
	
The	tensions	of	individual	and	collective,	inevitability	and	impossibility	introduced	by	
Veblen	continued	to	influence	Borges’	self-fashioned	inheritance	of	the	Jewish	tradition.	
Block	de	Behar	recognizes	these	tensions	in	Borges’	insistence	on	“the	firmness	of	a	Jewish	
																																																								
105	Mario	Diamant,	"Una	Conversación	Con	Jorge	L.	Borges	"	Plural	3,	no.	19	(Nov.	1978):	6.	I	have	translated	
as	“important”	Borges’	use	of	the	word	“importante”	in	Spanish,	which	has	several	meanings:	important,	
valuable	and	significant.	
106	Aizenberg,	Borges,	El	Tejedor	Del	Aleph	Y	Otros	Ensayos:	Del	Hebraìsmo	Al	Poscolonialismo,	54.		
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net	that	assimilated	cultural	differences	in	a	single	identity,	whose	differentiating	feature	is	
precisely	that	they	are	not	different.”107	Borges	also	continued	to	challenge	the	split	he	saw	
between	the	way	Veblen	presented	these	tensions	and	the	reality	he	encountered	in	the	
State	of	Israel.	In	a	1971	interview	in	anticipation	of	receiving	the	Jerusalem	Prize	later	that	
year,	he	briefly	reports	a	discussion	he	had	with	Israeli	writers	in	his	1969	visit.	
	
Are	you	familiar	with	the	new	Israeli	literature?	
	
Borges:	I	don’t	know	Hebrew,	but	I	have	spoken	to	Israeli	writers	who	
amazed	me.	I	had	supposed	the	literary	tendency	would	be,	naturally,	to	
approach	the	Psalms,	the	Song	of	Songs	[…]	But	no.	They	told	me	they	did	not	
want	to	copy	King	David.	They	wanted	to	be	modern.	I	answered	them	that	
being	modern	did	not	seem	obligatory	to	me.	From	the	moment	you	are	born	
you	are	modern,	like	it	or	not.	Why	impose	upon	yourself	a	
contemporaneousness,	which	you	already	posses	in	any	event?108		
	
The	writers	he	met	seem	to	express	a	desire	for	progress	akin	to	that	of	“the	wayfaring	Jew”	
in	Veblen’s	account.	But	Borges	rejects	this.	On	the	other	hand,	their	answer	clearly	signals	
a	desire	to	depart	from	Eliot’s	scheme	of	“the	historical	sense”	as	well.	While	Argentina	
struggles	to	find	its	place	within	Eliot’s	scheme	of	“the	historical	sense,”	Borges	encounters	
an	Israel	full	of	Jewish	writers	who	are	entirely	in	possession	of	such	a	sense	and	insist	on	
																																																								
107	Block	de	Behar,	"Antecedents	of	an	Unexpected	Poetic	Affinity:	Jorge	Luis	Borges	as	Reader	of	Martin	
Buber,"	188.	
108	From	an	interview	published	in	Raíces,	1971.	Quoted	in:	Borges,	El	Judaìsmo	E	Israel.	2	ed.,	Sefaradica	
(Buenos	Aires:	Centro	de	Investigación	y	Difusión	de	la	Cultura	Sefardí,	1999),	168-69.	
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exiting	it	at	every	opportunity.	The	most	interesting	part	of	this	exchange	with	the	Israeli	
writers	is	that	Borges	seems	to	imply	that	he	has	an	idea	of	how	one	aught	to	write	from	
within	the	Jewish	tradition.109	This	idea	only	hinted	at	here	certainly	had	an	effect	on	
Borges’	writing.	
	
What	these	interviews	add	to	our	reading	of	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	is	that	
they	demonstrate	the	equivocations	Borges	makes	regarding	Veblen’s	argument.	First,	he	
conflates	between	individual	and	collective,	presenting	Veblen’s	argument	regarding	
preeminent	individuals	as	relating	to	the	Jewish	Diaspora	at	large.	Second,	Borges	seems	to	
assume	that	the	program	Veblen	was	promoting	has	already	happened.	That	is,	the	Jewish	
Diaspora	in	his	account	occupies	the	space	Veblen	only	hoped	they	would	end	up	in.	Lastly,	
Borges	identifies	in	the	Jewish	Diaspora	that	inevitably	but	impossibly	integrated	group	
Veblen	depicted	as	the	antithesis	of	Zionism.	Borges	thus	accords	with	Veblen	on	the	
question	of	Zionism	being	opposed	to	those	traits	he	values	in	Jewish	existence.	But	he	
differs	from	Veblen	in	that	he	seems	to	think	integration	has	been	successful	for	the	Jews	in	
the	Diaspora,	that	as	a	group	they	have	attained	“intellectual	superiority”	by	having	two	
traditions;	the	one	they	left	behind	and	the	one	they	operate	within	with	no	particular	
feelings	of	attachment.			
	
The	fact	that	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	ends	without	clarifying	the	question	of	
individual	and	collective	is	in	part	a	reflection	of	Borges’	reliance	on	the	structure	of	
Veblen’s	paper	for	his	own	lecture.	More	importantly,	however,	it	reflects	a	similarly	
																																																								
109	The	reader	will	recall	that	the	editors	of	Crisol	also	mention	a	“Psalmist	accent	characteristic	of	Hebrew	
poetry”	in	their	accusation	of	Borges’	Jewish	ancestry.	See:	A.H.,	"Carácter	De	Estas	Notas."		
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unresolved	tension	in	Borges’	own	argument.	While	the	title	of	the	lecture	addresses	a	
single	(“the”)	Argentine	writer,	the	collective	language	Borges	uses	(“we	Argentines”)	
presumes	a	group	that	can	and	should	mimic	Veblen’s	Jewish	collective.	Borges’	lecture	
thus	lays	out	an	understanding	of	Argentine	tradition	and	an	attitude	towards	it	that	he	
himself	intends	to	maintain.	The	question	is	whom	does	he	mean	by	“we”?	To	whom	does	
this	lecture	offer	a	solution	to	the	question	of	tradition?	While	there	is	a	generalizing	
instinct	to	talk	about	“we	Argentines,”	both	context	and	content	make	clear	that	the	
addressees	of	this	lecture	are	other	writers	and	public	intellectuals.	When	Borges	proposes	
the	Jews	as	a	model	to	imitate,	he	is	outlining	the	social	position	of	the	same	intellectual	
writer	we	have	seen	him	deal	with	in	“A	Vindication	of	the	Cabbala.”	Veblen	isn’t	concerned	
with	the	intellectual,	but	the	in-between	location	he	outlines	for	Borges	is	common	to	the	
Jew	and	the	intellectual	and,	in	moving	from	example	to	model,	is	read	by	Borges	as	a	
program	for	becoming	an	intellectual.	He	is	certainly	not	the	first	to	identify	the	in-between	
position	of	the	intellectual,	nor	is	he	the	first	to	relate	such	a	position	to	“the	Jew.”	To	
repeat	Aizenberg’s	insight:	110	when	Borges	tells	his	interviewers	that	he	regrets	not	being	
Jewish,	or	that	his	books	are	“profoundly	Judaic,”	he	is	referring	largely	to	the	Jew	and	the	
Judaism	of	Veblen,	and	thus,	by	extension,	to	the	role	of	the	intellectual.		
	
The	Intellectual	
	
As	we	have	discussed	in	reading	“A	Vindication	of	the	Kabbalah,”	Borges’	representation	of	
the	Judaic	is	closely	linked	to	the	understanding	of	his	own	role	as	an	intellectual	author.	
																																																								
110	Aizenberg,	Borges,	El	Tejedor	Del	Aleph	Y	Otros	Ensayos:	Del	Hebraìsmo	Al	Poscolonialismo,	54.		
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This	link	is	also	evident	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	where,	in	addition	to	
Cabalistic	tropes,	the	representation	of	a	social	position	particularly	Judaic	is	part	of	Borges’	
understanding	of	his	role	as	an	Argentine	writer.	It	is	also	important	to	note	that	questions	
of	the	intellectual’s	role	in	society	were	felt	all	the	more	intensely	during	the	Peron	era,	in	
which	this	lecture	was	delivered.	Borges’	own	clashes	with	the	Peron	government	are	
public	lore	in	Argentina.111	
	
However,	the	contribution	of	the	figure	of	“the	Jew”	to	a	definition	of	the	intellectual	and	
his	role	was	not	specific	to	Borges’	immediate	context.	Borges	was	part	of	a	larger	
contemporaneous	concern	with	identifying	and	defining	“the	intellectual.”	This	concern	has	
implicated	the	social	position	of	Jews	for	much	of	its	intellectual	history.	For	Julian	Benda	
and	Antonio	Gramsci	as	well,	two	of	Veblen’s	most	prominent	contemporaries	to	
conceptualize	“the	intellectual,”	representations	of	“the	Jew”	are	part	of	their	
conceptualizations	of	“the	intellectual”	and	his	role.	Thus,	for	Gramsci:	“Religion,	
Freemasonry,	Rotary,	Jews,	etc.,	can	be	subsumed	into	the	social	category	of	‘intellectuals,’	
whose	function,	on	an	international	scale,	is	that	of	mediating	the	extremes,	of	‘socializing’	
the	technical	discoveries	which	provide	the	impetus	for	all	activities	of	leadership,	of	
devising	compromises	between,	and	ways	out	of,	extreme	solutions.”112	The	conceptual	
																																																								
111	The	episode	Borges	himself	repeats	often	is	of	being	fired	from	his	job	at	the	national	library	and	placed	as	
an	inspector	of	chickens	in	the	poultry	market.	A	detailed	discussion	of	the	intellectual	circles	of	the	era	can	
be	found	in:	Louis,	Borges	Ante	El	Fascismo.	A	discussion	of	Borges	and	Peronism	can	be	found	in:	Aizenberg,	
The	Aleph	Weaver:	Biblical,	Kabbalistic	and	Judaic	Elements	in	Borges.	
112	Antonio	Gramsci,	A	Gramsci	Reader:	Selected	Writings,	1916-1935	(New	York:	New	Yrok	University	Press,	
2000),	206.	
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proximity	of	the	Jew	and	the	intellectual	is	expressed	in	Nazism	as	well,	as	Aizenberg	has	
noted,	“for	Borges,	as	for	the	Nazis,	Intellektueller	meant	Jude.”113		
	
Veblen,	on	the	other	hand,	would	not	recognize	this	proximity.	Since	in	his	discussion	of	
Jewish	integration	into	Europe	he	represents	attempts	at	integration	as	failed	and	resisted,	
Veblen	doesn’t	leave	room	for	seeing	the	Jewish	collective	as	occupying	the	space	and	
function	of	intellectuals.	The	concordance	between	Gramsci,	Borges	and	Nazism	on	the	
proximity	of	Jew	and	intellectual,	coupled	with	the	agreement	between	Veblen	and	Borges	
on	the	in-between	nature	of	these	positions,	suggest	there	is	more	at	hand	than	a	question	
of	Philo-Semitism	and	Anti-Semitism.	The	question	is	whether	the	long	century	of	Jewish	
existence	in	Europe,	between	late	eighteenth	century	emancipation	and	the	early	twentieth	
century	situation	of	Jews	in	Europe—with	their	dual	allegiances,	lack	of	attachment	to	
broader	culture—is	presented	as	a	story	about	the	success	or	the	failure	of	integration.	
Framing	the	question	in	these	terms	will	explain	the	Nazi	attitude	towards	Intellektueller,	
since	they	too	(like	their	Jewish	approximations)	are	the	product	of	a	failed	project	of	
integration.114		
	
																																																								
113	Aizenberg,	Borges,	El	Tejedor	Del	Aleph	Y	Otros	Ensayos:	Del	Hebraìsmo	Al	Poscolonialismo,	112.	
114	For	Nazism	this	would	be	a	nationalist	project	of	integration,	to	which	the	intellectuals	resisted.	This	is	not	
the	place	to	elaborate	on	Nazi	ideology	as	a	project	of	social	emancipation	through	racial	purification.	For	
more	on	Nazism	see:	Boaz	Neumann,	Reiyat	Ha-`Olam	Ha-Natsit	:	Merhav,	Guf,	Safah	(Hefah;	Tel-Aviv:	Hotsaat	
ha-sefarim	shel	Universitat	Hefah	;	Sifriyat	Ma`ariv,	2002).	For	a	related	cultural	history	of	Germany	in	the	
interwar	period,	see:	Li-Heyot	Be-Republikat	Vaimar	(Tel	Aviv:	`Am	`oved,	2007).	For	more	on	late	nineteenth	
century	anti-Semitism	as	a	response	to	perceptions	of	a	failed	integration,	see:	Brian	Porter,	When	
Nationalism	Began	to	Hate	Imagining	Modern	Politics	in	Nineteenth	Century	Poland	(New	York:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2000).	For	more	on	the	changing	attitudes	towards	the	Jews	of	Germany	during	the	long	
century	of	emancipation	see:	Doron	Avraham,	in:	Boaz	Neumann,	Roni	Hirsh-Ratzkovsky,	and	Galili	Shahar,	
eds.,	Historyah	Be-Lo	Nahat	:	Ben	Yehudim	Le-Germanim	(Tel	Aviv;	Yerushalayim:	`Am	`oved	;	Mekhon	Leo	Bek,	
2012).	
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In	his	more	recent	discussion	of	the	intellectual,	Paul	Mendes-Flohr	describes	an	attitude	
we	might	identify	as	common	to	Borges	and	Veblen.	“‘Ideological’	exclusivity:	a	
conviction—or,	at	least,	sense,	however	vague—that	the	Jew	enjoys	a	unique	destiny	and	
role	in	universal	history.” 	115 	This	exclusivity	is	certainly	expressed	by	Veblen,	and	taken	up	
by	Borges	in	conceptualizing	his	own	role	as	intellectual	in	terms	of	the	Judaic.	Quite	the	
opposite	of	Veblen’s	argument,	however,	Mendes-Flohr	suggests	that	we	should	not	think	
of	this	group	as	“individuals	[who]	achieve	intellectual	distinction	by	virtue	of	their	self-
transcendence	as	Jews	in	order	to	serve	the	larger	cause	of	humanity.” 	116 	But	he	aligns	
with	Veblen	in	stating	that	we	must	appreciate	this	individual	as	“one	who	lives	at	or	
between	boundaries	cognitive,	cultural,	and	social.	Straddling	these	boundaries,	the	Jewish	
intellectuals	find	themselves	divided	between	the	respective	claims	of	the	provinces	of	
thought,	norms	and	values	in	which	they	simultaneously	reside.” 	117 	Mendes-Flohr	is	not	
speaking	exclusively	of	the	Jew	or	of	the	intellectual,	but	rather	of	“the	Jewish	intellectual.”	
At	the	moment	I	would	like	to	bracket	the	question	of	whether	the	“Jewish	intellectual”	is	
an	amalgam	of	the	Jew	and	the	intellectual,	or	whether	“the	Jew”	and	“the	intellectual”	are	a	
parsing	out	of	an	earlier	social	phenomenon	of	Jewish	intellectuals.	I	would	like	to	focus	on	
the	contingent	nature	of	any	social	location	associated	with	these	categories,	and	ask	why	
their	conceptualization	within	an	in-between	space	has	remained	indispensible	to	so	many	
scholars.				
	
																																																								
115	Paul	R.	Mendes-Flohr,	Divided	Passions:	Jewish	Intellectuals	and	the	Experience	of	Modernity	(Detroit:	
Wayne	State	University	Press,	1991),	46.	
116	Ibid.,	15.	
117	Ibid.,	14.	
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Another	example	is	the	discussion	of	the	intellectual	offered	by	Edward	Said	in	the	1993	
Reith	Lectures.118	While	offering	a	conceptualization	quite	opposite	to	any	“ideological	
exclusivity,”	these	lectures	demonstrate	the	powerful	echo	of	Benda	and	Gramsci	(as	well	
as	Orwell	as	Rushdie)	in	latter	discussions	of	the	intellectual.	Said’s	depiction	of	“the	public	
role	of	the	intellectual	as	outsider	[…]	and	disturber	of	the	status	quo,”119	and	the	tension	it	
suggests	between	the	intellectual’s	“public”	nature	and	his	or	her	“outsider”	standing,	
echoes	Veblen’s	depiction	of	the	Jew	as	much	as	Rushdie’s	depiction	of	the	intellectual.	It	
also	introduces	a	question	that	will	concern	me	in	chapter	5;	how	is	it	possible	to	be	both	a	
“public”	figure	and	an	“outsider”?	What	kind	of	“public”	has	space	within	it	for	one	to	be	
“outside”	of	it?				
	
These	questions	get	at	the	very	heart	of	the	social	project		of	integration,	both	ideologically	
and	historically.	They	relate	to	the	possibility	of	Jews	leaving	their	tradition	and	having	
somewhere	(even	an	in-between	space)	to	go	that	was	not	fully	accepting,	and	thus	also	not	
fully	“gentile.”	And	at	the	same	time,	they	relate	to	a	mechanism	being	put	in	place	that	
would	encourage	the	departure	of	Jews	into	that	space.	These	questions	will	lead	us	to	the	
late	eighteenth	century	attempts	to	create,	delimit	and	enforce	a	space	for	Jews	in	broader	
society.	We	will	take	them	up	in	a	discussion	of	R.	Nachman	and	his	reflections	on	the	Jews’	
social	location.	
																																																								
118	Edward	W.	Said,	Representations	of	the	Intellectual	:	The	1993	Reith	Lectures	(New	York:	Pantheon	Books,	
1994).	
119	Ibid.,	x.	
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Chapter	4:	
Locating	Rabbi	Nachman	
	
Locating	Rabbi	Nachman	intellectually,	theologically,	literarily	and	even	geographically	is	a	
multilayered	task	of	outlining	the	histories	within	which	he	operated.	We	need	to	identify	
not	only	his	place	in	the	history	of	the	Hasidic	movement,	of	European	Jewish	history	or	of	
general	European	history,	but	also	the	complex	relations	between	these	histories,	which	
form	concentric	circles	around	and	within	R.	Nachman’s	life	and	work.	R.	Nachman’s	birth	
year	(1772)	is	already	a	fine	illustration	of	this	complex	background	and	its	
indispensability	to	discussing	his	writing	and	thought.						
	
The	year	1772	is	generally	regarded	as	a	critical	one,	or	at	least	an	important	
turning	point,	in	the	history	of	Hasidism.	Three	decisive	events	took	place	in	
that	year	which	altered	both	the	ideological	and	the	organizational	course	on	
which	the	movement	had	originally	embarked.	The	spring	brought	with	it	the	
first	outbreak	of	bitter	hostilities	between	the	mitnaggedim1	and	the	hasidim	
in	Vilna,	whence	the	dispute	quickly	spread	to	other	Jewish	communities	in	
Lithuania	and	Galicia.	During	the	summer	months	Belorussia	was	annexed	to	
Russia,	and	Galicia	to	Austria,	in	the	first	partition	of	the	disintegrating	
kingdom	of	Poland;	as	a	result,	parts	of	the	Jewish	(and	hasidic)	community	
in	Poland	which	until	then	had	formed	a	single	cultural	and	political	entity	
found	themselves	arbitrarily	separated.	At	the	end	of	the	year,	in	December,	
																																																								
1	The	orthodox	opponents	of	the	Hasidic	movement	
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the	supreme	leader	of	hasidism,	R.	Dov	Ber,	the	Maggid	of	Mezhirech,	died	
without	leaving	an	“heir”	to	take	charge	of	the	movement	in	his	place.2	
	
In	1772	there	was	a	convergence	of	major	events	surrounding	R.	Nachman’s	life.	In	the	
history	of	Hasidism	it	marks	the	end	of	the	“founders’	generation”	and	the	shift	away	from	
centralized	leadership.	In	Jewish	history	this	year	marks	a	rift	within	the	Eastern	European	
Jewish	community,	previously	united	in	the	Polish-Lithuanian	Commonwealth	under	the	
governance	of	the	Council	of	Four	Lands.3	The	conflict	between	Hasidism	and	its	orthodox	
opponents	(the	Mitnagdim)	would	shape	much	of	Eastern	European	Jewish	history	in	the	
following	half	century	and	its	traces	are	present	to	this	day.4	In	European	history	this	year	
marks	the	geopolitical	expansion	of	empires	(the	Russian,	Prussian	and	Austro-Hungarian)	
into	previously	monarchical	realms.	
	
The	dynamic	and	complex	relations	between	these	historical	events	are	for	another	project.	
I	will	here	only	outline	them	as	they	relate	to	R.	Nachman.	The	conflict	between	Hasidism	
and	the	Mitnagdim	was	the	struggle	between	an	innovative	popular	movement	and	its	
																																																								
2	Ada	Rapoport-Albert,	"Hasidism	after	1772:	Structural	Continuity	and	Change,"	in	Hasidism	Reappraised,	ed.	
Ada	Rapoport-Albert	(London:	Littman	Library	of	Jewish	Civilization,	1996),	76.		
3	The	Council	was	officially	disbanded	in	1764	but	it	wasn’t	until	the	Polish-Lithuanian	Commonwealth—the	
political	structure	under	which	it	operated—fell	apart	that	the	effects	of	the	vacuum	of	leadership	spread	so	
fiercely	to	the	Jewish	community.	For	more	on	Eastern	European	Jewish	History	in	this	period	see:	Gershon	
David	Hundert,	Jews	in	Poland-Lithuania	in	the	Eighteenth	Century	a	Genealogy	of	Modernity	(Berkeley:	
University	of	California	Press,	2004).	As	well	as:	Simon	Dubnow,	History	of	the	Jews	in	Russia	and	Poland,	from	
the	Earliest	Times	until	the	Present	Day.,	trans.	Israel	Friedlaender,	3	vols.,	vol.	1	(Philadelphia:	Jewish	
Publication	Society	of	America,	1916).	and:	Yisrael	Bartal,	The	Jews	of	Eastern	Europe,	1772-1881	
(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2005).	For	more	on	the	Hasidic	expansion	in	Eastern	Europe,	
see:	Glenn	Dynner,	Men	of	Silk	the	Hasidic	Conquest	of	Polish	Jewish	Society	(New	York,	N.Y.:	Oxford	University	
Press,	2006).	
4	For	more	on	the	conflict	between	Hasidism	and	the	Mitnagdim	see:	Mordecai	Wilensky,	Hasidim	U-
Mitnagdim	:	Le-Toldot	Ha-Pulmus	She-Benehem	(Yerushalayim:	Mosad	Byalik,	1970).	As	well	as:	Dubnow,	A	
History	of	Hasidism.	
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conservative	traditionalist	counterpart,	both	for	religious	authority	and	to	fill	the	broader	
political	vacuum	left	where	the	Council	of	Four	Lands	had	previously	governed.	The	
conflict’s	containment	is	due	in	large	part	to	the	subsequent	(first)	partition	of	the	Polish-
Lithuanian	Commonwealth,	which	left	the	orthodox	stronghold	of	Vilna	in	the	Grand	Duchy	
of	Lithuania	and	the	overwhelmingly	Hasidic	Podolia	region	in	the	Kingdom	of	Poland—at	
least	for	the	next	two	decades.	The	death	of	the	Magid	marks	the	decentralization	of	the	
Hasidic	movement’s	leadership	not	only	due	to	the	lack	of	a	central	figure	but	also	due	to	
the	insertion	of	a	tenuous	set	of	borders	into	the	previously	united	Commonwealth,	within	
which	the	Ba’al	Shem	Tov	and	the	Magid	moved	freely	about.	R.	Nachman,	born	into	a	
world	just	at	the	moment	it	began	to	change	unrecognizably,	was	to	live	a	cross-section	of	
the	great	changes	and	anxieties	of	his	era.			
	
By	the	time	R.	Nachman	had	reached	his	twentieth	year,	further	weighty	events	had	
occurred.	In	the	history	of	Hasidism,	the	first	Hasidic	books	had	been	published.5	This	
marked	the	movement’s	significant	ideological	turn	away	from	the	skeptical	and	
apprehensive	attitude	both	the	Ba’al	Shem	Tov	and	the	Magid	exhibited	towards	print	
technology.	For	the	founder’s	generation	the	medium	for	reaching	the	masses	of	Eastern	
European	Jewry	was	personal	charisma.	The	generation	that	followed	the	Magid’s	death	
certainly	did	not	neglect	this	aspect	of	Hasidism’s	appeal.	To	the	contrary,	the	charismatic	
feature	of	the	Hasidic	rabbi—known	as	the	“zadik,”	or	righteous	man—was	solidified	into	
the	doctrine	of	Zadikism.6	Yet	the	implementation	of	print	technology	as	a	more	effective	
																																																								
5	I’m	referring	here	to	the	books	of	R.	Yakov	Yosef	of	Polnoie	beginning	with:	Jaakov	Joseph	of	Polnoie,	Sefer	
Toldot	Ya`Akov	Yosef	(1780).	
6	Most	notably	by	R.	Elimelech	of	Leżajsk,	see:	Elimelech	of	Leżajsk,	Sefer	No'am	Elimelech	(Lemberg1787).	
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means	of	reaching	the	masses	of	Jews	in	Eastern	Europe	represents	an	“update”	to	what	it	
meant	for	Hasidism	to	be	a	“popular	movement.”7		
	
In	Jewish	history	more	broadly,	R.	Nachman’s	first	two	decades	of	life	saw	a	series	of	
excommunications	issued	by	the	Mitnagdim	against	the	Hasidic	movement.	These	had	led	
to	aggressive	persecution	of	Hasidic	rabbis	mostly	in	the	Lithuanian	Grand	Duchy,	resulting	
in	exile,	beatings	and	complaints	to	the	authorities.	To	the	extent	that	this	ideological	
divide	ran	along	the	new	political	borders	between	Poland	and	Lithuania,	it	solidified	the	
character	of	these	two	communities	into	the	archetypal	figures	of	modern	Eastern	
European	Jewish	history—the	Hasid	and	the	Litvak.8	Finally,	in	European	history	the	
American	Revolution	and	the	French	Revolution,	though	taking	place	on	the	other	side	of	
the	continent	(or	the	world),	significantly	mark	the	breakdown	(not	to	say	execution)	of	
existing	socio-political	hierarchies	across	Europe.	This	broader	historical	context	should	
inform	our	understanding	of	the	Hasidic	movement	too,	as	it	attempted	to	consolidate	the	
masses	of	Eastern	European	Jews	against	the	old	guard	of	the	orthodox	rabbinic	
establishment.9	
	
Then	in	1793	and	1795	two	further	partitions	brought	about	the	disappearance	of	the	
Lithuanian	Grand	Duchy	and	the	Polish	kingdom.	This	marked	the	final	replacement	of	
																																																								
7	See:	Siff,	"Shifting	Ideologies	of	Orality	and	Literacy	in	Their	Historical	Context:	Rebbe	Nahhman	of	
Bratslav’s	Embrace	of	the	Book	as	a	Means	for	Redemption."	
8	Yiddish	for	“a	Lithuanian,”	this	term	is	used	to	refer	to	orthodox	Jews	to	this	day.	We	should	mention	the	
third	archetypal	figure,	the	Galicianer	(Yiddish	for	“a	person	from	Galicia”),	which	refers	to	the	Jews	of	Galicia	
who	had	been	annexed	to	the	Austro-Hungarian	Empire	with	the	first	partition	of	the	Polish-Lithuanian	
Commonwealth.		
9	Officially	this	establishment,	the	Council	of	Four	Lands,	had	ceased	to	function	in	1764	but	the	ideology	of	
“eruditism,”	the	social-hierarchical	superiority	of	a	traditionally	educated	elite	was	firmly	represented	by	the	
Mitnagdim	of	Vilna.				
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previous	monarchical	systems	of	rule	with	modern	imperial	bureaucracy.	The	majority	of	
Jews	from	both	Lithuania	and	Poland	now	found	themselves	in	the	Russian	Empire,	under	
the	progressive	rule	of	Empress	Catharine	the	Great.	However,	her	modernizing	efforts	and	
enlightenment	ideology	did	not	affect	them	long.	In	1796	she	died	and	a	period	of	political	
instability	under	the	rule	of	her	son	Emperor	Paul	I	lasted	until	his	assassination	in	1801.		
	
During	these	years	several	further	significant	events	took	place.	The	northern	branch	of	
Hasidism	consolidated	under	the	leadership	of	R.	Schneor	Zalman	of	Lyadi	in	the	
northeastern	region	of	(what	had	been)	Lithuania.	In	1796	he	published	his	book	Tanya,	
effectively	forming	the	Chabad	school	of	Hasidism.10	The	following	year	the	leader	of	the	
Mitnagdim,	R.	Eliyahu	the	Gaon	of	Vilna,	died.	Following	the	Gaon’s	death,	and	finding	
themselves	all	under	the	same	rulership	for	the	first	time	since	1772,	the	Mitnagdim	
launched	another	campaign	against	the	Hasidic	movement.	Their	(final)	effort	was	to	
engage	the	Russian	Imperial	bureaucracy	against	the	movement.11	The	years	following	the	
final	partition	brought	a	new	kind	of	anxiety	for	the	Jewish	communities	of	Eastern	Europe.	
With	the	stabilization	of	the	Russian	Empire’s	borders	(for	the	time	being)	the	question	
was	no	longer	which	political	entity	they	will	be	ruled	by,	but	in	what	manner	will	they	be	
governed	and	what	will	be	their	legal	standing	under	the	new	Imperial	bureaucracy.	These	
questions	would	only	be	answered	after	the	assassination	of	Emperor	Paul	I.	His	son	
																																																								
10	Shneur	Zalman	of	Lyadi,	Tanya,	Ve-Hu,	Sefer	Likute	Amarim	(n.a.:	Defus	Dov	Ber	ben	Yisrael	ve	Dov	Ber	ben	
Pesach,	1796).	
11	In	1798	the	Mitnagdim	approached	the	Russian	authorities	and	accused	R.	Schneor	Zalman	of	sending	
money	to	the	Ottoman	Empire	in	support	of	Russia’s	major	enemy.	They	knew	of	course	that	this	money	was	
meant	to	support	a	Hasidic	community	living	in	Tiberias	and	not	the	Ottoman	Empire.	R.	Schneor	Zalman	was	
able	to	convince	the	authorities	of	this	and	was	released	after	two	months	in	jail.	
In	1801	he	was	accused	by	the	Mitnagdim	of	being	an	anarchist.	His	book	Tanya	(so	they	argued)	expressed	
his	opposition	to	the	Empire	and	put	him	in	the	same	subversive	anarchist	category	as	the	Freemasons’	
Association.	R.	Schneor	Zalman	was	again	able	to	convince	the	authorities	of	his	innocence	and	was	released.			
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Emperor	Alexander	I	would	revive	the	modernizing	efforts	of	his	grandmother	Catherine	
the	Great	when	he	assumed	power	in	1802.	
	
R.	Nachman	assembled	a	small	group	of	followers	in	Zlatopol	in	1800,	but	in	the	summer	of	
1802,	following	a	bitter	rivalry	with	another	local	Hasidic	leader—Rabbi	Aryeh	Leib	of	
Shpola—he	moved	to	Braslav.12	There	he	would	spend	the	next	eight	years,	and	there	he	
would	deliver	most	of	his	teachings	and	tales	to	his	disciples.	R.	Nachman’s	move	to	Braslav	
coincides	with	the	appointment	of	Alexander	I	as	Emperor	of	Russia	and	is	an	important	
backdrop	for	R.	Nachman’s	intellectual	activity.	Alexander	I’s	rule	would	be	characterized	
by	an	aggressive	enlightenment	agenda,	and	R.	Nachman’s	writings	are	marked	by	the	
processes	of	modernization	that	Alexander	I	promoted	across	the	Empire.	
	
Before	the	annexation	of	the	Polish-Lithuanian	Commonwealth	to	the	Russian	Empire,	Jews	
were	not	permitted	to	reside	within	the	Empire.	Following	the	partitions	of	the	Polish-
Lithuanian	Commonwealth	the	Russian	Empire	had	not	only	annexed	the	Lithuanian	Grand	
Duchy	and	the	Polish	kingdom,	but	had	also	assumed	control	of	the	largest	population	of	
Jews	at	the	time.	The	Jews	of	the	former	Commonwealth	were	prohibited	from	residing	in,	
or	even	entering,	the	Russian	Empire	without	proper	authorization.	The	annexed	
territories,	to	which	Jews	were	limited	from	the	time	of	the	first	partition,	were	termed	the	
Pale	of	Settlement.	The	modernization	of	the	Pale	of	Settlement	was	something	Alexander	I	
gave	particular	attention	to.		
	
																																																								
12	For	more	on	this	conflict	and	its	seminal	role	in	R.	Nachman’s	thought	see:	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	
Braslav.	and	Piekarz,	Hasidut	Braslav:	Perakim	Be-Haye	Meholeleha	Uvi-Khetaveha..			
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The	Organization	of	the	Jews	
	
One	of	the	first	orders	of	business	for	Alexander	I	was	to	commission	a	policy	committee	
regarding	the	Jews	of	the	Pale	of	Settlement.		
Because	of	multiple	complaints	to	Us	and	to	the	incoming	Governing	Senate	
on	different	abuses	and	troubles	that	have	harmed	agriculture	and	industry	
of	the	population	in	those	Gubernias	where	Jews	live,	We	considered	it	
necessary	by	the	Decree	to	the	Governing	Senate	given	in	the	9th	day	of	
November	1802,	to	organize	a	special	Committee	to	examine	this	related	
matter	and	to	determine	means	to	correct	the	present	regulation	of	Jews.13	
After	decades	of	internal	conflict	and	external	political	turmoil,	this	was	the	non-Jewish	
authorities’	first	concentrated	effort	to	address	the	issue	of	modernizing	the	Jewish	
population	of	Eastern	Europe.14	In	December	of	1804	the	Committee’s	examination	gave	
rise	to	the	Statute	Concerning	the	Organization	of	the	Jews.	The	significance	of	this	Statute	
to	our	discussion	of	R.	Nachman	permeates	the	histories	within	which	he	operated.	It	is	
worth	taking	a	moment	to	review	its	content,	as	this	will	both	summarize	and	frame	much	
of	R.	Nachman’s	thought	concerning	the	reordering	of	Jewish	society.15	
The	Introduction	to	the	Statute	states	that	“the	regulation	reflected	moderation	and	care	
about	the	genuine	welfare	of	Jews,	as	well	as	being	based	on	benefits	to	native	residents	of	
																																																								
13	Vitaly	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews,"		
http://www.jewishgen.org/belarus/1804_laws.htm.	
14	For	more	on	these	processes	see:	Bartal,	The	Jews	of	Eastern	Europe,	1772-1881.	
15	As	we	will	see	in	Ch.	5	of	this	study,	R.	Nachman	explicitly	addresses	the	Statute	and	its	effects	in	some	of	
his	teachings,	and	implicitly	in	some	of	his	tales.	
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the	Gubernias,	where	those	people	have	permission	to	live.”16	Dubnow	sees	this	phrase	as	
summarizing	the	balance	that	Alexander	I	hoped	to	strike	between	the	“welfare	of	Jews”	
and	the	“benefits	to	native	[non-Jewish]	residents,”	among	whom	the	Jews	lived	in	the	Pale	
of	Settlement.17	We	should	note	that	the	majority	of	these	residents	were	not	Russian,	but	
rather	Pols,	Ukrainians,	Lithuanians,	and	others.18	Yet	most	of	the	Statute	does	not	directly	
concern	the	relation	between	Jews	and	non-Jews.	The	first	section,	titled	“About	
Enlightenment,”	establishes	Jews’	access	to	the	public	education	system,	from	elementary	
school	through	university.	In	secondary	and	tertiary	education,	it	is	stipulated,	Jewish	
children	may	not	wear	“Jewish	dress,”	but	must	wear	“Polish	or	German	dress.”	This,	it	
continues,	is	“for	the	purpose	of	uniformity.”19		
“In	the	case	of	Jews	who,	despite	all	these	motivations,	refuse	to	send	their	children	to	
common	public	schools,”	the	Statute	continues	without	specifying	the	“motivations,”	
private	Jewish	schools	may	be	established.	However,	“among	the	subjects	taught	must	be	
one	of	these	languages:	Russian,	Polish	or	German.”20	These	languages	are	important	since	
the	Statute	proceeds	to	define	a	timeline	for	the	transition	of	all	business	records	and	
public	documents	(from	Yiddish	or	Hebrew)	into	one	of	those	languages.	“Without	this,	no	
document	will	be	accepted,”	it	concludes.21	By	1808	all	elected	officials	must	be	literate	in	
one	of	these	languages,	and	by	1812	even	Rabbis	will	not	be	appointed	without	such	
																																																								
16	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews"	(Introduction).	
17	Dubnow,	History	of	the	Jews	in	Russia	and	Poland,	from	the	Earliest	Times	until	the	Present	Day.,	1,	X.	2.	
18	While	nationalism	is	an	anachronistic	term	to	employ	here,	the	differences	in	language,	region	and	religion,	
as	well	as	in	historical	affiliations—some	of	the	non-Jewish	population	was	annexed	from	the	Kingdom	of	
Poland,	others	from	the	Grand	Duchy	of	Lithuania	and	still	others	from	smaller	regions—did	determine	
broader	group	affiliations.	
19	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews"	I.	1-3.	
20	Ibid.,	I.	6.	
21	Ibid.,	I.	8.	
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literacy.	Finally,	Jewish	elected	officials,	“for	general	order	and	uniformity,	must	wear	
Russian	or	Polish	dress,	if	they	do	not	like	to	wear	German	dress.”22		
Whether	the	Jewish	officials	like	to	wear	German	dress	is	not	a	question	of	fashion	
preferences,	nor	is	the	aim	of	the	Statute	to	establish	a	fashion	police	(though	we	will	soon	
see	the	enforcement	of	dress	codes	was	assigned	to	the	police).	The	repeated	mention	of	
order	and	uniformity	as	the	logic	underlying	this	requirement	should	be	understood—as	
the	title	of	section	I,	“About	Enlightenment,”	states—in	the	context	of	Enlightenment	ideas	
being	incorporated	into	administrative	policy.	What	is	at	hand	is	the	establishment	of	a	
public	sphere,	separate	from	the	spheres	of	religion	and	private	life.	The	removal	of	private	
or	religious	identifiers	from	public	visibility	is	an	important	part	of	the	configuration	of	this	
sphere,	and	of	its	representation	of	difference.		
The	next	section,	“About	Different	Estates	and	Trades	of	Jews	and	[their]	Rights,”	regulates	
the	rights	of	farmers,	manufacturers	and	artisans,	merchants	and	burghers.	The	general	
agenda	is	clear:	the	productivization	of	the	Jewish	population	of	the	Pale	of	Settlement	
through	the	forced	urbanization	of	non-farmers,	granting	them	access	to	professional	
guilds	and	to	dedicated	government	business	loans.	Most	importantly,	the	regulation	of	
these	estates	does	away	with	the	double	taxation	scheme	to	which	Jews	were	previously	
subject.	Jewish	businesses	and	workers	are	to	be	taxed	equally	to	their	non-Jewish	
counterparts.			
Towards	the	end	of	this	(the	longest)	section	of	the	Statute,	the	fashion	police	make	an	
																																																								
22	Ibid.,	I.	9.	
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appearance.	“Jews	(including	their	wives	and	children)	temporarily	traveling	outside	of	the	
Pale,	have	to	wear	German	[style]	dress	no	different	than	that	of	others.	If	they	wear	
traditional	dress,	they	shall	be	sent	back	[to	the	Pale]	by	the	Police.”23	The	role	of	the	police	
in	enforcing	the	fashion	mandates	of	a	modernizing	empire	has	already	been	mentioned.	
What	is	interesting	in	this	clause	is	the	relation	it	suggests	between	the	Pale	of	Settlement	
and	the	“proper”	Russian	Empire.	In	the	Pale,	Jews	may	wear	“traditional	dress”	in	all	
private	or	religious	settings.	It	is	only	in	markedly	public	settings	(public	school,	public	
office)	that	dress	codes	are	set	to	uniformity.	But	outside	the	Pale,	within	the	territory	of	
the	Russian	Empire	where	Jews	may	not	live	(nor	even	enter	without	appropriate	
permission	and	documentation),	uniformity	is	mandated	everywhere.	That	is,	the	condition	
under	which	Jews	may	enter	the	Russian	territory	is	that	they	travel	“incognito.”	Their	
Judaism,	their	difference,	must	not	be	visible	anywhere	in	the	Russian	public	sphere.							
Section	III,	“Obligation	of	Jews	Regarding	Above-mentioned	Estates,”	begins	by	mandating	
that	“every	Jew	shall	have	or	accept	a	known	inherited	family	name,”24	but	its	main	
objective	was	the	most	detrimental	to	the	Jews	of	the	Pale.	The	section	outlines	the	terms	
by	which	all	Jewish-held	licenses	to	sell	alcohol	of	any	kind,	throughout	the	whole	of	the	
Pale,	are	immediately	revoked,	and	any	outstanding	debt	for	the	purchase	of	alcohol	from	a	
Jew	is	void	without	compensation.	This	decree,	in	effect,	pulled	the	economic	carpet	out	
from	under	the	feet	of	nearly	all	non-urban	Jewish	settlements.	Roadside	taverns	and	
alehouses,	the	production	and	sale	of	alcohol	to	non-Jews,	were	the	main	source	of	income	
and	rent	payment	for	most	small	Jewish	settlements.	As	Dubnow	sees	it,	“with	one	stroke	
																																																								
23	Ibid.,	II.	C.	&	D.	28.	
24	Ibid.,	III.	31.	
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this	clause	eliminated	from	the	economic	life	of	the	Jews	an	occupation	which,	though	far	
from	being	distinguished,	had	yet	afforded	a	livelihood	to	almost	one-half	of	the	whole	
Jewish	population	of	Russia.”25	The	effects	of	this	legislation	would	be	the	final	catalyst	for	
mass-urbanization	of	Jewish	communities.	“It	soon	became	evident	that	the	expulsion	
would	affect	60,000	Jewish	families,	or	about	half	a	million	Jews.	Needless	to	say,	within	the	
two	or	three	years	of	respite	which	remained	before	the	catastrophe,	this	huge	mass	could	
not	possibly	gain	access	to	new	fields	of	labor	and	establish	itself	in	new	domiciles.”26	As	is	
evident	thus	far	from	the	Statute,	the	productivization	and	modernization	of	the	Jews	of	the	
Pale	was	imagined	largely	as	a	top-down	process,	to	be	enforced	rather	aggressively	by	the	
Imperial	administration.			
At	the	level	of	European	history,	the	Statute	is	part	of	a	larger	process	of	modernization	
undertaken	by	the	Russian	Empire.	This	process	included	regulating	public	education	and	
professional	(guild)	affiliations,	overhauling	the	structure	of	Imperial	administration	and	
incorporating	enlightenment	ideas	adopted	from	Western	European	states.27	Another	
element	of	this	broader	project	is	formulated	in	section	IV	“On	the	Civil	Rights	of	Jews.”	It	
states	quite	plainly	that	Jews	“are	free	and	live	under	the	precise	patronage	of	laws	given	
on	the	level	with	all	other	Russian	subjects.”28	Equality	of	all	subjects	before	a	unified	code	
of	law	that	applies	to	all	subjects	equally	was	a	pillar	of	emancipation	all	across	Europe.	
This	marks	a	transition	away	from	what	we	might	call	“demographic	rule,”	whereby	
																																																								
25	Dubnow,	History	of	the	Jews	in	Russia	and	Poland,	from	the	Earliest	Times	until	the	Present	Day.,	1,	343.	
26	Ibid.,	346.	
27	A	notable	bureaucrat	involved	in	drafting	the	Statute	was	Michael	Speransky,	whose	own	biography	tracks	
much	of	the	ups	and	downs	of	this	Empire-wide	process.	See:	Marc	Raeff,	Michael	Speransky:	Statesman	of	
Imperial	Russia,	1772-1839	(Hague:	M.	Nijhoff,	1957).	
28	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews"	IV.	42.	
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different	demographic	groups	within	the	same	geographic	region	are	subject	to	different	
legal	systems,29	and	towards	a	system	of	“geographic	rule,”	whereby	all	subjects	within	a	
geographically	determined	area	were	subject	to	the	same	system	of	laws.	The	former	was	
the	reality	for	the	Council	of	the	Four	Lands	until	the	disintegration	of	the	Polish-
Lithuanian	Commonwealth.	Jews	were	subject	to	the	judicial	system	established	and	
maintained	by	the	Council,	and	in	accordance	with	Jewish	law,	while	their	non-Jewish	
neighbors	were	subject	to	entirely	different	judicial	systems.	Only	in	cases	of	conflict	
between	a	Jew	and	a	non-Jew	would	the	case	arrive	at	a	non-Jewish	court.30	The	
emancipation’s	legal	system	covered	all	subjects	within	a	geographically	determined	area,	
and	purported	to	grant	members	of	all	demographic	groups	equal	access	to	public	legal	
recourse,	regardless	of	their	personal	affiliations.		
Needless	to	say,	emancipation	ideology	proposed	to	remove	a	great	deal	of	power	from	the	
hands	of	traditional	leaders	of	the	Jewish	community.	This	is	referenced	in	the	very	title	of	
the	Statute	Concerning	the	Organization	of	Jews,	which	in	fact	attempted	to	re-organize	the	
Jewish	communities	so	that	in	public	matters	such	as	taxation,	legal	recourse,	trade	and	
guilds,	as	well	as	general	productivity,	they	would	be	on	par	with	all	other	inhabitants	of	
the	Pale.	At	the	same	time,	it	allowed	for	the	continued	organization	of	religious	life	in	
																																																								
29	The	similarities	of	this	system	to	the	colonial	administrative	system	of	“indirect	rule”	is	worth	mentioning	
here,	though	is	obviously	beyond	our	present	scope.	For	more	on	”legal	pluralism”	and	“indirect	rule”	see:	
Lauren	A.	Benton,	Law	and	Colonial	Cultures	Legal	Regimes	in	World	History,	1400-1900	(Cambridge;	New	
York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002);	Lauren	A.	Benton	and	Richard	Jeffrey	Ross,	eds.,	Legal	Pluralism	and	
Empires,	1500-1850	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	2013).	And:	Mahmood	Mamdani,	"Define	and	
Rule	Native	as	Political	Identity,"		(2012).	
30	This	was	the	case	in	all	types	of	law,	even	capital	offences.	There	are	rare	instances	of	documented	
application	of	capital	punishment	by	the	Council	in	cases	of	Jews	murdering	other	Jews.	For	more	on	the	
Council’s	functions	in	Jewish	life,	see:	Dubnow,	History	of	the	Jews	in	Russia	and	Poland,	from	the	Earliest	Times	
until	the	Present	Day.,	1.	On	the	utilization	of	its	mechanisms	by	the	Mitnagdim,	in	their	conflict	against	
Hasidim,	see:	A	History	of	Hasidism.	
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exclusively	non-public	terms.31	Thus	section	V,	“The	Position	of	Rabbis,”	states	that	“the	
rabbinate	is	just	an	honorable	post.”32	Consequently,	“it	is	forbidden	[for	rabbis]	to	inflict	
any	other	punishment,	except	revelation	and	pronunciations	inside	the	synagogues;	Rabbis	
and	other	spiritual	leaders	who	dare	go	against	this	rule	and	inflict	public	punishment,	of	
whatever	kind	[such	as]:	fine	by	the	prohibitions	of	Paskha	[…]	and	kosher	meat,	and	even	
by	condemnation	and	denunciation	will	be	punished.”33	Equal	access	to	the	law	involved	
denying	rabbis	their	traditional	role	as	adjudicators,	as	well	as	their	rights	to	requisitions	
and	compensation	from	the	community.			
The	process	of	modernizing	the	Jew	of	the	Pale	would	extend	well	beyond	R.	Nachman’s	
lifetime,	but	its	formal	beginnings	are	in	the	first	years	of	Alexander	I,	during	which	time	R.	
Nachman	was	still	establishing	himself	as	the	leader	of	his	own	Hasidic	court.34	R.	
Nachman’s	first	year	in	Braslav	was	marked	by	extensive	political	efforts	of	the	Jewish	
community	(Hasidim	and	Mitnagdim	alike)	to	assuage	the	severity	of	what	they	suspected	
would	turn	out	to	be	a	detrimental	decree	against	the	Jewish	population	of	the	Pale	of	
Settlement.	At	the	level	of	Jewish	history,	this	joint	effort	began	a	period	of	cooperation	
between	Hasidim	and	their	orthodox	opponents.	In	1804,	when	the	Statute	was	enacted,	it	
included	a	clause	that	effectively	brought	an	end	to	the	conflict	between	these	groups:	“If	in	
any	place	there	arises	a	separation	of	sects	and	a	split	occurs	in	which	one	group	does	not	
want	to	be	in	a	synagogue	with	the	other	group,	then	it	is	possible	[for]	one	of	them	to	build	
																																																								
31	What	the	opposite	of	“public”	was	in	this	context	is	a	question	we	will	see	R.	Nachman	take	up	in	chapter	5.	
32	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews"	V.	52.	
33	Ibid.,	V.	51.	
34	See:	Dubnow,	History	of	the	Jews	in	Russia	and	Poland,	from	the	Earliest	Times	until	the	Present	Day.,	1.	In	
particular	Ch.	X.	
	
	169	
its	own	synagogue	and	to	select	its	rabbis.”35	From	that	point	on	there	could	be	more	than	
one	synagogue	per	town	and	thus	there	was	no	longer	a	single	position	of	rabbinic	
authority	to	vie	for.	Hasidim	and	Mitnagdim	were	free	to	establish	their	own	synagogues.36	
In	the	history	of	the	Hasidic	movement,	this	allowed	the	undisturbed	establishment	of	new	
Hasidic	communities	across	the	Pale	of	Settlement,	and	the	emergence	of	the	first	Hasidic	
leaders	of	what	would	become	patrilineal	dynastic	courts.37	In	broader	European	Jewish	
history,	the	end	of	hostilities	between	these	two	groups	set	the	stage	for	the	next	conflict,	
which	R.	Nachman	would	see	only	the	earliest	stages	of,	between	the	Eastern	European	
Jewish	Enlightenment	thinkers	(the	Maskilim)	and	the	traditionalist	communities	of	
Hasidism	and	Mitnagdim.38	
In	R.	Nachman’s	personal	biography,	1804	is	the	beginning	of	his	extremely	productive	
years.	Almost	all	of	what	he	taught	and	published	was	done	between	1804	and	his	death	in	
1810.	All	the	themes	we	have	mentioned	thus	far—the	decentralization	of	the	Hasidic	
movement	and	the	ideology	of	Zadikism,	the	conflict	with	the	Mitnagdim,	his	own	conflict	
with	other	Hasidic	rabbis,	the	arrival	of	Jewish	Enlightenment	ideas	from	Western	Europe,	
the	1804	Statute—all	figure	in	his	teachings	and	tales.	His	life	was	a	microcosm	of	these	
historical	forces	and	his	oeuvre	was	no	different.		
																																																								
35	Charny,	"1804	Russian	Set	of	Laws	Concerning	Jews"	V.	53.	
36	For	more	on	the	implications	of	this	legislation	for	the	conflict	see:	Wilensky,	Hasidim	U-Mitnagdim	:	Le-
Toldot	Ha-Pulmus	She-Benehem.	
37	For	more	on	the	various	“phases”	of	Hasidism,	see:	Dubnow,	A	History	of	Hasidism.	
38	The	conflict	erupted	in	full	force	only	in	1815,	but	R.	Nachman	was	close	to	the	Maskilim	in	his	region	and	
his	friendship	with	them	was	the	source	of	considerable	criticism,	even	from	his	own	disciplines.	For	more	on	
this	conflict,	see:	Refa'el	Mahler,	Hasidism	and	the	Jewish	Enlightenment	:	Their	Confrontation	in	Galicia	and	
Poiland	in	the	1st	Half	of	the	19th	Century	(Philadelphia	u.a.:	Jewish	Publ.	Soc.	of	America,	1985).	For	the	
effects	of	this	conflict	on	the	historiography	of	Hasidism,	see:	Israel	Bartal,	"The	Imprint	of	Haskalah	
Literature	on	the	Historiography	of	Hasidism,"	in	Hasidism	Reappraised,	ed.	Ada	Rapoport-Albert	(London:	
Littman	Library	of	Jewish	Civilization,	1996).		For	more	on	R.	Nachman’s	relations	with	the	Maskilim,	see:	
Haim	Liberman,	"R.	Nachman	Breslaver	Und	Die	Umener	Maskilim,"	YIVO	Bleter	XXIX	(1947).	
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R.	Nachman’s	creative	years	coincide	with	the	reorganization	of	Eastern	European	Jewish	
society	that	is	the	culmination	of	all	the	political,	social	and	geographic	uncertainty	
accumulated	over	several	decades	in	the	region.	They	last	until	a	moment	before	this	
volatility	disappears	into	the	post-Napoleonic	solidification	of	Russian	borders	and	
reformation	policies.	Within	such	a	dynamic	period,	the	question	of	“locating”	R.	Nachman	
historically,	socially,	even	geographically,	is	not	a	simple	one.	The	standard	dichotomy	
between	tradition	and	modernity	does	not	encompass	the	multiple	traditions	and	possible	
modernities	that,	in	his	moment,	R.	Nachman	attempted	to	think	through	and	articulate.	
What	these	concentric	histories	should	imply	for	a	study	of	R.	Nachman	is	that	any	such	
location	will	not	be	a	static	one.	It	is	the	unabated	and	unavoidable	dynamism	of	R.	
Nachman’s	position	that	we	should	keep	in	mind	as	we	turn	to	read	his	work.		
This	dynamism	is	also	the	way	he	himself	represented	his	role	as	zadik	to	his	followers;	
moving	between	historical,	social,	even	theological	forces,	negotiating	between	faith	and	
heresy,	enlightenment	and	tradition,	this	was	the	“position”	of	the	zadik.	We	will	read	this	
representation	shortly	in	“Teaching	64:	Go	in	Unto	Pharaoh”	of	R.	Nachman’s	collected	
teachings	Likkutei	Moharan.39	Leading	into	our	discussion	of	this	teaching,	however,	we	
will	pause	to	consider	another	social	position	that	emerged	simultaneously	and	with	
similar	dynamism	to	that	of	R.	Nachman’s	“zadik.”	Occupying	a	similar	dynamic	position	
vis-à-vis	the	broader	society,	considering	the	connections	of	“the	Intellectual”	and	“the	
Zadik”	will	help	introduce	the	terms	in	which	I	am	proposing	to	read	R.	Nachman’s	writings,	
further	clarify	the	particular	context	of	his	contribution	to	the	reorganization	of	Eastern	
European	Jewry	and	prepare	us	to	make	sense	of	Teaching	64.		
																																																								
39	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1;	Likkutei	Moharan,	vol.	2	(Mohilev1811).	
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Was	Rabbi	Nachman	a	Jewish	Intellectual?		
	
There	are	two	questions	that	stand	out	as	most	commonly	posed	in	the	study	of	R.	
Nachman’s	thought	and	writing.	The	first:	did	R.	Nachman	think	he	was	the	Messiah?	(A	
question	which	may,	depending	on	the	audience,	amount	to	asking,	“was	R.	Nachman	the	
Messiah?”)	The	answer	(regardless	of	the	audience)	has	been	a	resounding	“yes.”	The	
second:	should	we	include	R.	Nachman’s	writing	in	the	category	of	Modern	Hebrew	
Literature?	While	this	may	seem	an	odd	question	to	ask	about	the	(perhaps,	self-perceived)	
Messiah,	this	too	has	mostly	been	answered	in	the	affirmative.40	Neither	of	these	questions	
will	concern	us	here.	The	first	question	is	tangential	to	our	attempt	to	focus	on	the	
intricacies	of	R.	Nachman’s	social	thought	and	his	imaginative	writing,41	and	even	more	so	
once	we	consider	R.	Nachman’s	own	understanding	of	what	the	messianic	moment	would	
look	like	in	social	terms.					
	
As	for	the	second	question,	the	“yes”	never	ends	up	producing	a	clear	affirmation	of	R.	
Nachman’s	Hebrew	literary	modernity.	Eager	statements	of	inclusion	such	as	Arnold	
Band’s	are	not	hard	to	find:	“While	these	collections	of	Hasidic	tales	have	not	generally	
																																																								
40	The	most	significant	readers	of	Braslav	literature	all	agree	on	this	point.	See:	Band,	Nahman	of	Bratslav,	the	
Tales.	Dan,	Ha-Sipur	Ha-Hasidi.	Elstein,	Pa`Ame	Bat	Melekh:	Hikre	Tokhen	Ve-Tsurah	Be-Sipuro	Ha-Rishon	Shel	
R.	Nahman	Mi-Braslav.	Green,	Tormented	Master:	The	Life	and	Spiritual	Quest	of	Rabbi	Nahman	of	Bratslav.	Zvi	
Mark,	Megilat	Setarim:	He-Hazon	Ha-Meshihi	Ha-Sodi	Shel	R.	Nahman	Mi-Braslav	(Ramat-Gan:	Bar-Ilan	
University,	2006).	Piekarz,	Hasidut	Braslav:	Perakim	Be-Haye	Meholeleha	Uvi-Khetaveha.		
41	The	possibility	that	R.	Nachman’s	tales	are	in	fact	not	fictional,	but	rather	allegorical	references	to	very	
present	metaphysical	realities,	has	been	raised	by	many	of	the	readers	I	have	already	referenced.	Not	being	a	
metaphysician,	my	own	access	to	this	(somewhat	oxymoronic)	“metaphysical	reality”	is	rather	limited.	I	
suspect	the	same	is	true	of	the	readers	I	have	mentioned	as	well.	For	more	on	this	point	see:	Lewis,	
"Revealing	and	Concealing	as	Literary	Devices	in	the	Tales	of	Rabbi	Nachman,	or,	the	Case	of	the	Missing	
Ending."	
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been	included	in	histories	of	Modern	Hebrew	Literature,	the	arguments	Dov	Sadan	and	
others	have	proposed	for	their	inclusion	are	quite	convincing.”42	The	more	obvious	issues	
with	fitting	R.	Nachman	into	the	categories	of	“Hebrew”	and	“literature”	is	that	he	
published	both	tales	and	teachings,	and	it	is	unclear	whether	they	were	in	fact	delivered	in	
Hebrew	or	Yiddish.	Eventually	statements	such	as	Band’s	are	qualified,	and	R.	Nachman	
becomes	a	“forerunner”43	to	Hebrew	literary	modernity,	or	simply	(and	unproblematically)	
contemporaneous	with	it.	“If	we	use	the	term	[‘modern’]	generically,	referring	to	a	period	
of	time	–	the	last	two	centuries,	for	instance	–	[then	the	tales	of	R.	Nachman]	are	of	the	
'modern'	period.	If	'modernity,'	however,	is	measured	by	the	secular,	inquisitive,	and	
historic	spirit,”44	continues	Band,	then	the	tales	of	R.	Nachman	are	not.	
	
The	issue	of	R.	Nachman’s	relation	to	the	category	of	“modernity”	is	not	my	concern	here.	It	
merely	illustrates	the	difficulty	that	exists	in	placing	his	thought	and	writing	within	readily	
available	categories,	be	they	Modern	or	Messianic.	There	was	another	social	category	that	
was	emerging	towards	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	and	which	might	better	serve	our	
understanding	of	R.	Nachman’s	tales	and	teachings.	The	position	I	have	in	mind	is	that	of	
the	Intellectual.	“The	men	of	letters	of	the	eighteenth	century	[…]	being	out	of	touch	with	
practical	politics	indulged	in	abstract	political	theories	and	vague	generalizations,”	writes	
George	Huszar	in	the	first	pages	of	The	Intellectuals.45	He	is	speaking	of	the	role	French	
intellectuals	played	in	the	Revolution,	but	extends	this	observation	to	European	men	of	
letters	in	the	late	eighteenth	century	more	generally.		
																																																								
42	Band,	Nahman	of	Bratslav,	the	Tales,	30.	
43	See:	Schwartz,	"Rabbi	Nachman	of	Bratslav:	Forerunner	of	Modern	Jewish	Literature."	
44	Band,	Nahman	of	Bratslav,	the	Tales,	29.	
45	George	B.	de	Huszar,	ed.	The	Intellectuals:	A	Controversial	Portrait	(Glencoe,	Ill.:	Free	Press,	1960),	8.	
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The	politicization	of	letters	(and	men	of	letters)	in	that	period	is	not	a	novel	argument.	
Contemporaries	of	R.	Nachman	such	as	Madam	de	Staël	in	her	Politics,	Literature,	and	
National	Character46	had	already	articulated	this	process	and,	from	Alexis	de	Tocqueville	to	
Raymond	Williams,	the	increased	involvement	of	men	of	letters	in	politics	and	the	effects	of	
this	trend	have	been	well	documented.47	For	reasons	beyond	our	present	scope,	questions	
and	possibilities	of	the	relation	between	politics	and	intellectual	activity	received	new	
articulation	in	late	eighteenth	century	Europe	and	a	variety	of	writers,	poets	and	
philosophers	had	taken	up	politics	and	government,	whether	as	topic	or	as	occupation.	
These	men	came	to	comprise	their	own	social	group	known	as	Intellectuals.48	Though	they	
had	little	practical	political	experience,	as	Huszar	notes,	“they	had	great	confidence	in	[their	
ideas]	and	thought	that	under	the	rule	of	reason	a	sudden	and	radical	transformation	of	a	
complex	society	was	possible.”49	Such	intellectuals	took	on	key	roles	in	the	revolutions	and	
reformations	of	the	period,	and	the	revolutions	and	reformations	of	Jewish	society	were	no	
different.	So,	was	R.	Nachman	a	Jewish	intellectual?	
	
How	could	a	Hasidic	zadik	be	considered	a	Jewish	intellectual?	Our	first	reaction	would	
probably	be	to	see	this	as	a	contradiction	in	terms,	for	two	reasons.	First,	we	tend	to	think	
																																																								
46	Germaine	de	Stael,	Politics,	Literature,	and	National	Character,	trans.	Morroe	Berger	(New	Brunswick,	
U.S.A.;	London,	U.K.:	Transaction	Publishers,	2000).	
47	Tocqueville	discusses	the	French	context	in:	Alexis	de	Tocqueville,	"The	Old	Regime	and	the	French	
Revolution,"	(Garden	City,	N.Y.:	Doubleday,	1955).	Raymond	Williams	discusses	the	British	context	in:	
Raymond	Williams,	Culture	and	Society,	1780-1950	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1958).	For	a	
discussion	of	the	extent	to	which	politics	and	letters	blended	in	this	process,	see:	Sophia	Rosenfeld,	"Writing	
the	History	of	Censorship	in	the	Age	of	Enlightenment,"	in	Postmodernism	and	the	Enlightenment	:	New	
Perspectives	in	Eighteenth-Century	French	Intellectual	History,	ed.	Daniel	Gordon	(New	York:	Routledge,	2001).	
Huszar’s	edited	volume	offers	a	comprehensive	view	of	the	political	role	of	18th	and	early	19th	century	
intellectuals	in	the	U.S.	and	Russia	as	well.	See:	Huszar,	The	Intellectuals:	A	Controversial	Portrait.		
48	See:	The	Intellectuals:	A	Controversial	Portrait,	3.	
49	Ibid.,	8.	
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of	the	intellectual	as	an	enlightened,	rational,	perhaps	even	secular	figure.	Thus,	the	Berlin	
rabbi	Moses	Mendelssohn	might	be	considered	an	early	Jewish	Intellectual,	while	his	
contemporary	Polish	rabbi	Yisra’el	Baal	Shem	Tov	would	not.	This	“secular”	hypothesis	is	
certainly	not	true	of	the	non-Jewish	intellectuals	in	R.	Nachman’s	lifetime,	nor	is	it	
unproblematically	true	of	Mendelssohn	for	that	matter.50	In	fact,	the	earliest	non-Hasidic	
documentation	of	Hasidism	was	done	by	Maskilim.	Through	harsh	criticism	and	biting	
satire	these	early	accounts	set	up	an	opposition	between	the	zadik	as	a	corrupt	populist	
leader	exploiting	the	Jewish	masses	and	the	Maskil	as	a	modern	intellectual	operating	
“above”	the	masses.	This	opposition	would	characterize	historical	work	on	both	groups	for	
the	next	two	centuries.51	Second,	research	on	this	social	group	has	tended	to	focus	on	the	
intellectuals’	liminal	position	vis-à-vis	the	society	in	which	they	operate.	We	have	seen	this	
in	the	previous	chapter	with	Veblen	and	Borges,	as	well	as	accounts	of	the	intellectual	from	
Julian	Benda	and	Antonio	Gramsci	to	Paul	Mendes-Flohr	and	Edward	Said.52	Hence	the	
invocation	of	“exile,”	“inter-space,”	and	“in-between-ness”	in	these	more	recent	
representations	of	the	intellectual.	In	R.	Nachman’s	day,	however,	neither	Jews	nor	
intellectuals	could	be	so	obviously	“located.”		
	
There	is	something	more	to	note,	however,	about	the	inflection	in	the	category	of	“Jewish	
																																																								
50	On	religious	strands	in	French	intellectual	thought	of	the	time,	see:	Albert	Salomon,	"The	Messianic	
Bohemians,"	in	The	Intellectuals:	A	Controversial	Portrait,	ed.	George	B.	de	Huszar	(Glencoe,	Ill.:	Free	Press,	
1960).,	in	contemporary	Russian	intellectual	thought,	see:	Hugh	Seton-Watson,	"The	Russian	Intellectuals,"	
ibid.,	in	the	later	Russian	intellectual	context,	see:	Sydney	Hook,	"Communism	and	the	Intellectual,"	ibid.	On	
Mendelssohn,	see:	Allan	Arkush,	Moses	Mendelssohn	and	the	Enlightenment	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	
York,	1994).		
51	In	fact	much	of	the	Maskil	literature	against	the	Hasidic	movement	satirizes	the	zadik	to	the	point	of	
presenting	him	as	the	very	antithesis	of	the	“modern	intellectual”	Maskil.	For	more	on	the	bias	of	early	
documentations	of	Hasidism	see:	Bartal,	"The	Imprint	of	Haskalah	Literature	on	the	Historiography	of	
Hasidism."	For	more	on	Maskilic	satire	against	Hasidism	see:	Jonatan	Meir,	Imagined	Hasidism:	The	Anti-
Hasidic	Writings	of	Joseph	Perl	(Yerushalayim:	Mosad	Bialik,	2013).	
52	See	the	conclusion	of	chapter	1	for	a	discussion	of	these	representations	of	the	intellectual.	
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Intellectual.”	The	in-between	social	location	so	central	to	understandings	of	both	the	Jew	
and	the	Intellectual,	was	not	readily	available	to	Jews	(or	intellectuals)	in	R.	Nachman's	
lifetime.	Certainly	Medieval	and	early-Modern	social	conditions	in	Europe	contained	no	
such	space.	As	a	group,	Jews	were	for	the	most	part	either	fully	identifiable	and	socially	
contained	(as	in	the	ghettos	of	Italy),	or	they	were	absent	(as	in	England).	If	there	was	to	
exist	a	difference	between	Jews	and	the	non-Jewish	surrounding	society,	it	would	be	visible.	
If	such	difference	was	not	desirable,	it	was	expelled.53	In	the	late-eighteenth	and	early-
nineteenth	century,	with	the	spread	of	enlightenment	ideology	that	promoted	the	
separation	of	Church	and	State,	along	with	political	programs	of	emancipation	that	sought	
equal	access	for	all	citizens	to	a	unified	legal	code,	the	social	reality	began	to	change.	As	we	
have	seen,	the	inclusion	of	all	Jews	in	the	Pale	of	Settlement	under	a	unified	legal	code	may	
have	left	them	at	the	outer	limits	of	society—a	change	of	attire	is	all	that	was	needed—
nonetheless	they	were	at	the	outer	limits	of	inclusion.	The	1804	Statute’s	effort	to	outline	
the	borders	of	this	space—in	terms	ranging	from	geography	to	couture—was	an	early	
articulation	of	structures	of	inclusion,	vis-à-vis	which	the	Jews’	and	the	intellectuals’	
position	alike	would	come	to	be	defined	and	represented	by	later	thinkers.		
	
Commenting	on	the	historiography	of	the	French	emancipation	during	R.	Nachman’s	
lifetime,	Ronald	Schechter	states,	“despite	sometimes	bitter	political	differences,	the	
history	of	the	Jews	from	the	Enlightenment	through	the	revolutionary-Napoleonic	period	
has	been	written	with	a	view	to	a	future	that	these	forces	are	presumed	to	have	brought	
																																																								
53	Interesting	exceptions	to	this	are	the	Marranos	of	Spain	and	Portugal.	
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into	being.”54	The	retrospective	foreshadowing	Schechter	takes	issue	with	sees	events	such	
as	the	Dreyfus	Affair	and	WWII	anti-Semitism	as	natural	outcomes	of	emancipation	
ideology.	Schechter	criticizes	such	retroactive	framing	of	emancipation	ideology	as	an	
“attempt	at	eradicating	the	Jews.”55	As	Dubnow	has	documented,	many	of	R.	Nachman's	
contemporaries	certainly	understood	these	changes	would	cause	harm	to	the	Jewish	
population.	Nevertheless,	after	Napoleon	convened	the	Paris	Sanhedrin	in	1806	the	Jewish	
community	in	Eastern	Europe	was	split	as	to	which	empire	had	the	better	attitude	towards	
Jews,	the	negotiated	emancipation	of	Napoleon’s	Republican	France	or	the	forced	
modernization	of	Russia’s	“enlightened	despot”	Alexander	I.	The	difference	of	opinion	led	
to	some	of	the	worst	conflicts	within	the	Hasidic	movement	at	the	time.56			
	
The	question	I	want	to	focus	on	is	not	whether	forced	emancipation	or	negotiated	
emancipation	(or	even	the	denial	of	emancipation)	represents	an	attempt	to	eradicate	the	
Jews.	To	the	extent	that	Schechter	is	right	in	pointing	out	that	the	common	
historiographical	answer	seems	to	be	"both,"	we	would	do	well	to	accept	his	criticism	of	
implicit	historical	teleology.	Whatever	future	historical	developments	may	turn	out	to	be,	
what	is	common	to	both	Napoleon	and	the	Tsar	is	an	effort	to	reorganize	the	social	
mechanisms	that	determined	inclusion	and	exclusion.	And	what	is	common	to	the	Jews	of	
Europe	at	the	time	is	the	attempt	to	figure	out	their	place	within	this	reshuffling	of	the	
																																																								
54	Ronald	Schechter,	Obstinate	Hebrews	:	Representations	of	Jews	in	France,	1715	-	1815	(Berkeley:	Univ.	of	
California	Press,	2003),	3.	For	a	discussion	of	foreshadowing	and	the	possibility	of	“backshadowing”	in	Jewish	
literary	historiography	see:	Michael	Bernstein,	Foregone	Conclusions:	Against	Apocalyptic	History	(Berkeley:	
University	of	California	Press,	1994).	
55	Schechter,	Obstinate	Hebrews	:	Representations	of	Jews	in	France,	1715	-	1815,	3.	
56	For	a	fictional	depiction	of	this	moment,	see:	Martin	Buber,	Gog	and	Magog	:	A	Novel,	trans.	Ludwig	
Lewisohn	(Syracuse,	NY:	Syracuse	University	Press,	1999).	For	accounts	of	this	difference	of	opinion,	see:	
Paul	R.	Mendes-Flohr	and	Jehuda	Reinharz,	Jew	in	the	Modern	World	:	Documentary	History	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	1995),	137-38.	
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social	space.		
	
As	we	have	seen	in	the	previous	chapter,	when	Veblen	speaks	of	"modern	Europe"	he	uses	
this	term	as	a	somewhat	uncritical	mix	of	geographical,	historical,	ideological	and	even	
religious	designations.	Ultimately,	he	arrives	at	an	evaluation	of	his	present	situation	of	
Jews	in	Europe	with	the	a-historical	and	a-contextual	conclusion	that	they	got	there	by	
leaving	their	tradition	behind	and	finding	the	broader	society	not	entirely	accessible.	Stuck	
between	tradition	and	modernity,	this	narrative	of	transition	that	he	ascribes	the	Jews	
becomes	the	very	definition	of	their	social	location.	What	we	find	in	Veblen	is	an	example	of	
historiographical	teleology	that	compliments	Schechter’s	criticism.	That	is	to	say,	while	the	
historians	Schechter	criticizes	will	retrospectively	see	the	history	of	emancipation	as	an	
attempt	at	eradicating	the	Jews,	Veblen	would	retrospectively	see	the	same	history	as	
bringing	into	being	the	preeminence	of	Jews	in	modern	Europe.57	Yet	when	we	apply	
Veblen’s	historical	narrative	to	R.	Nachman’s	lifetime	we	find	little	of	the	in-between-ness	
that	Veblen	identifies.	Neither	preeminence	nor	eradication	exists	as	a	predetermined	
course	for	R.	Nachman,	outside	of	a	later	teleological	account	of	his	moment.	
	
Paul	Mendes-Flohr,	in	his	book	Divided	Passions,58	argues	that	humanistic	self-
transcendence	of	one’s	own	Judaism	is	a	typical	representation	of	the	Jewish	Intellectual.	
Yet	R.	Nachman	was	firmly	rooted	in	the	Hassidic	movement.	His	attempts	to	make	sense	
(and,	later,	stories)	of	the	changing	world	around	him	did	not	lead	him	to	transcend	the	
traditional	tenets	upon	which	Jewish	society	in	Eastern	Europe	was	predicated.	No	more	
																																																								
57	Veblen,	"The	Intellectual	Pre-Eminence	of	Jews	in	Modern	Europe."	
58	Mendes-Flohr,	Divided	Passions:	Jewish	Intellectuals	and	the	Experience	of	Modernity.	
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than	was	the	broader	effort	of	the	Hassidic	movement,	at	any	rate.	If,	following	Veblen	and	
Mendes-Flohr,	we	define	the	Jewish	intellectual	as	an	in-between	figure,	straddling	
boundaries	with	divided	and	simultaneous	residence,	we	might	note	(as	Band	does59)	that	
R.	Nachman	was	hardly	such	a	figure.	Nor	could	he	be.	The	in-between	space,	in	which	the	
Jewish	intellectual	may	exist,	was	only	just	being	carved	out	in	R.	Nachman’s	lifetime;	both	
geographically	(starting	in	1772)	in	the	Pale	of	Settlement,	and	ideologically	(starting	in	
1804)	in	the	Statute	on	the	Organization	of	the	Jews.			
	
The	Jewish	Intellectual	is	“a	tangible	historical	and	social	configuration	in	Western	
society,”60	in	spite	of	its	elusiveness	and	methodological	problematic,	Mendes-Flohr	claims.	
R.	Nachman’s	tales	and	teachings	are	a	window	onto	a	moment,	from	which	this	
configuration	can	be	seen	as	taking	shape,	but	is	not	yet	as	“tangible”	as	Mendes-Flohr	sees	
it.	By	such	a	view,	to	call	R.	Nachman	a	“Jewish	intellectual”	would	be	anachronistic.	Yet	R.	
Nachman	certainly	raises	questions	regarding	the	possibility	of	such	a	“configuration.”	
Understanding	the	space	that	was	opening	(or	closing)	for	Jews	within	his	own	society	was	
for	R.	Nachman	a	primary	preoccupation.	In	that	sense,	we	might	pose	him	as	a	precursor	
to	just	such	Jewish	intellectuals	as	Mendes-Flohr	himself.	In	his	tales	and	teachings	R.	
Nachman	traces	and	astutely	criticizes	the	process	by	which	the	location	so	defining	of	the	
Jew	and	the	Intellectual	was	formed	and	conceived.	This	process	was	not	completed	during	
R.	Nachman's	lifetime,	at	least	not	in	Eastern	Europe.	But	some	of	its	most	significant	
moments	did	take	place	then.	
																																																								
59	Band,	Nahman	of	Bratslav,	the	Tales,	29.	In	what	follows	I	will	demonstrate	that	(leaving	“secular”	aside)	
“inquisitive”	and	“historic	spirit”	are	adjectives	that	well	apply	to	R.	Nachman’s	writing.	
60	Mendes-Flohr,	Divided	Passions:	Jewish	Intellectuals	and	the	Experience	of	Modernity,	25.	
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How	then	should	we	think	of	R.	Nachman’s	position	in	1804	that	is	not	in-between,	but	
represents	an	opening	onto	such	a	location?	Speaking	of	R.	Nachman—among	the	most	
exemplary	of	Hasidic	rabbis—Joseph	Weiss	answers:	"they	are	figures	at	the	very	limit,	at	
the	limit	of	Judaism,	whom	the	fascination	of	the	limit	and	what	lies	beyond	it	has	
overtaken."61	R.	Nachman	was	drawn	to	the	limit,	but	would	its	crossing	land	him	in	some	
in-between	space,	or	rather	on	the	"other	side"	entirely?	His	contemporary	Heinrich	Heine	
converted	to	Christianity	as	part	of	his	own	crossing	of	the	limit.	Borges	may	perceive	
Heine's	position	as	that	of	Jewish	marginality—and	perhaps	in	Western	Europe	of	the	time	
this	would	not	be	as	anachronistic	a	suggestion	as	it	would	be	for	Hasidic	rabbis	in	the	Pale	
of	Settlement—but	R.	Nachman	certainly	would	not	have	perceived	it	so.	His	gravitation	
towards	the	limit,	which	Weiss	terms	"the	gravitational	pull	of	the	limit,"62	is	not	yet	an	
account	of	anything	that	lies	just	beyond	the	limit.		
	
Precisely	what	is	being	asked,	then,	in	posing	the	question	of	a	possible	in-between	space?	
This	question	runs	along	the	lines	of	the	concentric	circles,	within	which	we	are	discussing	
R.	Nachman’s	life.	On	the	level	of	European	history	it	is	a	geo-political	question.	What	lies	
beyond	the	borders	of	the	Russian	Empire?	The	Pale	of	Settlement	was	a	geographic	region	
that	separated	what	was	properly	Russia	from	other	empires	to	the	west.	Though	subject	to	
Imperial	bureaucracy,	as	the	Statute	has	shown,	the	Pale	was	discontinuous	with	Russia	in	
several	ways.	We	have	already	seen	the	difference	in	the	regulation	of	public	space,	
whereby	Jews	were	free	to	wear	“their”	dress	outside	of	official	settings	in	the	Pale,	but	
																																																								
61	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	99.	
62	Ibid.,	Ch.7.	
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were	obligated	to	remain	in	German	dress	at	all	times	while	within	Russia.	The	Pale	was	
also	a	political	region	where	citizens	were	subject	to	a	unified	code	of	laws,	which	ensured	
their	equality	while	maintaining	their	designations	as	non-Russian	citizens.	The	Pale	was	
established	as	a	geo-political	in-between	space	in	terms	of	European	social	history.	
	
In	terms	of	European	Jewish	history	the	Pale	was	a	moment	between	the	relative	autonomy	
of	the	previous	two	centuries	and	an	effort	to	force	Jewish	emancipation	and	
modernization.	The	question	where	one	ends	up	when	leaving	the	Empire	is	mirrored	in	
the	question	of	where	one	ends	up	when	leaving	the	traditional	Jewish	world.	The	Maskilim	
were	not	the	first	to	pose	this	question	to	the	Eastern	European	Jewish	community.	
Hasidism	had	done	that	half	a	century	earlier.	For	the	Mitnagdim,	Hasidism	was	entirely	
outside	the	fold	of	the	traditional	community.	There	was	no	in-between.	But	in	the	early	
nineteenth	century,	with	the	arrival	of	the	first	Jewish	Enlightenment	figures	on	the	
Eastern	European	scene,	the	“topographical”	question	of	ideological	borders	was	reopened.	
Was	it	now	possible	to	step	out	of	the	traditional	setting	and	end	up	in	a	sort	of	Pale	of	
Settlement,	where	one	might	still	be	subject	to	Judaism,	but	as	a	non-traditional	member?	
Or	would	one,	as	the	Mitnagdim	argued	decades	earlier,	end	up	outside	the	fold	entirely,	
excommunicated?	On	the	level	of	Hasidic	history	this	was	precisely	the	question	they	had	
faced	in	the	years	of	contention	with	the	Mitnagdim.	And	there	was	the	theological	question	
too:	what	is	the	limit	between	faith	and	heresy?	How	far	into	the	realm	of	rationalism	(the	
hallmark	of	the	Enlightenment,	as	far	as	Hasidism	was	concerned)	could	one	venture	
before	ending	up	in	heresy?	As	a	traditional	Jew	caught	in	the	gravitational	pull	of	the	limit,	
R.	Nachman	was	also	drawn	to	the	question:	where	does	one	end	up	when	one	crosses	the	
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limit?	
	
The	rise	of	Jewish	Enlightenment	in	Eastern	Europe	towards	the	end	of	R.	Nachman's	
lifetime	suggested	such	a	“straddling	of	boundaries”	(to	borrow	Mendes-Flohr’s	
expression)	was	becoming	possible.	Moreover,	Braslav	ideology	"sees	a	special	role	in	the	
zadik	entering	among	the	investigators63	and	the	books	of	investigation	(that	is,	books	of	
heresy)	[...]	The	most	explicit	expression	[of	this]	is	found	in	teaching	64."64	The	question	of	
whether	these	"investigators"	straddled	the	limit	or	simply	exited	Judaism	is	a	question	R.	
Nachman	struggles	with	in	Teaching	64.	All	the	more	so	do	we	need	to	consider	the	social	
implications	of	an	ideology	that	ascribes	the	zadik	the	role	of	fraternizing	with	the	
Maskilim.	It	is	not	enough	to	note	the	Braslav	critique	of	rationalism	as	a	form	of	heresy,	
when	this	critique	is	part	of	an	ideology	that	calls	for	engaging	with	this	same	heresy.	In	his	
final	years,	living	in	the	home	of	a	Jewish	Enlightenment	scholar	in	Uman,	R.	Nachman	had	
"the	sensation	of	living	on	the	limit—a	very	characteristic	sensation	to	R.	Nachman	all	his	
life.	R.	Nathan	tells	that	while	living	in	the	home	of	R.	Nachman-Natan:65	'He	said:	here	we	
are	now	at	the	limit	and	edge	of	Israel	where	the	limit	of	Israel	ends,	for	everything	has	a	
limit	and	an	end.'"66		
	
The	question	of	how	to	locate	himself	vis-à-vis	the	"investigators,"	the	gravitational	pull	of	
the	limit	vis-à-vis	those	that	had	already	crossed	it,	was,	for	R.	Nachman,	part	and	parcel	of	
																																																								
63	“Investigators”	–	in	Hebrew:	mechakrim	–	is	the	term	R.	Nachman	uses	for	scholars	of	the	Jewish	
Enlightenment.	
64	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	64-65.	
65	R.	Nachman-Natan	was	the	Jewish	Enlightenment	scholar	in	Uman,	in	whose	home	R.	Nachman	lived	in	his	
final	months	of	life.	See:	Liberman,	"R.	Nachman	Breslaver	Und	Die	Umener	Maskilim."		
66	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	62.	
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the	larger	question	of	what	lies	beyond	the	limit.	Yet	while	R.	Nachman	was	drawn	to	the	
limit	and	the	prospects	of	its	crossing,	his	challenge	was	to	identify	a	point	of	access	that	
would	not	go	through	rationalism	and	thus	heresy	(as	seemed	to	him	to	be	the	case	with	
the	Jewish	Enlightenment	scholars).	Teaching	64	considers	the	various	kinds	of	“limits”	
that	encircle	Jewish	society—theological,	social,	and	epistemological—along	with	the	
possibilities	and	implications	of	their	respective	transgression.	Within	his	multi-layered	
consideration	of	the	limits	of	Jewish	society,	R.	Nachman	also	attempts	to	understand	the	
dynamics	of	his	own	position.		
	
R.	Nachman’s	position	is	not	that	of	a	“Jewish	intellectual”—not	in	Mendes-Flohr’s	sense	(in	
which	the	Jewish	Enlightenment	scholars	were),	nor	in	the	sense	Borges	intends	when	he	
represents	“the	Judaic”	as	informing	his	own	project	of	an	intellectual	author.	What	the	
juxtaposition	of	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	highlights	is	a	similarity	in	terms	of	their	operation	
of	writing	at	the	edge.	Recognizing	it,	contemplating	its	possibilities	and	inscribing	their	
writing	at	the	edge,	as	an	opening	of	the	edge	into	an	in-between	space,	which	will	be	their	
point	of	departure	as	writers.	R.	Nachman’s	introduction	of	a	"vacant	space"	between	the	
limit	and	its	beyond	is	what	makes	Teaching	64	so	significant	in	terms	of	understanding	his	
thought	on	this	operation.	
	
The	Topography	of	the	Question	
	
R.	Nachman	identifies	two	Talmudic	characters	that	represent	for	him	an	exemplary	
position	at	the	limits	of	Judaism.	In	his	teachings	he	expresses	a	particular	fascination	with	
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them.	The	first	is	Rabba	Bar	Bar	Hanna,	the	Talmudic	fabulator	and	wanderer	in	mythical	
spaces.	The	eighteen	teachings	that	begin	R.	Nachman’s	collection	in	Likkutei	Moharan	
center	around	interpretations	of	Rabba	Bar	Bar	Hannah’s	various	accounts	of	his	fabulous	
voyages.	“Every	Abba	is	an	ass	and	every	Bar	Bar	Hannah	is	a	fool”67	is	what	the	other	
Talmudic	rabbis	have	to	say	about	these	tales.	Nonetheless,	whatever	the	other	rabbis	
thought	of	him,	Bar	Bar	Hannah	consistently	explores	the	limit	of	his	own	world	and	R.	
Nachman	devotes	quite	a	bit	of	energy	to	reading	and	interpreting	the	accounts	of	this	
exploration.	
	
The	second	character	is	Elisha	ben	Abuya,	the	famous	rabbi-turned-heretic,	referred	to	
simply	as	“Other”	by	the	rabbis	of	the	Talmud.	R.	Nachman	sees	both	characters	as	caught,	
like	he,	in	what	Weiss	calls	the	gravitational	pull	of	the	limit;	between	the	known	world	and	
the	mythical,	between	rabbinic	knowledge	and	gentile	culture.	Most	importantly,	he	
represents	both	as	posing	questions	similar	to	his,	about	the	nature	of	the	limit	and	its	
crossing.	“What	was	it	about	‘Other’?	[R.	Nachman	recalls	the	Talmudic	question,	and	its	
answer:]	Greek	song	never	quit	his	mouth,	and	when	he	would	rise	from	his	study,	several	
heretical	books	would	fall	before	him.”68	What	draws	R.	Nachman	is	this	image	of	a	rabbi	in	
study,	always	humming	non-Jewish	tunes,	who	rises	from	his	study	of	Jewish	texts	only	to	
reveal	he	is	also	engaged	in	the	study	of	heretical	texts.	With	his	similarity	to	the	
“investigators”	of	R.	Nachman’s	day,	we	will	see	Elisha	ben	Abuya	appear	towards	the	end	
of	Teaching	64	in	a	surprisingly	positive	valuation.	
																																																								
67	Tractate	Bava	Batra	74.	“Rabba”	is	a	condensation	of	“Rab	Abba,”	which	is	why	the	Talmudic	rabbis	call	him	
“Abba.”		
68	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:5.	R.	Nachman	is	referencing	Babylonian	Talmud,	Tractate	Hagiga	15:		
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Mendes-Flohr	stated	the	Jewish	Intellectual	is	“one	who	lives	at	or	between	boundaries	
cognitive,	cultural,	and	social.	Straddling	these	boundaries,	the	Jewish	intellectuals	find	
themselves	divided	between	the	respective	claims	of	the	provinces	of	thought,	norms	and	
values	in	which	they	simultaneously	reside.”69	R.	Nachman	sees	Rabba	Bar	Bar	Hannah	and	
Elisha	ben	Abuya	as	similarly	straddling	boundaries,	the	former	between	reality	and	
fantasy,	the	latter	between	faith	and	heresy.	In	clear	opposition	to	the	Talmudic	rabbis'	
responses	to	their	respective	fantasy	and	heresy,	R.	Nachman	values	their	contribution	
towards	making	sense	of	his	changing	topography.	In	his	attempt	to	articulate	his	own	
position,	he	signals	these	rabbis	as	his	precursors.	What	might	this	topography	look	like,	
and	is	it	similar	to	that	which	Veblen	has	laid	out	for	Borges?			
	
Teaching	64	of	Likkutei	Moharan	is	widely	recognized	as	a	tenet	of	R.	Nachman's	
worldview.		In	it	R.	Nachman	lays	out	the	topography	of	the	limit	and	the	possibilities	he	
sees	of	crossing	it.	He	develops	his	concept	of	the	"Vacant	Space"	as	a	space	that	only	a	
select	few	may	travel:	wayfarers,	wanderers,	zadikim.	Anyone	else	would	get	lost;	fall	
through	the	bottom	into	heresy.	The	most	comprehensive	interpretation	of	teaching	64	
belongs	to	Joseph	Weiss	and	is	an	essential	background	to	my	own	reading.70	However,	
Weiss’	efforts	are	limited	to	the	philosophical	understanding	of	the	concept	of	“Vacant	
Space,”	and	deals	exclusively	with	the	epistemological	thesis	R.	Nachman	develops.	My	task	
here	will	be	to	consider	the	social	implications	of	the	“Vacant	Space,”	and	understand	its	
																																																								
69	Mendes-Flohr,	Divided	Passions:	Jewish	Intellectuals	and	the	Experience	of	Modernity,	14.	
70	See:	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	Ch.8.	and:	Noam	Zadoff	and	Jonathan		Meir,	"The	Empty	Space,	
Sabbateanism	and	Its	Melodies	-	Joseph	Weiss'	Reading	of	Liqqutei	Moharan	64,"	Kabbalah:	Journal	for	the	
Study	of	Jewish	Mystical	Texts	15	(2006).	
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significance	to	R.	Nachman’s	identification	of	an	emerging	possibility	of	in-between-ness,	
within	which	he	might	operate.		
	
Since	this	is	the	first	of	R.	Nachman’s	teachings	that	we	are	reading,	an	aside	is	in	order:	
The	associative	element	is	very	powerful	in	R.	Nachman’s	teachings,	which	makes	them	
difficult	to	follow	at	times.	The	marker	of	free-association	is	the	term	“bechina,”	–	literally	
“aspect,”	“facet,”	“dimension.”	Shaul	Magid	defines	this	term	as	a	“meta-midrashic	literary	
trope.”71	The	term	“trope”	may	be	out	of	place	here,	since	the	essential	point	about	
“bechina”	is	neither	its	figurative	use	nor	its	recurrence	as	a	theme.	In	fact,	the	semantic	
denotation	of	“bechina”	is	too	vast	and	vague	for	it	to	be	of	use	to	the	reader	navigating	R.	
Nachman’s	thoughts.	Nor,	on	the	other	hand,	are	the	formal	relations	of	the	two	elements	
being	linked	by	the	term	“bechina”	properly	definable.	To	the	extent	that	such	a	definition	
would	be	coterminous	with	a	typology	of	association	as	such,	identifying	“bechina”	as	a	
“trope”	seems	counterintuitive	(or	at	least	counter-associative)	to	its	own	connotation	of	
an	imaginative,	freely	associative	link	being	made.	“Bechina”	points	to	a	type	of	relationship	
that	lies	beyond	definition.	In	that	sense,	I	believe	we	would	do	well	to	read	“bechina”	
(when	we	encounter	it)	as	a	meta-structural	indicator	of	those	points	in	which	R.	
Nachman’s	exegesis	turns	into	imaginative	free-association.	With	that	in	mind	let’s	proceed	
to	Teaching	64.	
	
																																																								
71	Shaul	Magid,	"Associative	Midrash:	Reflections	on	a	Hermaneutical	Theory	in	Rabbi	Nachman	of	Braslav's	
Likkutei	Moharan,"	in	God's	Voice	from	the	Void:	Old	and	New	Studies	in	Bratslav	Hasidism,	ed.	Shaul	Magid	
(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2002),	16.	
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Teaching	64	begins	with	the	summary72	of	a	classic	idea	in	Lurianic	Cabala,73	the	tzimtzum.		
God	desired	to	create	the	physical	world	for	His	mercy,	for	He	wanted	to	reveal	His	
mercy,	and	if	there	were	no	world,	upon	whom	would	He	have	exhibited	His	mercy?	
[…]	When	God	wanted	to	create	the	world,	there	was	no	space	to	create	it,	for	
everywhere	was	the	infinite	divinity,	He	therefore	withdrew	the	light	[of	His	own	
infinite	divinity]	to	the	sides,	and	by	this	Withdrawal74	a	Vacant	Space75	was	created,	
and	within	this	Vacant	Space,	there	came	to	be	all	the	days	and	measurements,	that	
are	the	creation	of	the	world	(as	it	is	written	in	Etz	HaChaim	in	the	beginning).76		
R.	Nachman	concludes	the	first	paragraph	of	the	teaching	with	a	bibliographic	reference	to	
Etz	HaChaim,	the	major	work	of	Lurianic	Cabala.77				
	
Next	R.	Nachman	continues	to	one	of	the	basic	philosophical-theological	paradoxes	that	
arise	from	the	Lurianic	idea	of	God’s	withdrawal,	namely,	that	if	it	was	necessary	for	God	to	
withdraw	Himself	in	order	to	allow	the	creation	of	anything	separate	from	His	infinity,	then	
the	Vacant	Space,	and	with	it	the	entire	physical	world	that	was	created	therein,	would	be	
entirely	devoid	of	divinity.	Insisting	on	the	withdrawal	of	divinity	from	the	physical	world	
																																																								
72	For	R.	Nachman’s	disciples	and	readers	of	the	time,	this	brief	reference	to	familiar	themes	and	Cabalistic	
ideas	would	have	been	a	summary,	meant	only	as	an	exposition	to	his	subsequent	elaboration	on	the	theme.	
To	the	interested	contemporary	reader	for	whom	these	brief	passages	are	anything	but	a	“recap,”	I	would	
suggest	following	up	on	the	references	in	the	following	footnotes,	especially:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	
Mysticism.	And:	Scholem,	On	the	Kabbalah	and	Its	Symbolism.					
73	Rabbi	Yitzhak	Luria	(1534–1572)	was	the	major	figure	of	the	Safed	circle	of	cabalists	in	the	16th	century.	
For	more	on	his	innovative	contributions	to	the	Jewish	mystical	tradition	see:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	
Mysticism,	Ch.7.	For	a	thesis	on	R.	Luria’s	influence	on	Jewish	storytelling	(including	the	Hasidic	story)	see:	
Dan,	Ha-Sipur	Ha-Hasidi.	
74	Referred	to	as	Tzimtzum	in	Hebrew.	
75	Referred	to	as	Chalal	HaPanui	in	Hebrew.	
76	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:1.	My	additions	for	purposes	of	clarification	will	be	marked	with	square	
parentheses.	-YL	
77	Etz	HaChaim	is	the	major	book	of	Lurianic	Cabala.	It	contains	the	teachings	of	R.	Luria	collected	by	his	
student	R.	Chaim	Vittal	in	Safed	in	the	early	1570s.	
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is	the	only	way	to	ensure	the	world	does	not	get	swallowed	up	by	the	infinite	divinity	and	
thus	lose	its	very	existence,	predicated	as	it	is	upon	it	being	separate	from	God.	Yet,	if	we	
accept	this	premise,	we	are	forced	to	admit	that	the	physical	world	we	inhabit	is	a	God-less	
world.	Lurianic	Cabala	would	thus	force	us	into	a	radically	transcendental	view	of	
divinity.78	For	the	Hasidic	movement,	whose	founder’s	motto	was	“the	whole	earth	is	full	of	
His	glory,”79	this	was	not	an	easy	conclusion	to	accept.		
	
Weiss	has	suggested	that	the	basic	theological	tension	at	the	heart	of	the	Hasidic	movement	
is	that	of	reconciling	divine	immanence	with	divine	transcendence.	He	sees	this	as	a	result	
of	the	attempt	to	reconcile	the	opposing	ideas	of	Zoharic	and	Lurianic	Cabala	in	Hasidism’s	
popularization	of	mysticism.80	For	R.	Nachman,	suggests	Weiss,	this	attempted	
reconciliation	produces	his	deepest	critique	of	rationalism,	the	rejection	of	the	“law	of	non	
contradiction,”81	ultimately	claiming	that	within	the	Vacant	Space	God	both	exists	and	does	
not	exist,	and—most	significantly—claiming	that	this	is	not	a	flippant	epistemological	
position	but	the	empirical	recognition	of	an	ontological	contradiction	that	is	the	foundation	
of	the	Vacant	Space.	That	is	to	say,	this	ontological	contradiction	is	the	space	within	which	
the	physical	world	came	to	be.	“For	we	must	say	that	two	opposites	are	within	[Vacant	
Space]:	existence	and	non-existence	[of	God],”82	R.	Nachman	explains.	
																																																								
78	This	implication	of	Lurianic	Cabala	is	the	source	of	the	classical	(yet	simplistic)	opposition	between	
immanence	and	transcendence	in	Cabala.	The	former	paradigmatically	expressed	in	the	Zohar’s	system	of	
God’s	10	emanations,	and	the	latter	expressed	in	the	Lurianic	idea	of	God’s	withdrawal.	For	further	discussion	
of	this	see:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism.	And:	Moshe	Idel,	Kabbalah	New	Perspectives	(New	
Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1988).	
79	The	Ba’al	Shem	Tov,	founder	of	Hasidism	c.	1740,	made	this	verse	from	Isaiah	[6:3]	an	integral	part	of	his	
innovative	teaching.	
80	See:	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	Ch.6.	
81	The	principle		of	logic	that	stipulates:	if	A	is	true,	its	opposite	cannot	also	be	true.	
82	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:1.	
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Weiss	further	identifies	the	law	of	non-contradiction	as	paradigmatic	of	rationalist	thought	
in	R.	Nachman’s	day.	In	this	teaching	R.	Nachman	develops	his	most	elaborate	and	
comprehensive	rejection	of	the	enlightenment’s	rationalist	ideal.	Unlike	other	teachings	
where	R.	Nachman	focuses	his	criticism	on	the	futility	he	sees	in	the	rationalists'	endless	
production	of	questions,	converting	every	answer	into	a	new	question	to	be	answered,83	in	
this	teaching	he	attempts	a	more	comprehensive	engagement	with	rationalism	that	would	
raise	the	stakes,	so	to	speak.	Thus	R.	Nachman	begins	the	next	section	of	the	teaching:		
And	know,	that	there	are	two	kinds	of	heresy:	there	is	heresy	that	comes	
from	external	wisdom,	and	about	which	it	is	written	(Ethics	Ch.2):	and	know	
what	to	answer	a	heretic;	for	this	heresy	has	an	answer.84		
	
Weiss	explains	that	this	first	kind	of	heresy	is	produced	by	"the	questions	that	form	out	of	
the	encounter	between	religion	and	the	sciences,"85	that	is,	between	religious	beliefs	and	
rational	investigations,	and	they	can	be	resolved	rationally.	R.	Nachman's	implication	in	
referencing	"know	what	to	answer	a	heretic"86	relates	to	the	verb	"know,"	which	is	to	say	
that	the	contradictions	of	religion	and	reason	are	epistemological,	and	thus	resolvable	
through	reason.	Moreover,	states	Weiss,	"in	this	realm	of	[epistemological]	contradiction	
rational	thought	is	king,	and	discursive	thinking	is	not	only	one's	permission	but	one's	
																																																								
83	Rational	investigation	proposes	to	answer	questions,	only	to	eventually	fortify	the	question	by	providing	
the	very	logical	conditions	that	are	to	be	doubted	in	posing	the	question	in	the	future.	Thus	R.	Nachman	
describes	the	futility	of	rational	investigation	in:	Likkutei	Moharan,	2,	7:8.	
84	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:2.	
85	Zadoff	and	Meir,	"The	Empty	Space,	Sabbateanism	and	Its	Melodies	-	Joseph	Weiss'	Reading	of	Liqqutei	
Moharan	64,"	221.	
86	Ethics	of	the	Fathers	2:17	
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obligation."87	
	
"But	there	is	another	kind	of	heresy,"	continues	R.	Nachman.	The	contradictions	of	this	
other	heresy	do	not	emerge	out	of	rational	investigation,	though	they	appear	to.		
There	are	several	questions	and	contradictions	among	the	investigators,	that	
in	truth	are	not	related	to	knowledge,	and	the	questions	are	null	and	void,	
but	since	they	cannot	be	resolved	through	human	reason,	they	therefore	
appear	to	be	[epistemological]	contradictions.88	
In	this	typology	of	contradictions,	Weiss	explains,	R.	Nachman	"turns	the	ontological	terms	
of	Lurianic	Cabala	into	logical	terms,"89	concluding	that	the	creation	of	the	world	through	
the	withdrawal	also	brought	about	the	existence	of	epistemological	contradictions,	that	is,	
the	apparent	contradiction	between	scientific	observation	and	religious	faith.90	It	also	
brought	into	existence	the	rational	faculty	required	for	their	resolution.		
	
R.	Nachman	then	circles	back	to	the	ontological	realm	in	which	the	withdrawal	of	divinity	
implies	its	existence	and	non-existence	within	the	created	world	itself	(rather	than	within	
human	perception	of	it).	This	contradiction	produces	the	second	kind	of	heresy,	the	heresy	
that	comes	from	the	Vacant	Space,	that	is,	from	the	space	in	which	divinity	does	not	exist.	It	
leads	to	heresy	when	it	is	confused	for	a	resolvable,	epistemological	contradiction.	The	shift	
R.	Nachman	offers	here,	explains	Weiss,	moves	away	from	seeing	the	withdrawal,	and	the	
																																																								
87	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	129.	
88	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:2.	
89	Zadoff	and	Meir,	"The	Empty	Space,	Sabbateanism	and	Its	Melodies	-	Joseph	Weiss'	Reading	of	Liqqutei	
Moharan	64,"	221.	
90	Weiss	further	maps	this	distinction	onto	the	Lurianic	distinction	between	“shells”	and	“sparks”	(klipot	and	
nitzotzot)	within	the	created	world,	but	this	is	beyond	our	scope	at	the	moment.	
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resulting	existence	and	non-existence	of	God,	as	a	logical	contradiction.	That	is,	R.	Nachman	
does	not	want	to	see	this	contradiction	as	a	result	of	epistemological	fallacies	we	
experience	as	humans,	as	a	result	of	fallacies	in	our	ability	to	know	or	perceive	anything	
about	the	physical	existence	of	our	world.	Instead,	R.	Nachman	proposes	to	see	the	
contradiction	between	faith	and	reason	as	precisely	the	successful	perception	of	the	
manifestation	of	the	ontological	contradiction	formed	by	the	withdrawal,	and	that	is	the	
condition	of	possibility	of	our	created	existence.	
	
For	Weiss,	the	first	sections	of	Teaching	64	serve	as	a	point	of	departure	to	elaborate	upon	
R.	Nachman's	concept	of	"the	question"	(that	is,	religious	doubt)	as	the	ultimate	recognition	
of	the	ontological	contradiction	and	thus,	paradoxically,	the	ultimate	experience	of	faith.	
From	this	point	on	Weiss	focuses	his	discussion	on	the	realm	of	epistemological	questions,	
specifically	on	the	human	experience	of	doubt	that	R.	Nachman	seeks	to	transform	into	
faith.	As	we	proceed	through	this	teaching,	we	will	consider	the	many	levels	on	which	the	
Vacant	Space	is	a	limit;	within	the	ontological,	epistemological	and	social	topography	of	the	
world.	R.	Nachman’s	challenge	is	to	find	a	mode	of	crossing	the	limit,	a	“leap	of	faith”	from	
one	type	of	(resolvable)	heresy	to	the	space	of	the	second	(unresolvable)	type,	without	
(like	the	Maskilim)	getting	stuck	in	heresy.		
	
In	the	next	paragraph	R.	Nachman	elaborates	upon	the	Vacant	Space	as	a	limit.	"God	fills	all	
creation	and	encircles	all	creation	[...]	so	there	must	be	a	space	between	the	filling	and	the	
encircling,	for	if	not	so,	then	all	would	be	one."91	Having	concluded	that	God	both	does	and	
																																																								
91	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:2.	
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does	not	exist	within	creation,	R.	Nachman	draws	our	attention	to	a	new	problem.	What	
precisely	were	the	ontological	effects	of	God’s	withdrawal?	If	divinity	exists	(even	as	
contradictory)	within	the	world	and	all	around	the	area	from	which	it	withdrew,	then	we	
are	still	all	within	the	infinity	of	divine	presence.	But	such	infinity	was	precisely	what	had	
to	be	limited	and	contained	in	order	for	the	individuation	of	existence	to	be	possible.	Here	
R.	Nachman	offers	his	most	radical	understanding	of	the	Vacant	Space.	This	is	the	space	
that	interrupts	the	continuity	of	the	infinite	divinity	that	surrounds	existence	from	the	
ontologically	contradictory	form	of	divinity	that	fills	all	existence.	
It	is	the	Vacant	Space	[and	not	God]	that	surrounds	all	of	creation,	and	God,	
who	surrounds	everything,	surrounds	the	Vacant	Space	[but	between	God's	
filling	and	God's	encircling	of	everything]	in-between	divides	the	Vacant	
Space.92					
	
It	is	worth	repeating	the	radical	nature	of	this	proposal:	R.	Nachman	states	that	there	is	in	
fact	a	space,	in	which	God,	in	a	non-contradictory	yet	fully	ontological	sense,	does	not	exist!	
And,	he	continues,	this	space	(the	Vacant	Space)	lies	in-between	the	created	world	we	
inhabit	and	the	infinity	that	is	there-beyond.	The	radical	nature	of	R.	Nachman's	
understanding	of	the	Vacant	Space	becomes	even	clearer	when	we	consider	the	various	
provinces	this	in-between	space	divides.	First,	it	is	an	ontological	space	that	divides	the	
created	world	from	the	infinite	divinity,	and	the	paradoxical	existence	of	God	within	the	
world	from	His	infinite	existence	outside	of	the	world.	Second,	it	is	an	epistemological	
space	that	marks	the	limit	of	rational	thought's	ability	to	comprehend	reality,	and	buffers	
																																																								
92	Ibid.	
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between	the	province	of	reason	and	the	unattainable	knowledge	of	God	that	exists	in	the	
infinite	beyond.	It	is	the	realm	in	which,	as	Weiss	articulates	it,	"the	law	of	non-
contradiction	does	not	hold	true	for	itself."93	Lastly,	and	what	is	most	important	to	
emphasize	in	our	reading,	it	is	also	a	social	space	that	separates	the	faithful	from	the	
"investigators,"	and	the	space	within	which	heretical	books	circulate.	The	Vacant	Space	is	a	
social	buffer	zone,	between	traditional	Judaism	and	the	non-Jewish	world,	within	which	the	
Maskilim	and	their	heretical	ideas	exist	outside	of	Jewish	faith	but	are	not	yet	absorbed	into	
the	non-Jewish	world	that	surrounds	them.	
	
What	are	we	to	do	with	such	a	Vacant	Space;	vacant	of	God,	of	the	basic	tenets	of	reason,	of	
religious	faith,	and	full	of	heresy	and	irresolvable	contradiction?	Or,	to	ask	this	otherwise:	
where	does	R.	Nachman	locate	himself	within	this	topography?	"And	know,	if	there	is	a	
zadik,	who	is	bechina	of	Moses,	he	must	deliberately	look	into	the	ideas	of	this	[second]	
heresy,"	he	states.	This	overlap	of	social	and	(for	lack	of	a	better	word)	speculative-
philosophical	realms	is	a	key	to	understanding	R.	Nachman's	teachings	in	general,	and	the	
topography	of	the	Vacant	Space	in	particular.		
	
One	way	to	understand	this	overlap,	as	Magid	states,	is	to	recognize	that	"theological	
speculation	is	always	contextual,	emerging	via	imaginative	interpretation	rather	than	via	
pure	philosophical	argumentation."94	Could	we	then	not	say	the	same	for	political	
																																																								
93	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	133.	The	law	of	non-contradiction	is	a	logical	principle	that	states:	if	A	
is	true	the	opposite	of	A	cannot	also	be	true.	By	“does	not	hold	true	for	itself”	Weiss	means	to	insert	the	law	of	
non-contradiction	as	the	“A”	of	the	law.	That	is,	within	the	epistemology	of	the	Vacant	Space,	the	statements	
(1)	“A	and	not-A	cannot	both	be	true”	and	(2)	“A	and	not-A	can	both	be	true,”	can	both	be	true.	
94	Magid,	"Associative	Midrash:	Reflections	on	a	Hermaneutical	Theory	in	Rabbi	Nachman	of	Braslav's	
Likkutei	Moharan,"	18.	
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speculation?	Certainly	it	is	a	speculative	project	R.	Nachman	is	undertaking.	He	arrives	at	
the	in-between-ness	of	the	Vacant	Space	by	contemplating	the	question	of	the	limit—
theological	and	rational,	ontological	and	social—of	his	changing	world.	As	the	zadik	whose	
role	is	precisely	to	explore	the	Vacant	Space,	the	multifaceted	nature	of	any	possible	
maneuver	R.	Nachman	might	consider	attempting	within	it	will	remain	a	central	
observation	of	our	further	reading.	
	
For	the	Maskilim,	the	topography	of	the	Vacant	Space	is	comparable	to	the	in-between	
space	of	Veblen	and	Mendes-Flohr’s	Jewish	intellectual.	It	is	where	one	ends	up	when	
stepping	out	of	the	limits	of	Jewish	tradition,	but	from	where	one	can	no	longer	budge.	For	
R.	Nachman,	to	be	lodged	between	tradition	and	its	inaccessible	surroundings	is	to	fall	into	
heresy.	For	the	Maskilim,	he	imagines	the	transition	as	one-directional	the	way	Borges	and	
Veblen	do.	That	is,	they	lose	the	ability	to	return	to	the	fold	of	tradition.	But	this	is	not	true	
for	the	zadik.	In	that	sense,	R.	Nachman's	Vacant	Space	is	at	once	more	open	and	more	
restricted	than	Borges’	“Jewish	margin.”	It	is	restricted	in	the	sense	that	it	is	not	
propitiously	accessed	by	just	anyone.	After	all,	the	Maskilim	access	it	at	the	price	of	
irreparable	heresy,	which	to	R.	Nachman	is	hardly	a	propitious	result.	But	it	is	more	opened	
in	the	sense	that	those	that	are	able	to	act	propitiously	within	it	(the	zadik,	that	is)	are	also	
able	to	return	from	it	to	the	fold	of	Jewish	tradition.		
	
This	ability	to	return	has	an	important	social	function.	It	mediates	between	the	community	
and	its	outliers.	The	zadik,	as	we	will	see,	is	able	not	only	to	return	from	the	Vacant	Space,	
but	to	bring	back	with	him	those	Maskilim	that	have	fallen	into	heresy.	The	zadik	saves	
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these	Maskilim	from	being	lodged	in	the	Vacant	Space.	In	epistemological	terms	this	means	
recognizing	the	difference	between	resolvable	rational	contradictions	and	irresolvable	
ontological	contradictions	mistaken	for	the	former.	In	social	terms	this	means	maintaining	
relations	with	the	Maskilim	and	attempting	to	draw	them	back	into	the	fold	by	entertaining	
their	heretical	ideas.	There	were	no	more	than	a	handful	of	such	Maskilim	in	R.	Nachman’s	
surroundings,	mostly	in	Uman,	and	he	was	in	touch	with	them	all.95	In	fact,	as	we	have	
mentioned,	he	spent	the	final	months	of	his	life	living	in	their	homes	in	Uman.		
	
On	a	local	level	it	appears	his	efforts	were	mildly	successful.	R.	Nathan	and	later	Braslav	
biographies	recount	regular	meetings	between	R.	Nachman	and	the	Maskilim	of	Uman,	as	
well	as	several	Maskilim	attending	the	mourning	rituals	over	R.	Nachman’s	passing	and	
even	returning	the	following	Rosh	ha-Shana	to	pray	with	R.	Nachman’s	followers	at	his	
gravesite.96	Hayim	Liberman	sums	up	the	atmosphere	between	R.	Nachman	and	the	
Maskilim,	“the	Maskilim	enjoyed	coming	to	visit	R.	Nachman	and	even	played	chess	with	
him.	R.	Nachman	is	known	to	have	visited	Hirsch	Ber	Hurwitz.”97	
	
The	possibility	of	a	space	that	separates	between	the	traditional	and	the	“external”	is	R.	
Nachman’s	innovation	not	only	in	metaphysical	terms,	but	in	social	terms	as	well.	It	
conceptualizes	an	in-between	space,	within	which	Maskilim	may	exist—get	stuck,	
																																																								
95	See:	Liberman,	"R.	Nachman	Breslaver	Und	Die	Umener	Maskilim."	
96	References	to	this	from	R.	Nathan’s	biography	of	R.	Nachman	(see:	Sternhartz,	Chayey	Moharan.)	and	later	
sources	(see:	Avraham	Hazan,	Sefer	Sippurim	Nifla'im	(Jerusalem:	H.	Zukerman,	1935).)	have	been	collected	
in:	Liberman,	"R.	Nachman	Breslaver	Und	Die	Umener	Maskilim."		
97	"R.	Nachman	Breslaver	Und	Die	Umener	Maskilim,"	208.	
Hirsch	Ber	Hurwitz	(1785–1857)	was	a	young	Maskilim	in	Uman	and	one	of	the	first	in	Eastern	Europe.	In	
1825	he	moved	to	England,	converted	to	Christianity	and	changed	his	name	to	Herman	Hedwig	Bernard.	He	
served	as	a	professor	of	Oriental	languages	in	Cambridge	until	his	death.	(See:	ibid.,	211	cf.	37,	appendix	4	
(18-19).	
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perhaps—without	totally	detaching	from	Judaism.	In	his	conceptualization	of	the	Vacant	
Space	as	a	place	from	which	the	zadik	“retrieves”	the	heretics,	it	is	certainly	not	a	desirable	
location.	But	in	R.	Nachman’s	own	terms	it	is	a	location	that	nonetheless	allows	for	the	shift	
in	ones	relation	to	Jewish	tradition,	from	the	continuity	along	which	religious	leaders	of	the	
time	positioned	themselves,	into	the	kind	of	contiguity	that	the	Vacant	Space	maintains	
with	the	created	world.	If	we	consider	the	transition	from	continuity	to	contiguity	with	
tradition	a	key	moment	in	the	formation	of	Modern	Jewish	Literature,98	then	in	the	sense	
that	R.	Nachman’s	operations	within	the	Vacant	Space	were	conceived	as	“retrieval”	and	
were	aimed	against	the	relocation	of	Jews	into	this	space,	he	is	hardly	a	“forerunner	of	
modern	Jewish	literature.”99	But	to	the	extent	that	he	recognized	it	as	a	space	within	which	
the	Zadik	aught	to	operate,	his	writing	of	this	space	partakes	in	the	processes	by	which	the	
edge	was	opened	into	a	location	in-between	the	Jews	and	their	non-Jewish	surroundings.	
Furthermore,	to	the	extent	that	this	social	contiguity	is	also	mirrored	in	the	outlines	of	the	
Pale	of	Settlement,	it	may	not	have	been	a	space	R.	Nachman	desired	to	enter,	but	he	
nonetheless	found	himself	within	it,	at	least	on	the	geo-political	level	we	have	already	
discussed.	In	that	sense,	his	thoughts	on	the	zadik’s	possible	operations	within	the	Vacant	
Space	are	also	a	discussion	of	his	possible	operations	within	the	new	social	spaces	of	the	
Pale	and	an	emancipated	society.	
	
	
	
																																																								
98	As	is	conceptualized	by	Dan	Miron.	See:	Miron,	From	Continuity	to	Contiguity	toward	a	New	Jewish	Literary	
Thinking.	
99	See:	Schwartz,	"Rabbi	Nachman	of	Bratslav:	Forerunner	of	Modern	Jewish	Literature."	
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Antiphilosophy	
	
How	does	the	epistemological	significance	of	maneuvering	the	Vacant	Space	relate	to	the	
social	significance	of	its	exploration?	Having	indicated	the	similarities	and	differences	
between	the	social	topography	of	the	Vacant	Space,	the	Pale	of	Settlement	and	Borges’	
ideas	about	“Jewish	marginality,”	the	next	step	will	be	the	comparison	between	Teaching	
64	and	Borges’	thought	on	the	limits	of	rationalism.	A	guide	to	this	comparison	will	be	
Bruno	Bosteels	discussion	of	“Borges	as	Antiphilosopher.”100	The	speculative	metaphysics	
of	R.	Nachman's	Vacant	Space	is	comparable	with	what	Bruno	Bosteels	describes	as	Borges'	
antiphilosophical	system	in	several	ways.	Firstly,	as	is	evident	from	the	critique	of	
rationalism	contained	in	this	teaching,	R.	Nachman's	position	opposes	a	strict	rationalistic	
understanding	of	the	world	as	much	as	it	opposes	a	naive	anti-rationalism.	That	is,	R.	
Nachman	divides	between	contradictions	that	cannot	be	resolved	by	reason	(the	second	
kind,	the	contradictions	of	the	Vacant	Space)	and	those	that	can	be	resolved	by	reason	and	
with	regards	to	which,	as	Weiss	states,	“discursive	thinking	is	[…]	one's	obligation."101	In	
developing	his	position,	R.	Nachman’s	“rejection	of	systematic	thinking	is	in	itself	
astonishingly	systematic.”102	Furthermore,	this	systematic	rejection	of	systematic	thought	
follows	the	contours	of	what	Bosteels	identifies	as	the	exemplary	antiphilosophical	position.	
"Opposed	to	the	universality	claims	[sic.]	of	truth	but	[…]	also	forever	in	search	of	a	radical	
gesture	that	would	be	able,	if	not	fully	to	replace,	then	at	least	continuously	to	compete	
																																																								
100	Bruno	Bosteels,	"Borges	as	Antiphilosopher,"	Vanderbilt	e-journal	of	Luso-Hispanic	studies	3	(2006).	
101	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	129.	
102	Bosteels,	"Borges	as	Antiphilosopher,"	1.	
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with	the	prestige	of	truth	in	philosophy.”103	For	R.	Nachman	this	gesture	is	the	paradoxical	
nature	of	Faith.	
	
We	can	distinguish	a	few	general	clues	that	serve	to	detect	an	
antiphilosophical	approach	to	thinking:	first,	the	assumption	that	the	limits	
of	language	coincide	with	the	limits	of	the	world;	second,	the	reduction	of	
truth	to	being	nothing	more	than	a	linguistic	or	rhetorical	effect,	the	outcome	
of	historically	and	culturally	specific	language	games;	third,	an	appeal	to	
what	lies	just	beyond	language,	or	at	the	upper	limit	of	the	sayable,	as	a	
domain	of	meaning	irreducible	to	truth;	and,	finally,	in	order	to	gain	access	to	
this	domain,	the	search	for	a	radical	act,	such	as	the	religious	leap	of	faith	or	
the	revolutionary	break,	the	intense	thrill	of	which	would	disqualify	in	
advance	any	systematic	theoretical	or	conceptual	elaboration.104		
	
As	we	read	through	the	rest	of	Teaching	64	we	will	encounter	three	of	these	“clues.”105	
	
And	know,	if	there	is	a	zadik,	who	is	bechina	of	Moses,	he	must	deliberately	
look	into	the	ideas	of	this	[second]	heresy,	and	even	though	they	cannot	be	
resolved	[...]	For	these	contradictions	and	questions	of	this	[second]	heresy	
that	come	from	the	Vacant	Space,	they	are	bechina	of	silence,	for	there	is	no	
																																																								
103	Ibid.,	2.	
104	Ibid.	
105	We	will	see	the	first,	third	and	fourth	of	these	“clues”	expressed	in	Teaching	64.	The	second	“clue,”	that	of	
the	historical	and	cultural	contingency	of	knowledge,	is	expressed	by	R.	Nachman	in	other	teachings,	which	
we	will	not	discuss	here.	See	for	example:	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	29.				
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resolution	for	them.	For	the	creation	[of	the	world]	was	through	speech,	as	it	
is	written	(Psalms	33[:6]):	“By	the	word	of	the	Lord	were	the	heavens	made,	
and	all	the	host	of	them	by	the	breath	of	His	mouth.”	And	in	speech	there	is	
wisdom	[...]	And	speech	is	the	limit	of	all	things,	for	He	delimited	His	
knowledge	within	the	letters	[with	which	the	world	was	created106].	But	in	
the	Vacant	Space	[...]	there	is	no	speech,	nor	knowledge	without	letters,	and	
therefore	the	contradictions	that	come	from	there,	they	are	bechina	of	silence	
[...]	That	is	why	one	may	not	enter	[the	Vacant	Space]	and	look	into	these	
words	of	heresy	and	contradiction	except	for	a	zadik	who	is	bechina	of	Moses	
who	is	bechina	of	silence,	for	Moses	is	bechina	of	silence,	in	the	bechina	that	
he	is	called	“'slow	of	speech”	(Exodus	4[:11]).107	
	
Since	letters	and	words	are	the	building	blocks	of	the	created	world,	as	the	idea	of	God	
creating	the	world	through	speech	would	suggest,	the	limits	of	language	are	the	limits	of	
the	created	world.	Language	can	articulate	contradictions	that	emerge	from	creation	for	it	
is	made	of	the	same	substance	as	creation—words	and	letters.	Furthermore,	“[God]	
delimited	His	knowledge	within	the	letters,”108	making	language	the	vessel	of	knowledge.	
In	the	Vacant	Space	there	is	no	creation,	thus	language	cannot	articulate	it	and	knowledge	
of	it	is	not	possible.	The	very	articulation	of	the	question	“does	God	exist?”	is	putting	into	
words	God’s	paradoxical	existence	and	non-existence	and	causes	the	ontological	
																																																								
106	This	is	an	allusion	to	the	Sefer	Yetzirah,	one	of	the	earliest	Jewish	mystical	texts,	which	begins	by	
recounting	that	“God	created	the	Universe	in	thirty-two	mysterious	paths	of	wisdom	[…]	ten	sefirot	are	its	
firmament,	and	twenty	two	letters	its	foundation”	(my	paraphrasing).					
107	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:3.	
108	Ibid.	
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precondition	of	existence	to	appear	as	an	epistemological	contradiction.	This	is	what	
happens	when	one	attempts	to	put	into	language	a	knowledge	of	what	lies	beyond	it,	that	is,	
beyond	what	words	can	create.	In	Borges’	antiphilosophical	thinking,	Bosteels	continues,	
"so	much	weight	is	given	to	the	effects	of	language	and	the	change	it	can	produce	that	the	
principle	of	non-contradiction,	cornerstone	of	classical	logic	if	there	ever	was	one,	no	
longer	applies	[…]	When	taken	to	an	extreme,	this	privileging	of	rhetoric	over	logic	can	
easily	lend	the	argument	a	mystical	overtone.”109	
	
R.	Nachman	concludes	that	it	is	not	possible	to	say	anything	about	the	function	of	language	
in	the	Vacant	Space	since	there	is	none.	At	this	point	R.	Nachman's	teaching	shifts	the	
discussion	to	the	function	of	language	in	the	created	world.	This	will	lead	quite	explicitly	to	
a	discussion	of	the	social	realm.	
And	know,	that	disagreement	is	bechina	of	the	creation	of	the	world.	[God]	
withdrew	His	light	to	the	sides,	and	there	was	Vacant	Space,	and	within	it	He	
created	all	of	creation	[...]	by	means	of	the	words	[that	He	inserted	into	the	
Vacant	Space].	And	so	is	the	bechina	of	disagreement,	for	if	all	scholars110	
were	one,	there	would	be	no	space	for	the	creation	of	the	world,	if	not	for	the	
disagreement	between	them,	whereby	they	divide	from	each	other,	and	each	
pulls	himself	in	a	different	direction,	by	this	is	there	formed	between	them	
bechina	of	Vacant	Space,	which	is	bechina	of	withdrawal,	in	which	is	the	
creation	of	the	world	[accomplished]	by	means	of	speech.	
																																																								
109	Bosteels,	"Borges	as	Antiphilosopher,"	4.	
110	R.	Nachman	refers	here	to	scholars	of	Jewish	tradition,	but	this	term	could	be	understood	more	broadly	as	
well.	
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For	all	the	words	that	each	of	them	speaks,	all	are	only	for	the	creation	of	the	
world,	which	is	done	by	them	in	the	Vacant	Space	between	them.	For	
scholars	create	everything	by	means	of	their	words	[...]	But	caution	is	needed	
not	to	speak	too	much,	only	as	is	needed	for	the	creation	of	the	world,	no	
more.	111		
	
R.	Nachman	elaborates	several	points	about	the	social	aspect	of	this	teaching.	First,	he	
connects	the	cosmology	of	the	previous	sections	to	the	topography	of	social	discourse.	
Every	scholar	is	a	microcosm	of	the	grand	Lurianic	cosmological	drama.	Scholars	have	the	
dual	role	of	creating	the	Vacant	Space	between	them,	and	of	filling	it	with	words	of	creation.	
“This	decisive	role	of	the	speaking	subject,	finally,	constitutes	a	fifth	and	final	feature	that	is	
typical	of	antiphilosophy,”112	Bosteels	concludes	regarding	Borges’	antiphilosophical	
system.	For	Bosteels	there	is	a	mystical	overtone	to	antiphilosophy.	The	centrality	of	the	
speaking	subject	is	clear	in	this	passage	from	Teaching	64,	but	for	R.	Nachman	mysticism	is	
an	integral	part	of	his	system.	Having	mapped	the	ontological	onto	the	epistemological	and	
social	realms,	we	can	articulate	R.	Nachman’s	framing	of	the	epistemological	in	Lurianic	
terms.	The	epistemological	unity	presumed	by	rationalism	is	what	needs	to	be	withdrawn	
for	a	social	world	of	discourse	to	be	created.	R.	Nachman’s	scholar	is	empowered	with	the	
ability	to	create	this	world.	But	he	is	also	stranded	within	the	Lurianic	drama	in	the	sense	
that—while	every	time	he	disagrees	he	creates	Vacant	Space,	which	he	can	fill	with	
words—every	instance	of	filling	Vacant	Space	with	creation,	as	R.	Nachman	has	radically	
																																																								
111	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:4.	
112	Bosteels,	"Borges	as	Antiphilosopher,"	6.	
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argued,	is	also	the	simultaneous	creation	of	a	buffer	between	the	withdrawn	and	the	
created	therein.	The	scholar,	in	that	sense,	is	always	isolated	from	the	world	he	creates	by	
the	Vacant	Space	necessary	for	his	intellectual	individuation	and	existence.	The	scholar	
here	resembles	the	infinite	divinity	whose	every	attempt	at	creation	is	also	a	distancing	of	
Himself	there-from.113	The	ontological	terms	in	which	God	created	the	world	are	mapped	
onto	the	epistemological	terms	in	which	scholars	create	knowledge	within	that	world	
	
In	the	next	section	of	the	teaching	both	the	ontological	and	the	epistemological	terms	of	
“world	creation”	are	mapped	onto	the	social	terms	of	community	inclusion	and	exclusion.	
Unlike	language,	the	zadik	is	able	to	operate	in	the	created	world	as	well	as	the	Vacant	
Space.	In	social	terms,	the	zadik	straddles	both	sides	of	the	divide,	at	once	within	the	
paradoxical	created	world,	drawn	by	the	gravitational	pull	of	the	limit,	and	at	the	same	time	
outside	of	the	world,	engaging	with	heresies	and	heretics	on	all	three	realms.	This	is	first	
and	foremost	R.	Nachman's	self-location,	and	self-assignment	of	the	role	of	propitiously	
exploring	the	possibility	of	an	in-between	beyond	the	edge.	Continuing	to	the	next	section,	
we	come	to	R.	Nachman’s	chosen	precursor	Elisha	ben	Abuya.	
	
And	know,	that	by	means	of	the	melody	of	the	zadik	that	is	bechina	of	Moses,	
he	raises	the	souls	from	this	heresy	of	the	Vacant	Space	into	which	they	have	
fallen.	For	know,	that	each	and	every	discipline	of	study	in	the	world	has	a	
particular	tune	and	melody,	which	is	particular	to	that	discipline	of	study.	
																																																								
113	As	we	will	see	in	the	next	chapter,	when	we	read	Borges’	“A	Vindication	of	the	Cabala,”	he	too	saw	the	role	
of	the	intellectual	in	similar	terms:	“The	intellectual	[…]	remotely	approximates	the	Lord.”	(See:	Borges,	
Selected	Non-Fictions,	85.)	
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And	from	that	melody	is	derived	that	discipline	of	study.	And	this	is	bechina	
of	(Psalms	47[:8]):	“sing	ye	praises	with	understanding”114;	that	every	
understanding	has	a	particular	song	and	tune.	And	even	the	discipline	of	
heresy,	it	has	a	tune	[sic.]	and	melody	particular	to	the	heretical	discipline	of	
study.	This	is	what	our	sages	of	blessed	memory	said	(Tractate	Hagiga	15:):	
“What	was	it	about	‘Other’?	Greek	song	never	quit	his	mouth,	and	when	he	
would	rise	from	his	study,	several	heretical	books	would	fall	before	him.”	For	
one	depends	upon	the	other,	for	by	means	of	the	song	that	never	quit	his	
mouth,	by	that	[song]	the	heretical	books	would	fall	before	him.	For	that	song	
was	particular	to	that	heresy	and	the	blasphemy	within	it.115		
	
R.	Nachman	turns	“Other’s”	famous	heresy	into	a	fight	against	heresy.	Knowing	the	melody	
of	a	discipline	gives	the	zadik	an	ability	to	contest	that	discipline,	and	redeem	individuals	
who	have	fallen	into	its	heresy.	Music,	unlike	language,	does	exist	in	the	Vacant	Space	and	is	
the	means	by	which	the	zadik	is	able	to	maneuver	it.116	The	Greek	song	is	not	a	sign	of	
heresy,	but	a	means	by	which	“Other”	is	able	to	defeat	Greek	heresy,	to	cause	its	arguments	
(in	its	books)	to	fall	before	him.	In	this	move	from	the	cosmological	nature	of	melodies	to	
its	place	in	“Other’s”	mouth	during	study,	R.	Nachman	here	continues	to	indicate	the	
overlapping	nature	of	the	cosmological	with	the	social	topography	of	the	Jewish	community.	
																																																								
114	The	Hebrew	reads	“sing	maskil,”	which	is	also	the	term	for	a	Jewish	Enlightenment	scholar.	
115	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:5.	
116	The	place	of	music	in	R.	Nachman’s	thought	is	a	fascinating	topic,	but	beyond	the	scope	of	our	present	
concerns.	The	reader	interested	in	the	topic	may	find	the	following	references	helpful.	In	R.	Nachman’s	
teachings,	see:	ibid.,	3,	65,	282.,	Likkutei	Moharan,	2,	63.	In	research,	see:	Weiss,	Mehkarim	Ba-Hasidut	Braslav,	
Ch.5.;	Mark,	Mysticism	and	Madness:	The	Religious	Thought	of	Rabbi	Nachman	of	Bratslav,	Ch.4.	Chani	Haran	
Smith,	Tuning	the	Soul:	Music	as	a	Spiritual	Process	in	the	Teachings	of	Rabbi	Nahman	of	Bratzlav	(Leiden;	
Boston:	Brill,	2010).		
	
	203	
That	is,	“Other’s”	liminal	place	within	the	social	topography	turns	out	to	be	a	cosmological	
position	within	the	Vacant	Space	as	well.	And	this	identification	of	the	overlap	between	
cosmological	and	social	reveals	the	true	nature	of	“Other’s”	apparent	heresy,	as	combating	
against	heresy.	This	is	also	the	position	R.	Nachman	ascribes	to	himself.	His	relations	with	
the	Maskilim	are	not	evidence	of	a	heretical	inclination	but	of	a	desire	to	contest	heresy.	His	
exploration	of	heretical	ideas	is	presented	in	terms	of	maneuvering	between	the	limits	of	
Jewish	tradition	and	its	beyond.	This	effort	is	of	redemptive	power,	he	continues:	
	
And	faith	too	has	a	melody	and	tune	particular	to	that	faith,	and	as	we	see	
that	even	beliefs	of	non-Jews	in	their	erroneous	aspects,	every	faith	of	non-
Jews	has	a	particular	melody,	which	they	sing	and	with	which	they	pray	in	
their	houses	of	worship.117	
	
The	idea	R.	Nachman	develops	next	is	that	there	is	also	the	melody	of	ultimate	faith,	with	
which	it	is	possible	to	cross	over	the	contradictions	and	heresy	of	the	Vacant	Space	and	end	
up	in	the	infinite	light	of	divinity	that	lies	beyond.	“For	this	is	the	melody	that	pertains	to	
faith	in	the	infinite	light	itself,”118	he	explains.	This	melody	of	ultimate	faith,	and	hence	the	
possibility	of	crossing	the	Vacant	Space	entirely	into	infinite	divinity—which	would,	social	
terms,	mean	crossing	into	the	broader	non-Jewish	culture—will	only	be	revealed	in	the	
days	of	the	messiah.		
	
And	bechina	of	this	melody	of	ultimate	faith,	no	one	can	merit	except	the	
																																																								
117	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	64:5.	
118	Ibid.	
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zadik	of	the	generation	who	is	bechina	of	Moses,	who	is	at	that	level	of	faith,	
who	is	bechina	of	silence.	
	
And	therefore	by	means	of	the	melody	of	the	zadik,	who	is	bechina	of	Moses,	
by	this	are	raised	up	and	exit	all	the	souls	that	have	fallen	into	this	heresy	of	
the	Vacant	Space	[…]	for	by	this	melody	and	faith	is	all	heresy	annulled,	and	
all	melodies	are	included	and	[thus]	annulled	within	this	melody,	that	is	
above	everything.119				
	
The	zadik	of	the	generation	raises	those	that	have	fallen	into	heresy,	into	the	Vacant	Space,	
into	the	social	space	they	are	now	lodged	in.	The	messianic	moment	in	this	teaching	lies	in	
the	fact	that	this	unique	zadik	does	not	raise	the	souls	out	of	the	Vacant	Space	back	into	the	
fold	of	tradition,	but	rather	raises	them	into	the	infinite	beyond,	on	the	other	side	of	the	
Vacant	Space.	In	Veblen’s	horizon	all	Jews	leave	their	tradition,	cross	“the	edge”	and	remain	
(preeminently)	lodged	in-between,	for	the	benefit	of	what	he	calls	modern	Europe.	For	R.	
Nachman,	the	initial	possibility	of	successfully	crossing	over	the	limit	is	reserved	for	a	
select	few	zadikim,	but	his	messianic	horizon	shares	the	image	of	all	Jews	departing	from	
“the	created	world.”	Rather	than	get	stuck	in	the	Vacant	Space,	however,	they	manage	to	
cross	over	to	the	infinite	divinity.	What	it	would	mean	in	social	terms	for	Jews	to	cross	into	
“the	great	beyond”	of	European	society	is	not	discussed	in	the	teaching.	Imagining	all	Jews	
crossing	the	limit	is	a	messianic	image	for	R.	Nachman,	and	he	ends	the	teaching	with	that.	
																																																								
119	Ibid.	
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Section	Two:	
Conclusion	
	
How	are	we	to	read	the	exploration	of	the	limit	in	R.	Nachman	and	Borges’	stories?	And,	
more	specifically,	what	should	be	the	difference	in	our	understanding	of	this	maneuvering	
between	their	respective	writings?	We	have	seen	how	Borges	perceives	the	Judaic	as	a	
“model	of	marginality,”	and	we	have	seen	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	both	understand	“the	
edge”	as	a	question	of	location	rather	than	an	explanatory	designation.	We	have	also	
stressed	the	similarities	between	Borges	and	R.	Nachman’s	question	regarding	the	
inscription	of	writing	at	the	limit	as	an	opening	onto	an	in-between	space.	The	difference	
we	should	now	mention	lies	in	the	sense	in	which	their	representations	of	this	space	point	
to	a	“model.”		
	
The	very	necessity	of	having	a	map,	of	developing	a	model,	as	Pierre	Bourdieu	argues,	
attests	to	the	observer's	distance	from	the	topography	being	navigated.	The	model	and	the	
map	are	“the	analogy	which	occurs	to	an	outsider	who	has	to	find	his	way	around	in	a	
foreign	landscape	and	who	compensates	for	his	lack	of	practical	mastery,	the	prerogative	of	
the	native,	by	the	use	of	a	model	of	all	possible	routes.”1	The	wayfarer,	to	borrow	the	
character	navigating	Veblen’s	map,	never	has	a	full	view	of	all	the	possible	roads	in	the	
moment	of	choosing	one.	He	does	not	yet	know	what	lies	beyond	this	or	that	mountain,	
past	that	or	another	turn.	R.	Nachman	should	be	read,	in	this	sense,	not	as	elaborating	a	
“Jewish	model	of	marginality,”	(a	proposal	which	would	not	be	so	different	from	the	
																																																								
1	Pierre	Bourdieu,	Outline	of	a	Theory	of	Practice	(Cambridge,	U.K.;	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	
1977),	2.	
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anachronistic	title	of	“Jewish	Intellectual”)	so	much	as	the	reflections	of	a	wayfarer,	turning	
a	corner	to	discover	an	edge	he	might	not	have	expected	to	find,	and	setting	out	to	explore	
beyond	it.	His	position	precedes	the	map	that	will	articulate	it.		
	
For	Borges,	on	the	other	hand,	the	model	takes	precedence.	Only	after	developing	Veblen’s	
social	model	of	Jewish	marginality	is	it	possible	to	locate	himself	within	it.	The	topography	
is	thus	entirely	predictable	already	at	the	moment	of	setting	off	on	his	journey.	In	reading	
Borges’	articulation	of	his	in-between-ness	in	terms	of	“the	Judaic”	we	should	take	note	of	
“his	situation	as	an	observer,	excluded	from	the	real	play	of	social	activities	by	the	fact	that	
he	has	no	place	(except	by	choice	or	by	way	of	a	game)	in	the	system	observed.”2	Certainly,	
Borges	maintains	no	such	distance	from	the	questions	of	Argentine	tradition	and	its	
relation	to	Europe.	However,	as	we	have	seen	in	discussing	Borges’	game	of	inheritance,	his	
mapping	of	the	Argentine	situation	onto	“the	Judaic,”	and	his	production	of	“the	Judaic”	as	a	
model,	take	on	the	form	of	simultaneous	attraction	and	distancing.	In	contradistinction,	R.	
Nachman’s	articulation	of	his	position	should	not	be	read	as	a	game	of	self-positioning,	but	
rather	as	an	attempt	to	identify	possible	articulations	of	a	position	in	the	making.						
	
Every	turn	the	wayfarer	makes,	every	social	change,	reveals	unexpected	locations	within	it,	
and	the	need	to	adapt	after	the	fact.	"[The]	detachment	of	the	present	from	its	moorings	in	
the	past—and	its	elevation	as	an	autonomous	category	of	experience	and	an	independent	
sphere	of	meaning—is	often	regarded	as	the	ultimate	hallmark	of	the	secularization	
inaugurated	with	the	advent	of	modernity	[…]	The	founding	sensibility	of	modernity,	hence,	
																																																								
2	Ibid.,	1.	
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entails	a	self-conscious	discontinuity	with	the	past,”3	states	Mendes-Flohr.	Certainly	such	
detachment	from	the	past	is	characteristic	of	Jewish	intellectuals	in	Veblen’s	account	as	
well.	Sharing	the	detachment	of	the	Jewish	intellectual,	Borges—having	no	tradition	and	
every	tradition—will	articulate	the	incalculable	possibilities	and	combinations	of	mapping	
the	path	in	such	paradigmatic	tropes	as	the	labyrinth.4	However,	as	a	wayfarer	not	
expecting	this	detachment,	for	whom	such	“detachment	of	the	present”	emerges	through	
unpredictable	social	change,	R.	Nachman	will	not	share	this	map.	For	him,	the	articulation	
of	his	position	precedes	the	vocabulary	of	the	model.	He	has	yet	to	figure	out	what	lies	
beyond	the	next	moment	of	social	change,	as	he	attempts	to	articulate	the	uncertainty	of	an	
edge	and	its	departure.		
	
We	return	once	again	to	the	question:	where	does	one	end	up	when	one	departs	from	the	
edge?	In	Section	I	we	have	explored	the	poetics	of	such	departure.	In	Section	II	we	have	
discussed	the	broader	social	and	epistemological	significance	of	such	departure.	In	the	next	
(and	final)	section	we	will	ask	about	the	representation	of	such	departure	in	their	stories.	I	
will	demonstrate	R.	Nachman	and	Borges’	shared	effort	to	capture	the	many	poetic,	social	
and	epistemological	aspects	of	this	departure	in	narrative	form.								
	
Returning	to	our	discussion	of	beginnings,	I	want	to	understand	the	problem	of	
																																																								
3	Mendes-Flohr,	Divided	Passions:	Jewish	Intellectuals	and	the	Experience	of	Modernity,	54.	
4	For	example,	in	the	story	“Death	and	the	Compass,”	in:	Borges,	Labyrinths:	Selected	Stories	&	Other	Writings,	
85-94.	The	map	upon	which	the	detective	Lonnrot	searches	for	the	criminal	Scharlach	has	a	cipher—“The	
Tetragrammaton—the	name	of	God,	JHVH—is	made	up	of	four	letters”	(ibid.,	94.)—with	which	Scharlach	is	
finally	located.	In	his	final	words,	detective	Lonnrot	explains	the	superfluous	nature	of	the	puzzle	he	has	
solved,	and	the	labyrinth	he	has	fallen	into.		
“In	your	labyrinth	there	are	three	lines	too	many,”	he	said	at	last.	“I	know	of	one	Greek	labyrinth	
which	is	a	single	straight	line.	Along	that	line	so	many	philosophers	have	lost	themselves	that	a	mere	
detective	might	well	do	so,	too.”	
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intransitivity	as	a	question	of	writing,	and	to	read	R.	Nachman	and	Borges’	narratives	as	a	
representation	of	the	impossible	yet	inevitable	departure	that	follows.	In	understanding	
such	departure	in	terms	of	writing	in	the	edge—opening	it	up	into	a	space	for	the	
determination	of	alternatives—we	will	not	expect	to	find	a	leap	over	the	edge,	but	rather	
its	narration	as	an	endless	recurrence.	This	is	the	final	point	of	juxtaposition	between	R.	
Nachman	and	Borges—narrating	the	eternal	recurrence	of	a	threshold	and	its	crossing.	
What	lies	between	the	madness	of	the	king	and	the	madness	of	the	prince,	between	
Browning’s	poet	and	his	(imaginary)	friend,	between	an	Argentine	and	a	European,	
between	a	zadik	and	an	intellectual—is	narrated	as	gaps	in	epistemology,	represented	as	
epistemological	gaps	in	narrative.	Beginning,	for	Borges	and	R.	Nachman,	is	a	repeating	
moment—one	that	already	enfolds	a	“history”	of	points	of	departure	that	cannot,	but	must,	
be	undertaken.	This	repetition	in	the	stories	of	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	will	be	explored	in	
the	next	chapter,	through	the	significations	of	Borges’	Historia	Universal.	
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Section	Three:	A	Narratology	of	the	Margin	
	
In	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition”	and	“A	Vindication	of	the	Cabala”	we	have	seen	
Borges’	most	famous	expressions	of	the	significance	the	Judaic	had	for	him	as	a	position	
from	which	to	write	and	a	poetics	to	write	with.	As	Edna	Aizenberg	has	argued,	Borges’	
interest	in	the	Judaic	and	the	Jewish	textual	tradition	was	“an	attempt	to	find	precedents,	
from	the	edge	of	the	world,	for	alternative	literary	models:	models	of	strategic	
‘marginality.’”1	In	previous	chapters	we	have	seen	Borges	articulate	his	ideas	of	authorship	
and	tradition	through	direct	reference	to	what	he	knew	of	the	Judaic.	However,	as	
Aizenberg	states,	Borges	sees	the	Judaic	as	a	“literary	model”	of	difference.	Our	exploration	
of	the	Judaic	in	Borges’	writing	cannot	be	content	with	identifying	Jewish	themes	in	his	
writing.	That	is,	we	need	to	push	the	question	of	Borges’	inheritance	of	the	Judaic	beyond	
the	identification	of	citation	and	reference	in	his	writing.	
	
Certainly,	the	manner	in	which	Borges	desired	to	mimic	the	Judaic	in	his	writing	did	not	
consist	of	mere	allusions.	If	Borges	takes	the	Judaic	to	be	a	way	of	writing	from	the	margin,	
and	was	successful	at	imitating	it,	we	should	expect	to	find	such	“alternative	literary	
models”	expressed	in	contexts	entirely	devoid	of	Judaic	references	as	well.	Aizenberg	
argues	that	Borges’	understanding	of	the	Judaic	becomes	a	model	for	his	writing,	and	
previous	chapters	have	discussed	both	the	form	and	content	of	what	Borges	wants	to	
mimic	in	the	Judaic—that	is,	the	aspects	of	it	that	serve	as	a	model	for	his	own	writing.	
However,	demonstrations	of	this	mimicry	have	contented	with	the	recognition	of	allusions	
																																																								
1	Aizenberg,	Books	and	Bombs	in	Buenos	Aires:	Borges,	Gerchunoff,	and	Argentine-Jewish	Writing,	106.	
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to	Judaic	sources.	That	Borges	quoted	Jewish	texts	does	not	make	him	any	more	“Judaic”	
than	the	obsession	with	“local	color”	made	the	nationalists	of	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	
Tradition”	any	more	Argentine.	In	the	first	part	of	this	chapter	I	want	to	push	the	argument	
that	Borges	took	the	Judaic	to	be	an	“alternative	literary	[model]	of	strategic	‘marginality’”2	
to	its	conclusion.	What	this	will	mean	is	that	I	will	search	for	an	expression	of	what	Borges	
took	as	a	model	in	a	work	that	has	no	mention	of	the	Judaic.	I	expect	to	identify	this	model	
in	texts	that	deal	with	the	themes	of	social	difference	and	differentiation	more	broadly.	
	
In	Teaching	64	we	have	seen	R.	Nachman’s	depiction	of	the	overlapping	social,	
epistemological	and	theological	aspects	of	opening	up	“the	edge	of	Israel”	into	an	in-
between	space.	In	our	discussion	of	the	introduction	to	Sippurey	Ma’asiyot	and	two	short	
parables,	we	have	outlined	the	“poetics	of	intransitivity”	through	which	R.	Nachman	
stylizes	the	gap	between	the	edge	and	its	beyond.	We	come	now	to	the	narrative	form	of	
representing	the	impossible	departure	and	its	traversing,	which	R.	Nachman	depicted	in	
the	previously	discussed	texts.	The	move	from	poetics	to	narratology	will	reveal	the	way,	in	
which	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	represent	the	departure	from	the	edge	as	successive	and	
recurring	event.	In	both	their	writing,	episodes	of	departure	repeat	within	a	single	story.	
This	repetition	highlights	their	shared	effort	to	contend	with	what	they	perceive	as	their	
own	location	at	the	edge.	It	also	emphasizes	their	understanding	of	this	location	as	part	of	a	
sequence,	of	which	they	partake	in	their	contemporary	setting,	but	which	has	many	ties	to	
past	precursors	and	present	interlocutors.	
	
																																																								
2	Ibid.	
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In	chapter	5	we	will	read	two	stories	side	by	side.	The	first	is	Borges’	“The	Man	on	the	
Threshold.”3	I	will	not	highlight	Jewish	motifs	in	this	story.	It	includes	few	if	any,	and	that	is	
part	of	the	reason	I	chose	it.	What	I	will	highlight	are	the	themes	of	difference	and	
differentiation	and	the	manner	in	which	the	story	engages	the	margin	as	a	question	of	
narration.	In	contrast,	Rabbi	Nachman’s	fourth	tale	“The	King	Who	Decreed	Conversion”4	is	
the	only	one	in	his	entire	collection	to	explicitly	distinguish	between	Jewish	and	non-Jewish	
characters.	This	tale	deals	with	perhaps	the	first	modern	Jew	to	encounter	“the	edge”	and	
negotiate	its	crossing;	the	Marranos.	However,	much	like	Borges’	story,	the	fluid	nature	of	
the	demarcation	between	Jew	and	non-Jew	in	the	tale	presents	questions	about	the	
narration	of	such	a	crossing.		
	
My	conceptual	point	of	entry	into	this	comparison	will	be	double.	First,	through	a	
discussion	of	Borges’	idea	of	Historia	Universal—an	idea	that	is	significantly	inflected	by	
(what	Borges	claims	is)	Nietzsche’s	notion	of	“eternal	recurrence,”	and	develops	through	
opposition	to	notions	of	progressive	history.	Bruno	Bosteels	states	that	“the	tendency	
always	lingers	in	Borges'	texts	to	equate	the	two	problems	of	self-identity	and	
temporality.”5	This	is	nowhere	more	evident	than	in	his	philosophical	discussions	of	the	
idea	of	eternal	recurrence.	Though,	as	Gisle	Selnes	notes,	“Borges'	attribution	of	the	
thought	of	the	Eternal	Return	to	Nietzsche	is,	one	might	suspect,	primarily	a	pretext	for	his	
																																																								
3	Originally	published	as:	Jorges	Luis	Borges,	"El	Hombre	En	El	Umbral,"	La	Nacion,	April	20,	1952.	It	was	
added	to	subsequent	editions	of	the	1949	collection	El	Aleph.	I	will	be	referring	to	the	story	as	it	appears	in:	
Jorge	Luis	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	trans.	Norman	Thomas	Di	Giovanni	(New	York:	
Bantam,	1971),	85-90.	
4	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	20b-23b.		
5	Bruno	Bosteels,	"After	Borges:	Literary	Criticism	and	Critical	Theory"	(1995),	193.	
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further	literary	operations	on	the	subject.”6	I	suggest	we	must	also	read	Borges’	narrative	
formulations	of	cyclical	temporality	as	enfolding	questions	of	identity,	difference	and	
differentiation.	Before	doing	so,	however,	we	will	explore	how	this	shift	takes	place	in	
Borges’	development	of	the	idea	of	Historia	Universal,	from	a	philosophical	afterthought	to	
an	aesthetic	operation,	and	to	questions	of	social	identity.		
	
We	will	encounter	our	second	point	of	entry	mid-way	through	our	reading	of	the	stories.	In	
Teaching	61	of	his	collected	teachings	Likkutei	Moharan,	R.	Nachman	responds	most	
directly	to	the	Statute	of	1804	and	its	attempt	to	force	the	modernization	of	Eastern	
European	Jewry.	In	it	R.	Nachman	develops	a	Politics	of	Secrecy	as	both	a	social	and	a	poetic	
response	to	the	Statute’s	mandates	and	their	horizon	of	emancipation.	The	present	chapter	
will	explore	the	social	implications	and	narrative	formulations	of	Borges’	Historia	Universal	
and	R.	Nachman’s	Politics	of	Secrecy.	
	
What	Borges’	Historia	Universal	and	R.	Nachman’s	Politics	of	Secrecy	share	is	their	concern	
with	a	repeated	departure	from	one’s	location	at	the	limit.	This	repetition	structures	the	
narratives	of	both	stories	we	will	read.	I	propose	to	read	in	this	series	of	departures	a	
narratology	of	the	margin	in	two	senses.	First,	as	the	story	of	an	encounter	with	the	edge	
and	its	transgression.	This	encounter	is	represented	through	epistemological	gaps	in	the	
narrative	itself,	and	the	transgression	of	the	edge	begins	with	the	narrative’s	ability	to	
continue	past	such	gaps.	Second,	as	a	story	produced	by	such	an	encounter,	the	successive	
overstepping	of	epistemological	gaps	in	the	narrative	represents	the	margin	as	an	in-
																																																								
6	Gisle	Selnes,	"Borges,	Nietzsche,	Cantor:	Narratives	of	Influence,"		CiberLetras	6	(2002),	
http://www.lehman.cuny.edu/ciberletras/v06/selnes.html.	
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between	location	that	is	endlessly	recurring	and	repeatedly	opened,	in	a	series	of	narrative	
departures	from	the	epistemological	gaps	that	structure	it.		
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Chapter	5:	
“Historia	Universal”	
	
It	may	be	that	historia	universal	is	the	history	of	a	handful	of	metaphors.	
The	purpose	of	this	note	will	be	to	sketch	a	chapter	of	this	history.		
(The	Fearful	Sphere	of	Pascal,	1951	–	opening	sentence1)	
	
In	October	of	1941	exiled	Italian	philosopher	Rodolfo	Mondolfo	published	an	article	in	
Argentina’s	major	daily	paper	La	Nación	that	outlined	a	contradiction	in	terms	between	
two	of	Nietzsche’s	major	ideas,	“eternal	recurrence”	and	“the	will	to	power.”2	The	idea	of	
eternal	recurrence,	he	explains,	maintains	an		
absolute	incompatibility	with	the	will	to	power.	The	theory	of	eternal	
recurrence	responded	to	a	clearly	deterministic	and	finitistic	orientation;	the	
will	to	power,	on	the	other	hand,	expressed	an	exigency	of	indeterminism	
and	of	the	infinity	of	development	[…]	It	is	precisely	the	will	to	power	that	
introduces	in	place	of	always	identical	forces,	a	continuous	augmentation	[…]	
the	closed	circle	of	the	system	of	definite	combinations	breaks,	and	through	
the	breach	it	has	itself	opened	up	comes	the	will	to	power,	eternal	traveler	on	
the	road	of	infinite	progress.3						
	
																																																								
1	Borges,	Labyrinths:	Selected	Stories	&	Other	Writings,	182.	
2	Rodolfo	Mondolfo,	"La	Contradiccion	De	Nietzsche,"	La	Nación,	October	5,	1941.	[All	translations	of	Spanish	
texts	are	mine,	unless	otherwise	bibliographically	indicated.	–YL]	
3	Ibid.	
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Mondolfo’s	argument,	that	infinite	progress	appears	as	a	radical	innovation	upon	the	
recurring	cycle	of	our	own	existence	did	not	appeal	to	Borges.	This	was	not	due	to	any	
affinity	he	felt	for	determinism.4	Borges	considered	Mondolfo’s	argument	out	of	touch	with	
current	events	and	the	response	he	felt	they	demanded.	Over	the	previous	two	years,	
Germany	had	invaded	Poland	and	France,	and	over	the	previous	two	months	had	pushed	
their	campaign	deep	into	Russia.	Leningrad	was	besieged	and	Moscow	was	now	embattled.	
From	ex-centric	Argentina—in	the	face	of	a	media	flooded	with	reports	of	a	war,	the	
proportions	of	which	would	have	been	unfathomable	just	two	decades	earlier—Borges	
preferred	to	circumscribe	talk	of	“infinite	progress,”	whether	Mondolfo	meant	it	as	a	
comment	on	current	affairs	or	not.5		
	
Eleven	years	almost	to	the	date,	after	the	military	coup	that	began	Argentina’s	“infamous	
decade,”	Borges	was	well	established	as	a	public	intellectual	through	his	regular	
contributions	to	many	journals	and	papers.	The	previous	decade	had	also	brought	several	
waves	of	German	immigration	to	Argentina—including	interwar	immigration,	exiles	
escaping	the	Third	Reich	and	Jewish	refugees—along	with	a	variety	of	ideologies.6	Borges’	
vocal	opposition	to	Nazism	in	Argentina	was	well	known,	most	notably	in	the	pages	of	Sur.7	
																																																								
4	The	reader	will	recall	Borges’	depiction	of	“the	determinists”	as	an	annoyingly-always-correct	group,	which	
we	have	previously	read	in	“The	Argentine	Writer	and	Tradition.”	
5	Mondolfo	was	exiled	from	Fascist	Italy	and	there	is	little	suspicion	of	him	being	a	Nazi	sympathizer.	Borges	
did	not	suspect	him	either.	But	he	did	see	a	connection	between	ideas	of	“infinite	progress”	and	the	Reich’s	
ideology.	He	will	express	this	at	the	end	of	his	response	to	Mondolfo’s	article.		
6	For	more	on	German	immigration	to	Argentina	and	its	ideological	effects,	see:	Robert	Vincent	Kelz,	
"Competing	Germanies:	The	Freie	Deutsche	Buhne	and	the	Deutsches	Theater	in	Buenos	Aires,	Argentina,	
1938-1965"	(Vanderbilt	University,	2010).	And:	Ronald	C.	Newton,	"Indifferent	Sanctuary:	German-Speaking	
Refugees	and	Exiles	in	Argentina,	1933-1945,"	Journal	of	Interamerican	Studies	and	World	Affairs	24,	no.	4	
(1982).	
7	For	Borges’	engagement	with	Nazism	over	the	pages	of	Sur,	see:	López-Quiñones,	Borges	Y	El	Nazismo:	Sur	
(1937-1946).	For	more	on	the	role	of	this	publication	in	Argentine	liberal	intellectual	circles,	see:	Gramuglio,	
Nacionalismo	Y	Cosmopolitismo	En	La	Literatura	Argentina.		
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Two	months	after	Mondolfo’s	article,	in	December	1941,	Japan	joined	the	war.	The	
Argentine	military	government	persisted	in	remaining	“neutral”	in	their	political	
alignments	with	embattled	Europe.	For	Borges	and	his	intellectual	circle	this	position	was	
anything	but	neutral.		
	
One	week	later,	on	December	14,	La	Nacion	was	detailing	the	Japanese	attack	on	Pearl	
Harbor,	op-eds	were	debating	the	effect	this	would	have	on	the	war	in	the	Pacific,	and	a	
correspondent	from	Stockholm	explained	the	Reich—having	failed	to	divide	between	
Britain	and	the	U.S.—was	“now	placing	great	hope	in	the	possibility	of	provoking	a	division	
between	the	Allies	and	the	countries	of	Latin	America.”8	On	these	same	pages,	Borges	
published	a	response	to	Mondolfo’s	article.				
	
“I	return	eternally	to	the	[idea	of	eternal	recurrence],”9	Borges	begins	his	article	tongue	in	
cheek.	Yet	we	should	not	confuse	his	playfulness	for	a	lack	of	deliberation.	This	jocular	
statement	draws	the	reader	away	from	Borges’	intention	to	entirely	ignore	any	mention	of	
“the	will	to	power”	in	what	he	presents	as	further	reflection	on	Mondolfo’s	article.10	This	
disregard	will	become	oppositional	in	the	closing	paragraph,	where	Borges	implies	an	
equation	of	Hitler	with	a	will	to	power	that	threatens	to	impoverish	humanity.	Before	that,	
however,	Borges	goes	on	to	define	the	“three	fundamental	modes”	of	eternal	recurrence.	
The	three	modes	are:	the	“astrological	mode,”	which	implies	the	question	of	determinism;	
																																																								
8	"Preocupa	En	El	Reich	La	Actitud	De	America	Del	Sur,"	La	Nacion,	Dec.	14,	1941.	
9	Jorge	Luis		Borges,	"Tres	Formas	Del	Eterno	Regreso,"	La	Nación,	Dec.	14,	1941.	
10	This	essay	was	reprinted	as	"El	Tiempo	Circular"	in	the	second	edition	(1953)	of	Historia	de	la	Eternidad.	
See:	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	393-96;	ibid.	The	first	sentence	of	Borges’	article	contains	the	only	
explicit	reference	to	Mondolfo’s	article	and	was	edited	out	of	"El	Tiempo	Circular."		
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the	“geometrical	mode,”	which	leads	through	a	combinatorial	question	to	the	possibilities	
of	aesthetic	formation;	and	the	“analogical	mode,”	which	questions	the	relation	of	such	
combinatorial	possibilities	to	the	human	experience.		
	
Following	Mondolfo’s	argument	that	an	“absolute	incompatibility”	exists	between	eternal	
recurrence	and	the	will	to	power,	Borges	will	formulate	this	incompatibility	in	terms	of	a	
rejection	of	the	very	possibility	of	historical	progress.	And	he	will,	finally,	present	this	
impossibility	in	an	optimistic	note	as	it	relates	to	World	War	II.	In	this	article,	Borges	
combines	the	“three	fundamental	modes	[of	eternal	recurrence]”	into	an	articulation	of	his	
idea	of	Historia	Universal.	From	his	explanation	of	the	very	first	mode,	the	astrological	one,	
Borges	uses	this	phrase.	If	astrological	patterns	reflect	human	history,	then	the	fact	that	the	
motion	of	the	stars	repeats	itself	would	mean	that	human	history	repeats	itself	as	well.	“If	
the	planetary	orbits	are	cyclical,	the	historia	universal	should	be	as	well,”11	he	states.	Borges	
clearly	has	an	eternal	recurrence	of	history	in	mind	here	but,	before	we	can	make	sense	of	
Borges’	response	to	Mondolfo,	we	need	to	ask	what	exactly	the	phrase	“historia	universal”	
means	to	him.		
	
The	phrase	historia	universal	may	be	familiar	from	titles	such	as	Borges’	1935	book	Historia	
Universal	de	la	Infamia.	However,	Borges	had	(only)	already	employed	this	phrase	three	
times	before;	in	his	1932	review	“Vindicación	de	‘Bouvard	et	Pécuchet;’”12	in	his	1935	
collection	Historia	Universal	de	la	Infamia;13	and	in	two	essays	of	his	1936	collection	
																																																								
11	Borges,	"Tres	Formas	Del	Eterno	Regreso."	
12	In:	Borges,	Discusión.	See:	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	259-62;	ibid.	
13	Historia	Universal	De	La	Infamia.	We	will	discuss	the	content	of	this	collection	in	the	next	chapter.		
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Historia	de	la	Eternidad.14	Borges’	use	of	this	phrase	is	quite	deliberate	in	response	to	
Mondolfo.	Moreover,	this	article	is	the	most	comprehensive	articulation	of	historia	
universal	as	an	idea	of	temporality	that	is	opposed	to	progressive	history,	and	that	will	
inform	much	of	Borges’	future	work.	Reviewing	the	three	previous	uses	of	the	phrase	
alongside	the	“three	fundamental	modes	[of	eternal	recurrence]”	will	clarify	Borges’	
response	to	Mondolfo.	
	
“The	time	of	Bouvard	et	Pécuchet	bends	toward	eternity,”15	states	Borges	in	his	review	of	
Flaubert’s	unfinished	work	by	that	name.		
In	order	to	ridicule	the	desires	of	humanity,	Swift	attributed	them	to	pigmies	
or	apes;	Flaubert,	to	two	grotesque	subjects.	Evidently,	if	the	historia	
universal	is	the	history	of	Bouvard	and	of	Pécuchet,	everything	it	integrates	
is	ridiculous	and	appalling.16		
In	this	first	use	of	the	term,	historia	universal	indicates	the	standard	meaning	we	might	
translate	as	“history	of	the	world,”	or	“world	history.”	It	does	not	suggest	any	eternal	
recurrence.	Yet	we	may	identify	basic	elements	of	its	later	use	in	two	implications.	First,	it	
implies	some	form	of	identity	between	the	narratives	of	Bouvard,	Pécuchet,	apes	and	
pigmies.	Second,	it	implies	that	world	history	is	in	some	sense	a	re-integration	of	these	
ridiculous	and	appalling	constants	that	are	human	desires.	While	Flaubert	is	no	recurrence	
of	Swift,	the	temporality	that	their	integration	involves	proceeds	from	Bouvard	et	Pécuchet	
onwards,	as	it	“bends	towards	infinity.”	But	how	could	“historia	universal”	as	world	history	
																																																								
14	Historia	De	La	Eternidad	(Buenos	Aires:	[F.a.	Colombo],	1936).	
15	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	262.		
16	Ibid.		
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also	be	the	particular	“history	of	Bouvard	and	of	Pécuchet?”17	Borges’	first	use	of	the	term,	
then,	involves	the	problem	of	reconciling	universal	and	particular	history.	This	is	the	first	
problematic	of	history	that	eternal	recurrence	will	help	Borges	resolve.		
	
In	her	book	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin,	Kate	Jenckes	discusses	the	second	appearance	
of	the	term	historia	universal,	as	she	reads	Borges’	discomfort	with	the	notion	of	a	
progressive	history.18	This	discomfort	is	evident,	she	argues,	in	his	attitude	towards	
allegory—a	trope	that	he	understood	as	“a	form	of	writing	history.”19	She	proposes	to	read	
Borges’	1935	collection	Historia	Universal	de	la	Infamia	as	a	critique	of	allegory	and	its	
mode	of	narrating	history.	This	book,	Jenckes	argues,	is	“a	book	about	history	itself	[…]	
parodically	and	paradoxically	telling	a	history	that	by	its	very	nature	cannot	be	told,	that	is	
infame.”20	That	is,	Jenckes	explains,	History	is	a	name	for	the	narrative	of	the	victors,	and	
allegory	is	the	central	trope	of	this	narrative.21	As	a	narrative	mode	then,	historia	universal	
is	the	alternative	to	“world	history”	in	that	it	narrates	what	History	does	not.	In	his	
response	to	Mondolfo,	Borges	posits	the	analogical	mode	of	narrating	a	historia	universal	as	
opposed	to	the	allegorical	mode	of	narrating	History.								
	
Jenckes	highlights	this	terminological	opposition	found	most	clearly	in	a	later	text,	“The	
																																																								
17	Ibid.	
18	Ibid.	
19	Kate	Jenckes,	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin	:	Allegory,	Afterlife,	and	the	Writing	of	History,	Suny	Series	in	
Latin	American	and	Iberian	Thought	and	Culture	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2007).	
Certainly	Borges	is	not	the	first	to	make	this	connection.	As	the	title	of	Jenckes’	book	clearly	states,	she	is	
influenced	by	Walter	Benjamin’s	writing	on	allegory	and	history.	
20	Ibid.,	68.	[Emphasis	in	the	original	–YL]	
21	As	the	title	of	her	book	suggests,	Jenckes	is	basing	her	argument	on	Walter	Benjamin’s	critique	of	history	as	
the	history	of	the	victors.	This	is	not	the	place	to	expand	on	Benjamin’s	idea.	
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Shame	of	History,”	which	appeared	in	Borges’	1952	collection	Otras	Inqiziciones.22	Borges	
quotes	a	statement	made	by	Goethe,	accompanying	the	Duke	of	Weimar	on	a	military	
campaign	to	Paris	in	1792:	“In	this	place	and	on	this	day,	an	epoch	in	the	history	of	the	
world	is	opened.”23	To	which	Borges	responds:	“Since	that	day,	historic	days	have	
abounded,	and	one	of	the	tasks	of	governments	[…],	has	been	to	fabricate	or	simulate	them	
[…]	I	have	suspected	[Borges	continues]	that	history,	true	history,	is	more	bashful	and	that	
its	essential	dates	can	be,	for	a	long	time,	secret.”24	In	opposition	to	something	like	Goethe’s	
World	History,	Borges	posits	another	history,	more	“true”	and	more	“secret,”	an	historia	
universal.	
	
In	the	second	“fundamental	mode”	Borges	refers	to—the	geometrical	mode—he	replaces	
the	question	of	identifying	world	historical	moments.	Since	a	finite	set	of	objects	is	
incapable	of	infinite	combinations,	no	amount	of	change	or	progress	can	break	free	of	the	
repetitive	nature	of	history.	If	history	is	no	more	than	the	recurrence	of	a	story	within	a	
determined	set	of	parameters,	if	it	is	no	more	than	the	algebraic	combination	of	these	
parameters,	then	rather	than	identifying	the	progression	of	its	moments,	(after	all,	“its	
essential	dates	can	be,	for	a	long	time,	secret,”25	Borges	tells	us)	the	essential	question	
becomes	to	identify	these	finite	constants.	For	Borges	the	constant	is	the	eternal	human	at	
the	center	of	the	fleeting	present.26		
																																																								
22	In:	Jenckes,	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin	:	Allegory,	Afterlife,	and	the	Writing	of	History,	68.	See:	Borges,	
Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	631-775.	
23	Quoted	and	translated	in:	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	631-775.	
24	Quoted	and	translated	in:	Jenckes,	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin	:	Allegory,	Afterlife,	and	the	Writing	of	
History,	107.	The	Spanish	term	Jenckes	translates	as	“history	of	the	world”	is	“historia	del	mundo.”	
25	Quoted	and	translated	in:	ibid.	
26	Borges	briefly	considers	Le	Bon’s	“atoms”	and	Nietzsche’s	“forces,”	before	choosing	Auguste	Blanqui’s	
“simple	bodies”	as	the	eternal	constant.	He	offers	little	information	on	these	thinkers	or	the	terms	they	offer.	
	
	221	
	
The	changes	in	the	meaning	of	historia	universal	from	1932	to	1935	have	lead	from	history	
to	narrative.	In	Borges’	1936	essay	“Historia	de	la	Eternidad”	he	comes	to	re-anchor	the	
term	in	human	experience,	linking	(as	Bosteels	has	suggested27)	the	question	of	identity	
with	this	form	of	temporality.	“It	is	known	that	personal	identity	resides	in	the	memory	and	
that	annulling	that	faculty	comports	idiocy,”28	states	Borges,	anticipating	his	1941	closing	
comments	on	the	human	impoverishment	that	is	Hitler.	“The	same	must	be	thought	of	the	
universe	[…]	Without	a	delicate	and	secret	mirror	of	what	has	happened	to	souls,	the	
historia	universal	is	lost	time.”29	What	fuels	the	temporality	of	historia	universal	is	a	secret	
mirroring,	in	which	souls	acquire	their	identity	through	their	reflection	in	some	other	
memory	of	the	universe.			
	
This	leads	to	the	analogical	mode,	the	third	and	final	in	Borges’	1941	essay,	which	he	
describes	as	“cycles	that	are	similar,	not	identical.”	30	This	mode	is	formulated	through	“two	
curious	ideas.	The	first:	negate	the	reality	of	the	past	and	of	the	future	[…]	The	second:	
negate,	like	Ecclesiastes,	any	kind	of	novelty.”31	Where	would	such	negations	leave	us?	“The	
conjecture	that	all	human	experience	is	(in	some	way)	analogous	might	at	first	sight	appear	
to	be	a	mere	impoverishment	of	the	world”,	Borges	admits,	since	it	would	suggest	“historia	
universal	is	that	of	a	single	man.”32	We	can	easily	identify	in	this	proposition	the	narrative	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
He	does	refer	to	his	longer	and	more	in	depth	discussion	of	Nietzsche’s	“forces”	in:	“La	Doctrina	de	los	Siglos.”	
In:	Borges,	Historia	De	La	Eternidad.	
27	Bosteels,	"After	Borges:	Literary	Criticism	and	Critical	Theory,"	193.	
28	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	364.	
29	Ibid.	
30	Borges,	"Tres	Formas	Del	Eterno	Regreso."	
31	Ibid.	
32	Ibid.	
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technique	Borges	returns	to	again	and	again,	in	which	multiple	characters	or	plot	lines	turn	
out	to	be	the	same,	or	of	an	over	determined	analogy	to	one	another.	If	historia	universal	is	
the	repeating	tale	of	one	man,	the	centripetal	force	of	which	we	might	call	analogy,	then	it	
becomes	clear	that	beyond	Borges’	essays	and	philosophical	discussions,	we	must	search	
for	it	in	his	narrative	formulations.			
	
Yet	what	is	of	the	essence	here	is	not	merely	the	repetition	of	the	tale,	but	the	firm	
anchoring	of	human	experience	at	the	center	of	the	historia	universal.	“In	climactic	times,”	
Borges	concludes,	“the	conjecture	that	the	existence	of	man	is	constant	and	invariable	
might	sadden	or	irritate;	in	times	of	decline	(such	as	these),	it	is	the	promise	that	no	
dishonor,	no	calamity,	no	Hitler,	will	ever	impoverish	us.”33	The	story	of	one	man,	which	is	
that	of	many	men,	is	the	assuring	echo	of	a	future	recurrence.	What	is	“promising”	about	
historia	universal	is	that	it	provides	a	means	by	which	to	resist	the	totalizing	efforts	of	a	
progressive	history.	The	slippage	between	history	and	fiction,	which	became	“analogy”	as	
the	essay	continued,	is	what	positions	the	narrator	at	the	heart	of	the	most	central	
questions	of	identity.		
	
How	then	can	we	understand	historia	universal	as	a	form	of	narration?	In	Spanish	“historia”	
means	both	“history”	and	“story”	or	“tale.”	The	double	meaning	of	“historia”	is	key	to	
recognizing	the	slippage	in	Borges’	article	from	the	philosophical	question	to	the	aesthetic	
operation.	As	we	have	seen,	Borges	moves	from	the	astrological	recurrences	of	events	to	
the	analogical	recurrence	of	human	experience.	In	narrative	terms,	this	is	a	move	from	the	
																																																								
33	Ibid.	
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historical	account	of	a	temporal	string	of	progressing	moments,	to	an	analogical	string	of	
identical	human	experiences.	I	propose	to	read	historia,	then,	as	a	recurring	story-history	
whose	constitutive	moments	and	experiences	are	always	analogous	to	each	other.		
	
However,	as	Jenckes	has	observed,	for	Borges	“history	[…]	is	something	secret”34	(and	
Borges	has	indeed	stated	this	several	times:	“its	essential	dates	[…]	secret,”35	“a	delicate	
and	secret	mirror,”36).	What	does	it	mean	to	say	this	history	is	universal?	That	is,	to	say	that	
a	secret	is	universal?	Like	historia,	there	is	an	ambiguity	to	this	word	as	well.	The	
ambiguous	meaning	of	universal	is	between	something	common	to	all,	and	something	
common	to	all	within	a	particular	group.	Calling	historia	“universal”	perpetually	poses	the	
question:	whose	story-history	is	it?	As	a	recurring	story-history	that	is	both	always	
analogously	identical,	and	incessantly	asking:	identical	to	whom?	–	historia	universal	
constantly	probes	the	outer	limits	of	inclusion;	or,	recalling	Borges’	representation	of	the	
Judaic—the	margin.		
	
As	a	response	to	Mondolfo,	as	a	comment	on	Nazi	ideology	of	progress	in	his	time	and	as	
the	repeating	story	of	“a	single	man,”37	Borges’	use	of	historia	universal	in	this	essay	frames	
it	as	the	literary	formulation	of	his	concerns	with	progressive	history	and	World	War	II	
ideologies.	The	challenge	Borges	is	left	with	is	harsh:	within	this	historia	universal	to	which	
all	men	belong,	of	which	all	men	are	analogous	echoes,	how	might	we	nonetheless	
																																																								
34	Ibid.	
35	Quoted	and	translated	in:	Jenckes,	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin	:	Allegory,	Afterlife,	and	the	Writing	of	
History,	107.		
36	Borges,	Obras	Completas,	1923-1972,	364.	
37	Borges,	"Tres	Formas	Del	Eterno	Regreso."	
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distinguish	Borges	from	Hitler,	Argentina	from	Germany?	How	might	we	identify	the	edge	
that	separates	the	one	in	the	face	of	the	many	(or	visa	versa)?		
	
In	an	attempt	to	answer	this	question,	we	must	keep	in	mind	that	the	distinguishing	
thresholds	will	receive	a	radically	de-territorialized	articulation.	That	is,	that	geography	
has	little	to	do	with	the	manner	in	which	the	narrative	of	Borges’	historia	universal	will	
narrate	the	margin.	“Allegory	of	course	comes	from	allos-agorein,	speaking	other	than	
publicly,”38	Jenckes	reminds	us.	As	part	of	an	attempt	to	think	past	allegorical	narration,	
this	alterity	to	“the	public”	will	come	to	replace	spatial	identifications—like	it	does	in	
Veblen’s	account	of	the	wayfarer,	and	in	R.	Nachman’s	account	of	the	Vacant	Space—as	a	
key	question	for	the	narrative	subjects	we	will	encounter	in	the	stories.	As	we	will	see,	
temporality	and	secrecy	will	prove	essential	attributes	through	which	the	margin	
distinguishes	itself	vis-à-vis	the	public.	
	
Temporal	Thresholds	
	
“The	precise	geography	of	the	events	I	am	going	to	relate	is	of	little	importance,”39	states	
Dewey,	the	internal	narrator	of	Borges’	story	“The	Man	on	the	Threshold.”	A	puzzling	
statement,	considering	Borges	has	chosen	to	set	this	story	in	rural	India,	where	Dewey	will	
go	searching	for	a	missing	colonial	judge	in	the	interwar	period.	Then,	after	discounting	his	
own	created	geography,	he	goes	on	to	wonder:	“besides,	what	would	the	names	of	Amritsar	
																																																								
38	Jenckes,	Reading	Borges	after	Benjamin	:	Allegory,	Afterlife,	and	the	Writing	of	History,	78.	
39	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	85.	
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or	Oudh	mean	in	Buenos	Aires?”40	What	would	they	mean	in	a	story	told	by	a	British	
consular	official	about	his	assignment	in	India	between	the	two	world	wars?	If	this	were	
not	a	rhetorical	question	we	might	answer:	they	would	mean	Borges’	attempt	to	stylize	his	
own	Argentine	marginality.	They	would	mean	this	story	will	explore	the	non-geographical	
relations	of	an	Empire	and	its	outskirts.		
	
Geography	is	not	the	main	term	through	which	the	margin	is	located.	Yet	the	terms	that	
frame	the	narrative	are	geographical—the	tension	between	the	“central	government”	of	the	
Empire	and	the	unnamed	cities	over	which	it	rules.	“Let	me	just	say,	then,	[Dewey	
continues]	that	in	those	years	there	were	disturbances	in	a	Muslim	city	and	that	the	central	
government	sent	out	one	of	their	best	people	to	restore	order.”41	Dewey	is	not	ignorant	of	
the	disturbance,	but	he	identifies	it	as	proper	to	that	“Muslim	city”	rather	than	proper	to	
the	relation	between	colonizer	and	colonized.		As	Daniel	Balderston	observes,	“Dewey	is	
distracted	[…]	by	his	assumption	that	India	is	a	land	[…]	where	politics	has	no	place.”42	The	
double	entendre	of	Balderston’s	observation	will	turn	out	to	be	true	in	both	senses.	Dewey	
will	learn	there	is	a	rather	effective	politics	that	is	at	work	in	this	narrative.	And,	that	this	
politics	has	no	“place,”	in	the	proper	sense	of	the	word.	The	politics	Dewey	comes	up	
against	do	not	proceed	from	the	divisions	a	geografía	universal—as	some	form	of	world	
atlas—imposes	upon	the	“place”	called	India.43	It	will	proceed	rather	from	Dewey’s	
encounter	with	the	man	on	the	threshold	and	his	narration	of	a	historia	universal.	But,	
																																																								
40	Ibid.,	85-86.	
41	Ibid.,	86.	
42	Daniel	Balderston,	Out	of	Context:	Historical	Reference	and	the	Representation	of	Reality	in	Borges	(Durham	
[N.C.]:	Duke	University	Press,	1993),	103.	
43	We	should	keep	in	mind	that	while	the	narrative	time	of	Dewey’s	tale	is	in	the	interwar	period,	the	frame	
story	(and	the	text	itself)	dates	from	1952,	soon	after	the	division	of	British	India	into	the	nation-states	of	
India	and	Pakistan.	
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while	the	man	on	the	threshold	may	narrate	such	a	historia	universal,	it	is	only	through	his	
encounter	with	Dewey	that	Borges’	story	comes	to	negotiate	the	question	“whose	historia	is	
this?”	And,	it	is	only	through	its	successful	negotiation	that	the	old	man	comes	to	mark	the	
non-spatial	threshold,	and	its	opening	into	a	margin	to	which	Dewey	has	no	access.				
	
[Spain,	Persia,	Babylon]	
R.	Nachman’s	tale	too	begins	with	an	exposition,	in	which	a	non-spatial	edge	is	encountered.	
An	edge	to	which	the	central	power	has	no	access:	
There	once	was	a	king	who	decreed	expulsion	or	conversion,	whoever	
wanted	to	stay	in	the	country	had	to	convert,	otherwise	he	will	be	expelled	
from	the	country.	Some	left	everything	behind	and	left	in	poverty	to	maintain	
their	faith	as	Israelites,	and	some	were	concerned	for	their	possessions	and	
remained	as	Marranos.	In	Tsinan’44	they	practiced	Jewish	religion	and	in	
public	they	were	not	allowed.	Then	the	king	died	and	his	son	became	king.45		
	
What	exactly	is	the	king	trying	to	accomplish	by	this	expulsion?	And,	does	the	creation	of	a	
Jewish	community	outside	of	the	public	sphere	indicate	that	his	attempt	has	failed	or	
backfired?	We	are	given	no	motivation	for	the	king’s	decree.	In	fact,	the	briskness	and	lack	
of	detail	with	which	this	opening	scene	is	related	would	give	the	impression	that	this	is	
merely	the	exposition.	This	first	king	is	not	a	main	character	in	the	story.	He	sets	the	stage	
																																																								
44	I	will	return	to	this	word	later	in	the	discussion—YL			
45	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	20b.	Unless	otherwise	indicated,	the	translations	of	Rabbi	Nachman’s	texts	are	
my	own.	I	have	consulted	the	fine	work	of	translation	done	by	Marianne	Schleicher.	While	my	own	rendering	
is	fairly	similar	to	hers,	I	have	maintained	those	differences	I	believe	are	significant.	I	therefore	do	not	make	
note	of	every	difference	between	our	translations.	The	reader	is	invited	to	consult	her	work	in:	Schleicher,	
Intertextuality	in	the	Tales	of	Rabbi	Nahman	of	Bratslav	a	Close	Reading	of	Sippurey	Maasiyot.	
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for	the	tale	to	begin.	We	should	thus	ask	in	what	way	this	scene	has	in	fact	exposed	the	
narrative	world	within	which	the	tale	will	take	place.	Particularly	considering	this	
exposition	is	of	a	moment	of	concealment.		
	
The	first	thing	to	notice	about	the	exposition	is	its	echo	of	the	Spanish	Expulsion.	Not	only	
in	the	most	basic	fact	of	a	king	giving	Jews	the	choice	to	convert	of	leave,	but	also	in	the	
name	it	gives	the	Jews	who	remain	in	the	kingdom;	anusim.46	Yet	the	name	of	the	country	is	
never	mentioned.	The	precise	geography	of	these	events	seems	of	little	importance.	Besides	
(to	borrow	Dewey’s	words)	what	would	the	names	of	Aragon	and	Castile	mean	in	Braslav?	
The	echo	of	these	names	in	the	exposition	sets	the	scene—for	R.	Nachman’s	listeners,	
familiar	with	this	historical	event—for	the	departure	from	traditional	accounts	of	the	
Expulsion,	that	will	take	place	in	the	next	scene.	That	is,	this	exposition	could	be	read	along	
the	lines	of	a	history	book,	one	that	will	recount	the	progress	made	from	some	originary	
moment	to	the	listeners’	present.	The	historical	knowledge	and	narrative	expectations	R.	
Nachman	is	priming	in	his	readers,	through	the	echo	of	the	Expulsion,	serve	to	identify	the	
Spanish	Expulsion	as	the	very	originary	moment	of	modern	Jewish	history.	This	would	be	
nothing	new	to	one	familiar	with	the	traditional	historical	narrative.	The	departure	will	
thus	affect	this	sense	of	familiarity	as	well.		
	
																																																								
46	I	have	translated	this	term	as	“Marranos.”	The	Hebrew	word	“anusim”	could	be	translated	as	New	
Christians	or	Conversos	as	well.	However,	based	on	the	depiction	of	this	group	in	the	story,	their	hidden	
practices	of	Judaism	and	concern	for	repealing	the	“decree,”	R.	Nachman’s	use	of	the	term	points	to	Marranos.	
For	more	on	the	differences	between	these	groups,	see:	Yirmiyahu	Yovel,	The	Other	Within:	The	Marranos:	
Split	Identity	and	Emerging	Modernity	(Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	2009).	
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What	is	it,	then,	that	R.	Nachman’s	audience	expected	to	hear	of	the	Spanish	Expulsion?	
First,	the	Spanish	Expulsion	was	a	watershed	moment	for	Spanish	Jews	and	European	
Jewry	more	broadly.47	Second,	Lurianic	Cabala	develops	out	of	this	moment	and	is,	as	
Gershom	Scholem	argues,	the	major	trend	of	Jewish	mysticism	up	to	the	Hasidic	movement.	
Yosef	Dan	argues	that,	in	literary	structural	terms,	Lurianic	Cabala	also	becomes	the	major	
mythical	universe	within	which	Sabbatian	and	(later)	Hasidic	storytelling	takes	place.48	
This	trend	marks	the	concerns	of	the	expelled	communities	and	the	significance	of	this	
event	for	those	Jews	who,	as	R.	Nachman	puts	it,	“maintain	their	faith	as	Israelites.”49	
Interest	in	those	Jews	who	chose	to	remain	in	Spain,	as	anusim,	is	a	marked	characteristic	
of	the	Sabbatian	movement.50	
	
It	is	all	the	more	surprising	to	find	in	the	next	scene,	that	of	the	second	king’s	life	and	rule,	
that	the	tale	is	concerned	not	with	the	effects	of	the	expulsion	on	the	lives	of	the	expelled,	
but	will	investigate	rather	the	lives	of	the	anusim	who	remain	in	the	country.	This	does	not	
become	evident	until	the	second	king	comes	on	stage.	The	exposition	is	all	the	more	
effective	in	setting	up	the	world	of	the	tale	as	a	departure	from	traditional	narratives	of	the	
Expulsion.	Since	it	gives	no	indication	of	the	tale’s	concern,	the	first	scene	enables	the	tale	
																																																								
47	Among	those	relevant	to	our	subject	matter	see:	Scholem,	Major	Trends	in	Jewish	Mysticism.	And:	Buber,	
Hasidism.	As	well	as:	Dan,	Ha-Sipur	Ha-Hasidi.			
48	See:	Ha-Sipur	Ha-Hasidi.	
49	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	20b.		
50	See:	“Redemption	Through	Sin.”	In:	Scholem,	The	Messianic	Idea	in	Judaism	and	Other	Essays	on	Jewish	
Spirituality,	78-141.	And:	Sabbatai	Sevi;	the	Mystical	Messiah,	1626-1676	(Princeton,	N.J:	Princeton	University	
Press,	1973).		
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to	position	the	Spanish	Expulsion	along	a	temporality	dissociated	from	the	Jewish	history	R.	
Nachman’s	listeners	were	familiar	with.51	
	
With	the	departure,	the	exposition	also	introduces	the	theme	of	Jewish	encounters	with,	
and	existence	within,	a	homogenizing	broader	culture.	For	R.	Nachman	this	theme	is	
framed	in	terms	of	Napoleonic	emancipation	and	Tzarist	reforms.	However,	his	
representation	of	this	theme	through	an	echo	of	the	Expulsion—and,	more	importantly,	
focusing	on	those	Jews	that	chose	to	become	anusim—links	the	narrative	representation	of	
such	encounters	to	the	social	and	political	roots	of	the	question	of	equality	in	modern	
Jewish	European	history.	Having	set	up	a	retrospective	connection	between	R.	Nachman’s	
own	concerns	and	the	Spanish	Expulsion,	the	tale	proceeds	through	a	historia	universal	of	
just	such	encounters.	
	
In	the	second	scene	we	are	introduced	to	the	main	character	of	the	tale,	a	marrano	minister	
in	the	court	of	the	king.	The	second	scene	will	trace	this	recurrence	back	to	the	character	of	
Mordechai	from	the	biblical	Book	of	Ester.	There	was	a	plot	in	the	king’s	court,	the	tale	
relates.	Some	ministers	conspired	to	kill	the	king.	The	minister,	whose	Judaism	in	unknown	
to	the	king	and	court,	warns	the	king.	Having	survived	the	assassination	attempt	and	
captured	the	conspirators,	the	king	rewards	the	minister	publicly.	
	
																																																								
51	That	is,	unless	one	believes	R.	Nachman	was	himself	a	Sabbatian.	While	influences	of	Sabbatian	and	
Frankist	thought	are	evident	in	R.	Nachman,	no	argument	has	been	made	that	he	himself	belonged	to	these	
movements,	or	engaged	with	them	in	any	way	other	than	to	clarify	his	own	position	in	contra-distinction.	For	
more	on	R.	Nachman’s	engagement	with	Sabbatian	and	Frankist	ideas	see:	Joseph	Weiss,	"Torat	Ha-Dialektika	
Ve-Ha-Emuna	Le-Rabbi	Nachman	Mi-Braslav"	(Hebrew	University	of	Jerusalem,	1951),	Chapter	3.	And:	Zadoff	
and	Meir,	"The	Empty	Space,	Sabbateanism	and	Its	Melodies	-	Joseph	Weiss'	Reading	of	Liqqutei	Moharan	64."		
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When	the	minister	first	considers	what	his	response	should	be	to	learning	of	the	conspiracy,	
his	internal	voice	is	related:	“Well,	why	am	I	a	marrano?	Because	I	wished	to	spare	my	
fortune	and	possessions.	Now	that	the	country	will	be	without	a	king	it	will	be	that	man	
will	swallow	his	neighbor	alive,	for	there	cannot	be	a	country	with	no	king.”52	We	should	
focus	for	a	moment	on	the	minister’s	logic.	In	particular,	the	question	here	is;	what	exactly	
does	the	minister	fear	would	happen	to	a	country	that	irrecoverably	(the	possibility	of	the	
king’s	son	assuming	the	thrown	doe	not	seem	to	occur	to	him)	lost	its	king?	What	makes	
the	king	such	an	indispensible	figure?	This	question	is	asked	with	regard	to	both	the	
minister’s	internal	logic	and	the	internal	logic	of	the	tale	itself.	I	will	suggest	several	
answers.		
	
First,	as	a	depiction	of	the	character’s	internal	logic	and	motivation,	the	perceived	
indispensability	of	the	king	is	an	important	detail	since	the	tale	is	ultimately	also	a	tale	of	
how	the	minister	learns	he	was	wrong	to	think	this,	how	he	comes	to	realize	the	possibility	
of	a	king-less	country.	As	the	main	character	of	the	tale,	the	conflict	he	will	overcome	is	his	
fear	of	this	kingless	reality,	and	the	anarchy	such	a	prospect	suggests	to	him.	This	fear	
prompted	him	to	remain	in	the	country	and	later	to	expose	the	plot	against	the	king.	It	is	
the	logic	by	which	he	operates.	This	logic	is	further	emphasized	by	the	fact	that	R.	Nachman	
alludes	here	to	(Pirkei	Avot	3:2):	“Rabbi	Hanina,	deputy	to	the	Priests,	would	say:	Pray	for	
the	wellbeing	of	the	rulership,	for	were	it	not	for	the	fear	of	it,	a	man	would	swallow	his	
neighbor	alive.”	This	allusion	both	serves	to	mark	the	dilemma	the	minister	will	have	to	
																																																								
52	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	21a.	
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overcome,	and	the	overcoming	of	outdated	modes	of	thought	about	the	relation	between	
Jews	and	sovereignty.	
	
Second,	as	an	echo	of	R.	Nachman’s	own	post-French	revolutionary	world,	the	minister’s	
lesson	is	also	his	own,	for	it	has	affirmed	the	possibility	of	a	kingless	country.	What	is	
involved	in	coming	to	terms	with	this	affirmation	is	reconciling	new	forms	of	republicanism	
and	imperialism	with	traditional	thought	on	sovereignty	(such	as	the	gloss	on	Pirkei	Avot)	
and	existing	structures	of	engagement	(such	as	the	recent	memory	of	the	Council	of	Four	
Lands),	through	which	Jews	come	into	contact	with	the	broader	culture,	with	its	shifting	
conceptions	of	homogeneity	and	equality.	In	that	sense,	for	the	minister	to	be	proven	
wrong	is	for	the	tale	to	affirm	the	possibility	of	such	reconciliation.	
	
Third,	as	the	main	character	slips	from	the	Spain	to	the	Persian	setting	of	the	Book	of	Ester	
and	(in	the	next	scene)	from	Persia	to	the	Babylonian	setting	of	the	Book	of	Daniel,	the	
recurrence	of	a	narrative	of	encounters	between	the	minister	and	the	king	sets	up	an	
analogous	relation	between	these	traditional	references	R.	Nachman	weaves	together	in	his	
tale.	The	kings	die	and	are	replaced,	but	the	minister	never	dies.	He	is	the	recurring	
character	of	this	story.	What	becomes	clear	from	the	laconic	reports	of	the	kings’	death—
and	in	death’s	formal	function	within	the	narrative	time—is	that	the	king	marks	a	rather	
standard	historical	genealogy	of	royal	lineage.	“Death	[…]	constitutes	the	one	end	of	the	
divine	inclusion	of	history,”53	proposes	Schleicher,	recurrence	would	constitute	the	other.	
																																																								
53	Schleicher,	Intertextuality	in	the	Tales	of	Rabbi	Nahman	of	Bratslav	a	Close	Reading	of	Sippurey	Maasiyot,	
220.	
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The	kings’	death	and	the	minister’s	recurrence	mark	an	encounter	between	the	two	modes	
of	temporality	we	outlined	earlier;	progressive	history	and	historia	universal.		
	
As	the	tale	advances	towards	proving	the	minister	wrong,	towards	affirming	the	possibility	
of	reconciliation	between	the	Jew	and	his	surrounding	culture,	it	simultaneously	advances	
towards	its	own	end	and	the	impossibility	of	reconciling	these	two	temporal	modes.	Will	
the	death	of	the	last	(fourth)	king	mark	the	end	of	the	minister’s	existence	as	the	main	
character	of	an	historia	universal?	What	recurrence	will	be	possible	when	the	structural	
marker	of	recurrence—the	king—is	gone?	Does	a	kingless	country	introduce,	as	Borges	
feared,	“in	place	of	always	identical	forces,	a	continuous	augmentation”54	that	would	break	
open	the	perceived	continuity	of	Jewish	culture?		
	
The	narrative	breaks	between	one	king	and	another—introducing	epistemological	gaps	
between	them,	as	between	the	reader	and	the	logic	of	sovereignty	each	king	reveals—
repeatedly	stylize	the	minister’s	encounters	with	the	edge.	The	tale’s	reconciliation	of	its	
two	temporalities,	the	poetic	stylization	of	a	space	beyond	the	edge	of	monarchy,	would	
also	be	the	opening	of	a	narrative	space	into	which	the	minister	can	cross.									
	
[A	Dim	Rumor]	
There	is	a	certain	repetition	of	this	dynastic	framework	and	its	epistemological	gaps	in	
Borges’	story.	“David	Alexander	Glencairn	is	what	he’ll	be	called	in	my	historia	tonight,”55	
																																																								
54	Mondolfo,	"La	Contradiccion	De	Nietzsche."	
55	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	86.	I	leave	the	word	historia	to	emphasize	Dewey’s	choice	of	
words.	
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Dewey	introduces	the	judge	that	has	gone	missing.	“The	names	are	fitting,”	he	explains,	
“since	they	belonged	to	kings	who	ruled	with	an	iron	scepter.”56	This	string	of	names	lays	
out	Dewey’s	own	(rather	standard)	self-identified	genealogy:	Biblical,	Greco-Roman	and	
finally	British	history.	But	it	does	more.	It	lays	out	the	temporality	Dewey	will	represent	in	
this	tale.	David	Alexander	Glencairn,	who	bears	the	names	of	his	predecessors,	is	the	fourth	
and	final	of	this	dynasty.	His	death,	like	the	death	of	R.	Nachman’s	fourth	king,	will	mark	the	
final	event	of	the	narrative.	But	more	to	the	point,	Glencairn’s	death	marks	the	moment,	in	
which	the	full	force	of	the	recurring	story-history	comes	into	view.	For	now,	suffice	it	to	
note	the	diachronic	nature	of	this	historically	compounded	name	Dewey	is	in	search	of:	
David	Alexander	Glencairn.	
	
Dewey’s	search	will	ultimately	lead	to	his	encounter	with	an	“old	man	squatted	on	the	
threshold.”57	Like	the	encounter	between	the	king	and	the	minister,	this	encounter	too	
plays	out	in	the	opposition	between	progressive	history	and	historia	universal.	“This	old	
man	for	whom	the	present	was	hardly	a	dim	rumor,”58	Dewey	recounts	his	first	
impressions	of	the	man.	He	is	still	thinking	in	terms	of	historical	progression.	In	her	own	
reading	of	this	story,	Jenckes	notes	the	man	on	the	threshold	“occupies	a	marginal	position	
vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	society.”59	What	this	position	marks	is	precisely	the	point—or	rather	
the	moment—of	encounter	between	these	two	temporalities.	However,	whereas	R.	
Nachman’s	reader	is	taken	through	a	series	of	encounters	that	ostensibly	form	the	process	
																																																								
56	Ibid.	
57	Ibid.,	87.	
58	Ibid.	
59	Kate	Jenckes,	"Borges	before	the	Law,"	in	Thinking	with	Borges,	ed.	William	Egginton	and	David	E.	Johnson	
(Aurora,	Colo.:	Davies	Group	Publishers,	2009),	149.	
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of	carving	out	these	two	temporalities,	Borges’	reader	is	led	to	the	single	and	climactic	
moment	of	their	full	opposition.		
	
The	minister	undergoes	a	process	of	recognizing	the	erroneous	assumption	at	the	base	of	
his	fear	of	anarchy,	which	is	finalized	only	with	the	death	of	the	fourth	king.	In	the	narrative	
recurrence	that	the	old	man	spins	for	Dewey,	this	possibility	is	already	reconciled	in	the	
disappearance	of	a	previous	judge.	The	old	man	will	tell	Dewey	a	story	from	his	childhood	
about	a	colonial	judge	gone	missing.	This	judge’s	arrival	was	a	cheerful	event	for	the	people	
of	the	town,	“for	they	felt	that	law	was	better	than	disorder.”60	Very	quickly,	however,	they	
change	their	minds,	admitting	that	“his	kinship	with	all	evil	judges	the	world	over	was	too	
obvious.”61	The	kidnapping	of	the	first	judge	marks	the	moment,	in	which	“thousands	of	
Sikhs	and	Muslims”62	overcome	not	merely	their	fear	of	lawlessness,	but	the	dichotomy	
between	law	and	disorder	that	has	structured	their	perception	of	the	“central	government.”	
In	this	overcoming,	they	also	overcome	whatever	strife	Dewey	had	perceived	as	proper	to	
their	religion.	Dewey’s	perception,	Balderston	notes,	is	stylized	by	his	repeated	designation	
of	the	limits	of	his	own	local	knowledge	as	“Muslim.”63	The	townspeople	take	public	action	
against	the	judge	and	“avenge	themselves	for	the	false	hopes	they	had	once	placed	in	
him.”64		
	
																																																								
60	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	88.	
61	Ibid.	
62	Ibid.	
63	See:	Balderston,	Out	of	Context:	Historical	Reference	and	the	Representation	of	Reality	in	Borges,	98-114.	
64	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	88.	
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We	have	now	reached	the	heart	of	the	concentric	frame	tales	of	Borges’	story.	Let	us	take	a	
moment	to	note	them,	before	discussing	the	manner	in	which	the	narrative	moves	in	and	
out	of	these	frames.	The	first	frame	is	that	in	which	Borges	narrates	an	encounter	with	his	
British	friend	Dewey	in	1952	Buenos	Aires.	Within	this	encounter	Dewey	tells	a	story	of	his	
interwar	service	in	India,	in	which	he	meets	the	old	man	on	the	threshold.	This	old	man,	in	
turn,	tells	Dewey	a	tale	of	his	own	childhood,	which	dates	to	the	1857	Indian	Uprising.	The	
narrative	progression	backwards	from	1952	to	1857	sets	up	the	chain	of	historical	
moments	that	the	end	of	the	story	will	pull	into	an	analogous	identity.	
	
R.	Nachman’s	tale	has	managed	to	spin	the	historia	universal	from	Babylon,	via	Persia	and	
Spain,	up	to	the	Pale	of	Settlement	in	1807	(the	year	he	told	the	tale)	in	an	attempt	to	
reconcile	the	possibility	of	a	country	with	no	king.	The	chronology	of	Borges’	story	begins	
with	this	very	reconciliation	as	the	townspeople	of	the	old	man’s	story	“executed—
incredulous—what	to	each	of	them	had	seemed	impossible.”65	This	reconciliation	will	echo,	
analogously,	in	Dewey’s	tale	of	his	time	in	India.	The	old	man’s	story	turns	out	to	be,	
simultaneously,	that	of	Glencairn’s	fate.	The	present	is	indeed	“a	dim	rumor”	to	the	old	man,	
but	this	turns	out	to	be	further	indication	of	his	multiple	ties	to	it,	and	of	the	incomparable	
temporal	breadth	within	which	he	operates.	With	his	story	he	has	in	fact	delayed	Dewey	at	
the	threshold	of	the	very	point	and	time—courtyard	and	moment—in	which	Glencairn’s	
trial	was	playing	out.	Only	after	the	story	is	told	will	Dewey	realize	it	was	the	story	of	his	
own	missing	judge,	and	the	interwar	Indian	Independence	movement	as	well.	Only	when	
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he	sees	the	naked	madman	crowned	with	flowers,	bloody	sward	in	hand,	will	the	threshold	
turn	out	to	be	that	of	an	altogether	different	temporality.	
	
This	Arabian-Nights-style	narrative	delay	will	prove	to	be	far	more	than	a	ploy	to	buy	time.	
The	old	man’s	tale	ends	simultaneously	with	the	end	of	Glencairn’s	trial.	“Having	said	this,	
he	got	up,”66	Dewey	reports	the	abruptness	with	which	the	old	man	finishes	his	tale.	
Dewey’s	tale	ends	one	paragraph	later	with	the	discovery	of	Glencairn’s	body,	and	with	
similar	abruptness.	The	final	lines	are	Dewey’s	first	person	account:		
At	the	heart	of	the	innermost	courtyard	I	came	upon	a	naked	man,	crowned	
with	yellow	flowers,	whom	everyone	kissed	and	caressed,	with	a	sword	in	his	
hand.	The	sword	was	stained,	as	it	had	dealt	Glencairn	his	death.	I	found	his	
mutilated	body	in	the	stables	out	back.67			
The	1952	frame	tale	seems	not	to	return	after	the	discovery	of	Glencairn’s	body	by	Dewey.	
Where	might	we	say	Borges’	own	frame	comes	to	an	end?		
	
Recall	Borges’	explanation	of	the	third	fundamental	mode	of	eternal	recurrence.	It	involves	
“two	curious	ideas.	The	first:	to	negate	the	reality	of	the	past	and	of	the	future	[…]	The	
second:	to	negate,	like	Ecclesiastes,	any	innovation.”68	The	full	confrontation	with	the	
temporality	of	historia	universal	is	not	Dewey’s.	It	is	the	reader’s.	And	the	confrontation	
that	Borges	has	structured,	involves	precisely	this	double	negation.	The	tale	will	not	
proceed	into	a	future.	Nor	will	the	force	of	analogous	identity	allow	the	narrative	refraction	
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68	Borges,	"Tres	Formas	Del	Eterno	Regreso."	
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that	would	demarcate	a	past.	And,	the	negation	of	any	innovation	is	the	negation	of	any	
possibility	of	further	narration.	In	that	sense,	Borges’	frame	cannot	have	an	end,	since	it	is	
not	a	moment	along	a	sequence	of	chronology	but	of	analogy.	The	poetics	of	intransitivity,	
with	which	the	ending	is	inflected,	is	resolved	by	the	transition	from	chronology	to	analogy.	
Furthermore,	while	Borges	is	calling	this	a	“negation,”	it	is	in	fact	a	mode	of	recurrence	full	
of	affirmation.	Recurrence,	in	this	sense,	is	not	the	description	of	a	limiting	present	(or	“a	
dim	rumor,”	as	Dewey	calls	it)	that	strips	its	subjects	of	agency.	It	is	rather	the	maxim	of	
agency	for	those	who,	by	way	of	analogy,	transgress	the	threshold	into	the	margin.				
	
Both	stories	have	constructed	a	narrative	temporality	that	also	creates	a	group.	While	R.	
Nachman’s	kings	or	the	British	central	government	may	think	universality	in	terms	of	a	
commonality	that	“all”	share,	the	minister	and	the	man	on	the	threshold	remind	us	that	any	
such	“all”	is	still	always	an	“all	within	a	particular	group.”	And,	in	both	stories,	this	
particular	group	is	one	to	which	the	king	and	the	British	colonial	official	have	no	access.	On	
this	point,	I	will	suggest,	R.	Nachman’s	story	charts	the	creation	of	those	non-spatial	
delimitations,	within	which	Borges’	story	attempts	to	identify	a	threshold.	If,	however,	
considering	the	question	“whose	historia	is	it?”	will	in	fact	suggest	such	delimitations,	it	will,	
inevitably,	equally	suggest	the	obverse	question,	“whose	historia	is	it	not?”			
	
The	Appearance	of	a	Secret	
[Scene	1]	
Let’s	return	to	R.	Nachman’s	tale,	in	which	the	expulsion	has	structured	the	inherent	
tension	between	the	“all”	and	“all	within”	in	the	kingdoms’	newly	conceived	commonality.	
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The	final	lines	of	the	exposition	describe	the	appearance	of	a	new	group,	the	anusim:	“And	
some	were	concerned	for	their	possessions	and	remained	as	anusim.	In	tsina’	they	
practiced	Jewish	religion	and	in	public	they	were	not	allowed.	Then	the	king	died.”69	
	
The	end	of	the	exposition	is	marked	by	the	death	of	the	first	king.	It	has	laid	out	the	
narrative	world	within	which	the	tale	unfolds,	and	has	marked	R.	Nachman’s	interest	in	
Jewish	existence	within	a	non-Jewish	world.	What	seems	timely	to	R.	Nachman	about	this	
narrative	world	is	its	strong	commitment	to	social	homogeneity.	In	his	own	times	this	idea	
had	been	called	social	“equality”	by	French	revolutionaries	and	legislated	as	a	dress	code	in	
the	Statute	of	1804.	At	any	rate,	this	tale	investigates	the	relation	of	one	Jew	to	such	an	idea,	
at	a	moment	in	which	the	very	terms	that	function	as	social	borders	are	shifting	their	
meaning.		
	
The	creation	of	a	homogeneous	“public”70	by	the	king	has	lead	to	the	creation	of	two	sets	of	
oppositions,	both	of	which	revolve	around	the	possible	meaning	of	the	word	tsina’—the	
word	R.	Nachman	opposes	to	“public.”	One	possible	meaning	of	the	word	tsina’	would	
suggest	the	tension	proper	to	the	lives	of	the	marranos	is	between	“public”	and	“private.”	
Another	meaning	of	the	word	would	suggest	the	tension	is	rather	between	“public”	and	
“secret.”	The	narrative	will	proceed	along	an	attempt	to	structure	the	relation	between	
these	sets	of	oppositions:	(1)	public	vs.	private,	(2)	public	vs.	secret.		
																																																								
69	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	20b.		
70	The	word	I	translate	as	“public”	is	parrhesia.	A	Greek	word	meaning	free-speech	which	comes	to	represent	
the	space	that	is	open	to	everyone.	It	has	a	long	Talmudic	history	in	which	it	denotes	the	same,	“public.”	For	
more	on	this	term,	see:	Mordechai	Arad,	Mehalel	Shabat	Be-Farhesya:	Munah	Talmudi	U-Mashma`Uto	Ha-
Historit	(New	York;	Yerushalayim:	Jewish	Theological	Seminary,	2009).		
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The	first	king	has	inadvertently,	perhaps	unknowingly,	created	a	tension	between	these	
two	sets	of	dichotomies.	He	has	excluded	from	“the	public”	both	the	private	and	the	secret.	
For	the	purposes	of	the	exposition,	they	are	one	and	the	same;	not-public.	I	propose	to	read	
the	minister’s	interaction	with	the	various	kings	as	an	investigation	of	these	dichotomies,	
through	which	R.	Nachman’s	tale	will	attempt	to	answer	the	question:	which	of	these	is	the	
tension	proper	to	the	lives	of	Jews	in	an	homogeneous	public?		
	
[Scene	2]	
The	second	king	is	a	stern	ruler	and	a	plot	forms	against	him	in	the	court.	The	minister	
hears	of	it.	He	then	decides	to	inform	the	king	of	the	conspirators	plot	“without	their	
knowledge,”71	and	it	is	foiled.	The	secret	plot	is	reported	in	secret	to	the	king.	But	is	this	
secret	of	the	same	order	as	the	minister’s	Judaism?	The	second	king	has	just	learned	a	
lesson	is	secrecy,	for	the	plot	was	indeed	secret,	yet	by	no	means	a	private	affair.		
	
“What	honor	can	I	give	you	for	saving	me?”	the	king	asks,	“say	what	privilege	you	would	
like	and	I	will	provide	it.”72	The	king	is	about	to	learn	a	further	lesson,	this	time	in	privacy.	
In	return	for	publicizing	the	secret,	the	minister	will	now	wish	to	publicize	the	private.	“The	
principle	of	my	privilege”	replies	the	minister,	“is	that	I	may	be	allowed	to	be	a	Jew	in	
public.”73	The	king	is	displeased	with	the	minister’s	wish,	yet	he	is	obligated	to	grant	it.	The	
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72	Ibid.	
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next	day	the	minister	goes	out	in	public	wearing	his	talit	and	tefilin,74	the	symbols	of	his	
Jewish	faith.	Then	the	king	dies.		
	
The	kings’	death	has	a	formal	function	in	this	tale.	It	demarcates	the	shifting	relations	of	
private	and	secret.	If	for	the	first	king	“private”	and	“secret”	are	indistinguishable,	and	both	
opposed	to	“public,”	for	the	second	king	they	become	mutually	exclusive.	On	the	one	hand,	
the	plot	to	kill	the	king	was	secret	but	not	private.	On	the	other	hand,	while	the	minister’s	
religion	is	no	longer	a	secret,	it	is	not	public	in	the	sense	that	it	is	not	part	of	the	
homogenizing	efforts	of	the	king.	The	second	king’s	rule,	then,	sets	up	the	tension	between	
these	elements,	not	as	they	relate	to	the	public,	but	as	they	relate	to	each	other.		
			
[Scene	3]	
The	third	king	was	very	wise,	tells	R.	Nachman.	Fearing	the	kind	of	plots	his	father	had	
survived,	he	summons	the	astrologers	and	bids	they	predict	what	he	must	guard	himself	
against,	so	that	his	royal	line	not	be	extinguished.	The	astrologers	tell	him	“his	seed	will	not	
be	felled,	just	that	he	should	be	guarded	from	ox	and	lamb.”75	The	king	has	this	chronicled	
in	the	royal	archives	(R.	Nachman	uses	the	precise	term	from	the	book	of	Ester,	Sefer	
HaZichronot)	and	dies.	This	third	scene	is	the	shortest	and	least	detailed	of	the	four.	Its	
function	in	the	narrative	flow	is	to	insert	the	riddle	of	ox	and	lamb.	These	remain,	as	
Wiskind-Elper	points	out,	“symbols	whose	meaning	is	left	hermetically	sealed.”76			
	
																																																								
74	Prayer	shawl	and	phylacteries.	
75	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	21b.	
76	Wiskind-Elper,	Tradition	and	Fantasy	in	the	Tales	of	Reb	Nahman	of	Bratslav,	156.	
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This	is	indeed	a	runic	warning.	It	revolves	around	another	ambiguous	wording:	to	“be	
guarded	from”	could	mean	that	the	king	must	guard	himself	against	these	enigmatic	ox	and	
lamb,	or	it	could	mean	that	the	king	will	be	guarded	by	these	ox	and	lamb.	The	king	walks	
on	a	razor’s	edge,	as	the	future	of	his	dynasty	depends	on	this	riddle.	A	riddle,	in	fact,	that	
secrecy	and	privacy	will	compete	to	resolve.	Will	the	ox	and	lamb	guard	him	from	demise	
or	must	he	guard	against	them	to	prevent	his	demise?	Will	the	successful	resolution	of	this	
riddle	ensure	the	king’s	survival,	or	bring	about	his	ultimate	extinction?				
	
[Scene	4,	part	1]	
This	fourth	and	final	scene	can	be	divided	into	two	sections.	In	the	first,	believing	he	has	
understood	the	riddle,	the	fourth	king	decrees	that	there	be	no	ox	or	lamb	anywhere	in	his	
country.	“He	therefore	has	no	fear	of	anything,”77	relates	R.	Nachman.	This	will	prove	to	be	
an	ironic	statement,	since	in	the	second	part	the	king’s	erroneous	resolution	of	the	riddle	
will	bring	his	dynasty,	and	the	tale,	to	an	end.	Before	doing	so,	however,	the	first	part	of	this	
scene	will	proceed	to	investigate	the	relation	of	“the	public”	to	the	idea	of	social	
homogeneity.	Previously	we	have	analyzed	this	tale	in	terms	of	a	historia.	We	come	now	to	
investigate	the	limits	of	the	“universal,”	to	which	such	a	historia	may	be	ascribed.			
	
“And	he	became	a	great	wise	man	and	encountered	an	art	by	which	to	conquer	the	entire	
world	without	war.”78	Could	there	be	a	greater	expansion	of	“the	public,”	a	larger	totality	
than	“the	entire	world?”	How	then	is	such	a	feat	achieved?		
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For	there	are	seven	parts	to	the	world,	and	seven	planets,	each	of	which	
shines	on	one	part	of	the	seven	parts	of	the	world,	and	there	are	seven	types	
of	metals,	for	each	of	the	seven	planets	shines	with	a	different	type	of	metal.79		
R.	Nachman’s	knowledge	of	astrology	is	beside	the	point	here.	What	is	more	pertinent	is	the	
fourth	king’s	recognition	of	the	cosmogony	heterogeneity	of	the	universe.	And	the	art	(or	
technology)	by	which	the	world	is	conquered	without	war	is	entirely	dependent	on	this	
recognition.	
	
The	king	constructs	an	idol	of	a	man	whose	organs	are	comprised	of	the	seven	metals	that	
represent	the	seven	planets.	As	mentioned	earlier,	this	image	alludes	to	Nebuchadnezzar’s	
dream	in	the	Book	of	Daniel.	Yet	in	Daniel’s	interpretation	this	image	represents	the	
fleeting	rulership	of	Nebuchadnezzar’s	Babylon,	one	of	four	kingdoms	to	be	succeeded	
before		
the	God	of	heaven	[shall]	set	up	a	kingdom,	which	shall	never	be	destroyed;	
nor	shall	the	kingdom	be	left	to	another	people;	it	shall	break	in	pieces	and	
consume	all	[other]	kingdoms,	but	it	shall	stand	forever.	(Daniel	2:42)		
A	kingdom	that	breaks	apart	into	pieces,	and	yet	consumes	all	other	kingdoms	and	stands	
forever	is	the	very	opposite	of	our	fourth	king,	whose	attempt	to	solidify	the	world	into	a	
single	kingdom	will	not	prevent	his	ultimate	demise.	
	
How	then	does	this	idol	function	as	a	technology	for	peaceful	world	domination?	The	
various	metals	offer	advice	by	glowing	or	not	glowing	in	reaction	to	the	king’s	questions.80	
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Each	metal	can	only	offer	advice	regarding	the	part	of	the	world	it	corresponds	to.	If	the	
construction	of	the	idol	is	an	attempt	to	represent	cosmogonic	heterogeneity	in	the	totality	
of	a	single	man’s	image,	its	functioning	entails	the	attempt	to	solidify	the	variety	of	human	
knowledge	in	a	single	consciousness.	Unlike	the	first	king’s	attempt	to	dominate	through	
imposing	public	homogeneity,	with	this	new	technology	the	fourth	king	will	attempt	to	
dominate	the	world	through	recognition	of	its	heterogeneity.	The	first	king’s	perceived	
overlap	of	totality	and	homogeneity	is	undone	by	the	fourth	king.	But	which	of	these,	then,	
is	the	“public”	to	be	associated	with?	Is	it	the	infeasible	homogeneity	of	a	single	country’s	
population,	or	the	equally	impossible	totalizing	of	a	heterogeneous	universe?	
	
To	further	complicate	the	plot,	R.	Nachman	explains	the	mechanism	of	the	idol’s	
functioning.	“And	that	idol	of	a	man	was	not	capable	of	all	this	except	on	condition	that	the	
king	would	humble	the	lofty	and	exalt	the	lowly.”81	It	may	be	a	stretch	to	call	the	idol	
“technology”	and	its	functional	mechanism	“social	revolution.”	However,	the	demand	to	
reshuffle	social	hierarchies	and	classes	as	a	condition	of	possibility	for	the	impossible	
totalizing	of	the	world’s	heterogeneity	will	finally	present	itself	to	the	fourth	king.	It	will	
take	the	form	of	a	demand	to	resolve	the	locus	of	tension	between	the	mutually	exclusive	
“private”	and	“secret”	on	the	one	hand	and,	on	the	other,	the	“public”	he	is	so	concerned	
with	expanding.	
	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
80	This	also	alludes	to	the	Urim	and	Tummim,	the	semi-precious	stones	that	adorn	the	high	priest’s	breastplate	
in	the	Bible,	and	which	glow	in	oracular	response	to	Moses’	questions	(according	to	Talmudic	legend).		
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To	maintain	the	idol’s	functional	mechanism,	the	king	begins	to	strip	his	ministers	and	
generals	of	their	titles.	“What	is	your	privilege?”82	he	asks	the	minister.	“That	I	may	be	
allowed	to	be	a	Jew	in	public.”83	In	order	to	satisfy	the	idol’s	functional	mechanism,	the	king	
must	reverse	the	minister’s	privilege.	But	what	is	the	reverse	of	the	minister’s	public	
privilege?	What	must	the	king	take	away	in	order	to	humble	the	minister,	in	order	for	the	
mechanism	of	his	own	totalizing	efforts	to	continue	to	function?	Which	is	its	opposite,	of	
which	the	king	must	rid	the	world’s	heterogeneity	in	order	to	achieve	totality:	privacy	or	
secrecy?			
	
We	may	imagine	two	possibilities.	First,	in	an	attempt	to	reverse	the	minister’s	public	
privilege	as	a	Jew,	the	king	abolishes	the	secrecy	of	Judaism,	whereby	the	minister	is	
swallowed	up	in	the	heterogeneity	of	the	public—a	heterogeneity	that	includes	“public	
Jews”	among	many	other	groups.	Or,	second,	in	an	attempt	to	reverse	the	minister’s	public	
privilege	as	a	Jew,	the	king	reduces	him	to	the	secrecy	of	his	previous	life	as	a	marrano.	If	
under	the	second	king	the	minister’s	secret	was	released	from	its	private	realm,	the	fourth	
king	would	thus	reduce	his	privacy	to	a	secret.	The	king	chooses	the	latter	and	the	minister	
“once	again	became	a	marrano.”84	This	will	prove	to	be	a	mistake.	The	former,	in	fact,	
would	have	saved	the	king’s	lineage	from	doom.	The	forth	king	chooses	to	oppose	“public”	
to	“private.”	But	establishing	this	opposition	of	public	and	private	is,	at	the	same	time,	the	
establishing	of	“the	secret”	as	that	which	temporarily	brings	to	a	halt	the	totalizing	project,	
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that	which	interferes	in	the	tense	complementarity	of	public	and	private,	disrupting	their	
definitions	of	the	limits	of	inclusion	and	exclusion.		
	
At	the	Secret’s	Threshold	
	
In	1804	Russian	Tsar	Alexander	I	adopted	the	Statute	Concerning	the	Organization	of	
Jews.85	This	document	aimed	to	regulate	the	Jewish	community	of	the	Pale	of	Settlement	by	
mandating	(among	other	things)	a	“secular”	curriculum	in	Jewish	schools	and	the	forced	
urbanization	of	many	Jewish	communities.	For	the	Jewish	community	this	Imperial	
imposition	was	seen	as	a	gzerat	shmad—a	decree	of	conversion,	as	in	the	Hebrew	title	of	
this	very	same	tale	by	R.	Nachman.86	The	mandates	presented	in	the	Statute	forced	Jewish	
leaders	to	confront	extent	notions	of	the	limits	of	Judaism—geographic,	social	and	religious.	
In	his	response	to	this	decree,	R.	Nachman	develops	a	politics	of	secrecy.	In	poetic	terms,	
this	is	the	production	of	an	epistemological	gap,	the	representation	of	a	space	beyond	the	
limit.	In	narrative	terms,	the	tale	we	are	reading	is	structured	around	a	series	of	such	gaps	
that	are	nonetheless	traversed	by	the	narrative.	The	secret	is	what	circulates	at	precisely	
the	outer	limits	of	inclusion,	as	it	demarcates	the	possibility	of	a	margin	within	which	the	
minister	will	find	himself.		
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86	The	Hebrew	title	reads:	Ma’aseh	mi-Melech	she-Gazar	Shmad	–	a	tale	of	a	king	who	decreed	shmad	(i.e.	
conversion).			
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This	terrible	decree	was	the	result	of	people	putting	their	trust	in	rabbis	that	are	not	fit	to	
lead,	rabbis	who	“have	a	great	evil	inclination	to	rule	the	world,”87	R.	Nachman	begins	his	
comments	on	the	Statute	of	1804.	In	his	criticism,	R.	Nachman	focuses	on	the	linguistic	
education	mandated	by	the	Statute.	When	we	trust	in	unfit	rabbis,	he	comments,	“the	script	
of	our	hand	is	weakened,	and	we	give	force	to	their	writing,	and	all	sentences	must	be	by	
[the	Empire’s]	writing,	as	‘ordinances	they	have	not	known.’”88	“Ordinances”	(Mishpatim),	
could	mean	both	grammatical	sentences	and	judicial	decrees.	This	pun	exists	in	the	
previous	part	of	the	quote	as	well,	where	R.	Nachman	plays	with	the	meaning	of	the	
Hebrew	word	Mishpat,	which	means	sentence	both	in	a	grammatical	sense	and	a	judicial	
sense.	The	clash	of	sentences,	he	suggests,	is	both	judicial	and	narrative.	It	is	crucial	to	
insist	upon	our	own	sentences,	as	writings	and	as	ordinances.	For	the	Empire’s	ordinances,	
he	continues,	lead	to	the	deportation	and	relocation	of	Jews	from	their	settlements.		
	
The	result	of	bad	leadership	is	not	merely	these	decrees,	R.	Nachman	explains.	More	
fundamentally,	it	is	that	“our”	wisdom	is	taken	from	us	and	delivered	to	“them.”	This	occurs	
because	unfit	leaders	do	not	know	how	to	balance	between	the	public	and	the	secret	
aspects	of	Jewish	existence.	“It	makes	sense	that	the	secret	[of	our	wisdom]	remain	with	
us,”89	he	states.	And	yet,	we	must	reveal	to	“them”	our	wisdom.	That	also	makes	sense.	“For	
this	is	your	wisdom	and	understanding	in	the	eyes	of	the	nations”	(Deut.	4:6),	quotes	R.	
Nachman.	The	wisdom	is	to	reveal	to	“their	eyes”	the	existence	of	the	secret,	and	yet	not	to	
																																																								
87	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	61:2.	
88	Ibid.	Rabbi	Nachman	quotes	here	from	Proverbs	149:20.	Another	pun	exists	in	the	Hebrew	plural	form	of	
Ketav,	which	means	both	script	and	writings.	
89	Ibid.	What	Rabbi	Nachman	identifies	as	the	secret	of	Jewish	wisdom	is	the	knowledge	of	astrology.	We	will	
return	to	this	in	the	second	part	of	the	forth	king’s	scene.	
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give	away	the	secret	itself.	“Only	so	that	they	will	know	that	we	have	the	secret,”90	he	
explains.		
	
Quoting	Proverbs	11:13,	R.	Nachman	turns	this	peculiar	esotericism	into	a	rule	of	thumb	
for	identifying	the	right	leadership.	“He	that	goeth	about	as	a	talebearer	revealeth	secrets,	
but	he	that	is	of	a	faithful	spirit	concealeth	a	matter.”	One	who	is	not	trustworthy	will	
reveal	secrets,	which	is	tantamount	to	canceling	the	script	of	our	hand.	But	the	wise	man,	
the	right	leader,	will	obviously	“concealeth	a	matter.”	A	rabbi	that	promises	to	reveal	
secrets	is	not	to	be	trusted	for	he	will	surely	deliver	“our”	sentence	into	“their”	hands.	Nor	
is	one	who	claims	there	is	no	secret,	for	wisdom	is	always	only	“in	the	eyes	of	the	nations.”	
There	must	be	a	concealment,	and	it	must	be	obvious.	There	is	a	delicate	balance	between	
revealing	and	concealing,	through	which	the	right	leadership	will	always	maintain—
perhaps	delay—the	Empire’s	representatives	at	the	threshold	of	the	secret.	No	closer,	but	
no	farther	either.	
	
[The	Other	Plot]	
Speaking	of	the	theme	of	conspiracy	in	Argentine	literature,	Ricardo	Piglia	suggests	“it	is	
around	the	[idea	of	a]	complot	that	[the	major	Argentine	writes]	establish	their	notion	of	
fiction.	Their	texts	narrate	the	construction	of	a	complot	and,	by	telling	us	how	a	complot	is	
constructed,	they	narrate	how	a	fiction	is	constructed.”91	Indeed	the	man	on	the	threshold	
is	precisely	such	a	liminal	figure,	marking	the	tenuous	overlap	in	the	mechanics	of	plot	and	
complot.	From	his	position	in	the	center	of	imperial	authority,	Dewey	will	encounter	this	
																																																								
90	Ibid.,	61:3.	
91	Ricardo		Piglia,	"Teoría	Del	Complot,"	Ramona:	revista	de	artes	visuales	23	(2002):	4.	
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threshold.	He	will	move	from	the	plot	of	the	tale,	the	imperial	bureaucrat	wandering	the	in	
search	of	a	judge	(another	center	of	authority),	to	the	plot	that	accompanies	it,	that	is,	the	
complot	of	the	old	man’s	tale.	
	
This	will	by	no	means	relocate	Dewey	from	his	office	at	“the	central	government”	to	rural	
Oudh	or	Amritsar.	It	is	not	a	geographical	relocation	we	are	tracking	in	these	tales.	What	
will	come	into	view	is	Dewey’s	position	vis-à-vis	the	borders	that	demarcate	an	edge,	and	
the	opening	of	space	beyond.	The	distribution	of	the	secret	will	bring	this	into	view.	Upon	
arriving	in	the	town	Dewey	reports:		
I	felt,	almost	at	once,	the	invisible	presence	of	a	conspiracy	to	keep	
Glencairn’s	fate	hidden.	There’s	not	a	soul	in	this	city	(I	suspected)	who	is	not	
in	on	the	secret	and	who	is	not	sworn	to	keep	it.92	
There	is	one	soul	in	the	city	who	is	not	“in	on	it,”	and	that	is	Dewey.	The	public	secret,	
“what	I	alone	do	not	know,”	is	translated	by	Dewey	into	a	complot.	“The	idea	of	a	complot,”	
continues	Piglia,	“is	the	mode	through	which	the	isolated	subject	can	think	the	political	[as	
he]	reads	daily	the	cipher	of	a	destiny	he	will	never	comprehend.”93	As	it	will	turn	out,	
Dewey	was	wrong.	It	is	not	Glencairn’s	fate	that	will	be	kept	hidden.	In	fact,	Dewey	will	
receive	written	invitation	to	the	address	where	he	will	find	the	old	man	squatting	on	the	
threshold,	who	will	do	his	best	to	lay	out	the	conditions	for	a	possible	moment	of	
comprehension.	Glencairn’s	body,	Glencairn’s	destiny,	and	perhaps	Dewey’s	own	as	well,	
will	all	come	into	view	in	the	final	lines	of	the	narrative.				
	
																																																								
92	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	86.	
93	Piglia,	"Teoría	Del	Complot,"	5.	
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“One	afternoon	I	was	handed	an	envelope	containing	a	slip	of	paper	on	which	there	was	an	
address,”94	Dewey	recalls.	This	address	will	lead	him	to	the	old	man	squatted	on	the	
threshold.	But	what	would	crossing	the	threshold	mean	for	Dewey?	What	passage	is	the	old	
man	keeping?	Dewy	does	not	in	fact	cross	the	threshold—at	least	in	the	non-geographical	
sense.	For	Dewey,	looking	over	the	threshold	from	without,	it	appears	that	what	is	revealed	
beyond	it	is	the	invisible	relation	of	plot	and	complot,	narrative	and	conspiracy.	At	that	
moment,	with	that	recognition,	the	tale	ends	and	the	dissimulation	is	complete.	Dewey	is	
not	“in	on	it.”	He	has	been	blinded	from	ever	seeing	“it.”		
	
The	encounter	with	the	threshold	of	the	secret	has	rendered	perceptible	the	invisibility	of	
the	complot	that	accompanies	the	plot.	But	this	is	merely,	as	Piglia	has	suggested,	“the	
mode	through	which	the	isolated	subject	thinks	the	political.”95	The	encounter	with	the	
threshold	has	reinforced	Dewey’s	isolation	as	an	individual	subject,	it	has	reiterated	for	
him	more	powerfully	his	mode	of	thinking	political	divisions.	It	has,	finally,	guaranteed	for	
him	the	utter	impenetrability	of	the	limit—epistemological	and	narrative—marked	by	the	
old	man.		
	
The	conspiracy,	it	turns	out,	ran	far	deeper	than	he	first	suspected.	The	complot	was	to	put	
up	the	façade	of	a	complot,	to	convince	Dewey	of	the	presence	of	a	secret.	And	thus,	to	
recast	his	position	as	the	isolated	center,	surrounded	on	all	sides	by	those	who	are	“in	on	
the	secret.”	This	peculiar	mode	of	secrecy	presents	two	questions.	First,	if	Dewey	is	the	only	
																																																								
94	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	87.	
95	Piglia,	"Teoría	Del	Complot,"	5.	
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one	that	doesn’t	know	the	secret,	in	what	sense	is	it	a	secret?	Second,	in	what	way	might	
the	circulation	of	this	knowledge	offer	an	answer	to	the	question:	whose	historia	is	this?		
	
Borges’	India	is	a	fine	pupil	of	R.	Nachman’s	politics	of	secrecy	on	several	counts.	At	first,	
Dewey	took	the	secret	to	be	“what	I	alone	know.”	This	is	how	he	first	heard	of	the	matter.	
“These	things	were	related	to	me	by	my	superior,	for	the	censorship	was	strict	and	the	
newspapers	made	no	comment	on	[…]	Glencairn’s	disappearance.”96	He	was	brought	“in	on	
it”	by	his	superior.	He	alone	knows	what	the	public	does	not,	and	could	not	read	in	the	
papers—that	a	judge	has	gone	missing.	But	this	is	inverted	in	his	first	person	account,	as	
the	secret	becomes	for	him,	finally,	“what	I	alone	do	not	know.”	Dewey	comes	to	know	the	
secret	in	the	way	R.	Nachman	wants	“the	nations”	to	know	the	secret.		
	
Moreover,	the	overlap	of	plot	and	complot	is	where	the	secret	exists	as	political.	This	is	first	
prefigured	in	Dewey’s	description	of	the	old	man.	“His	many	years	had	worn	him	down	and	
polished	him	as	smooth	as	water	polishes	a	stone,	or	as	generations	of	men	polish	a	
sentence.”97	In	what	sense	do	generations	polish	a	sentence?	As	becomes	evident	from	the	
old	man’s	tale,	the	link	between	judicial	and	narrative	sentences	is	another	aspect	of	the	
politics	of	secrecy,	which	parse	the	threshold	between	the	old	man	and	Dewey.98	“The	
English	justice	he	administered	was	not	familiar	to	anyone,”99	the	old	man	tells	of	the	first	
judge.	The	politics	of	secrecy	was	meant	to	confront	the	demand	that	all	sentences	be	by	
																																																								
96	Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	86.	
97	Ibid.			
98	Jenckes	has	also	noted	this	double	meaning	of	“sentence,”	but	reads	it	rather	as	“both	the	grammatical	and	
judicial	sense.”	In	the	broader	setting	of	the	narrative	temporality	the	old	man	weaves,	I	suggest	the	stronger	
reference	is	to	the	way	generations	of	men	polish	the	tale	about	a	missing	judge.	In	this	sense	I	read	
“sentences”	rather	as	judicial	and	narrative.	See:	Jenckes,	"Borges	before	the	Law,"	148.	
99Borges,	The	Aleph	and	Other	Stories	1933-1969,	88.		
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the	Empire’s	writing.	It	does	so	by	producing	alternate	sentences,	once	again	linking	
judicial	and	narrative.		
	
The	sentence	Glencairn	(and	the	previous	judge)	hear	from	the	madman	and	the	sentences	
Dewey	hears	from	the	old	man	also	display	the	link	between	judicial	and	narrative.	The	
moment	Dewey	finds	Glencairn’s	body	is	the	moment	this	link	becomes	evident.	It	is	also	
the	moment	the	reader	recognizes	the	overlap	of	plot	and	complot.	Borges	and	the	man	on	
the	threshold	both	“narrate	the	construction	of	a	complot	and,	by	telling	us	how	a	complot	
is	constructed,	they	narrate	how	a	fiction	is	constructed.”100	Bringing	this	overlap	into	view,	
the	reader	too	perceives	the	secret	as	the	threshold	of	a	divide	that	is	both	political	and	
fictional.		
	
As	the	narrative	passes	from	the	old	man	to	Dewey,	from	Dewey	to	Borges	and	from	Borges	
to	his	readers,	it	lays	out	the	analogous	identity	of	the	characters	as	well	as	the	analogous	
identity	of	the	political	and	the	fictional.	This	leads	back	to	the	question:	in	what	way	might	
the	circulation	of	the	secret	offer	an	answer	to	the	question:	whose	historia	is	this?	Complot	
as	a	political	thought	is	transformed	into	complot	as	narrative	of	“the	common,”	of	defining	
the	outer	limits	of	inclusion.	It	is	not	a	secret	knowledge	but	a	knowledge	of	the	secret	that	
performs	this	operation.	In	the	final	scene	of	R.	Nachman’s	tale,	the	knowledge	of	a	secret	
will	be	the	ultimate	division	between	the	king	and	the	minister,	as	between	the	marranos	
and	the	public.	
	
																																																								
100	Piglia,	"Teoría	Del	Complot,"	4.	
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[Scene	4,	part	2]	
The	second	part	of	this	final	scene	begins	by	returning	to	the	riddle	of	the	ox	and	lamb.	
Once	the	king	went	to	sleep,	and	saw	in	a	dream	that	the	skies	were	clear,	
and	he	saw	all	twelve	sign	of	the	zodiac,	and	he	saw	that	the	ox	and	lamb	that	
are	among	the	sign	of	the	zodiac,	that	they	are	laughing	at	him,	and	he	woke	
in	great	anger	and	very	fearful,	and	he	commanded	to	bring	the	book	of	
chronicles	(the	Sefer	HaZichronot)	and	found	written	that	by	ox	and	lamb	will	
his	seed	be	felled,	and	a	great	fear	overcame	him.101					
The	fourth	scene	began	with	the	king’s	decree	that	there	be	no	ox	or	lamb	anywhere	in	his	
country,	and	therefore	having	no	fear	of	anything.	The	dream	marks	the	beginning	of	the	
second	part	of	this	scene,	in	which	the	king	is	entirely	motivated	by	his	fear.	And	this	fear	is	
once	again	brought	on	by	the	runic	ox	and	lamb.	
	
Let	us	recall	that	in	his	interpretation	of	the	ambiguous	meaning	of	the	astrologers’	
warning,	the	fourth	king	has	decided	to	guard	himself	against	the	secret	of	the	ox	and	lamb,	
rather	than	believe	the	secret	would	itself	guard	him.	This	fear	of	the	secret	is	compounded	
by	his	recognition	of	the	complementarity	of	public	and	private	at	the	exclusion	of	the	
secret,	which	is	how	we	interpreted	the	manner	in	which	he	stripped	the	minister	of	his	
privileges.	
	
																																																								
101	Braslav,	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	22a-22b.	Rabbi	Nachman	calls	the	zodiac	signs	“ox	and	lamb”	to	fit	with	the	
earlier	symbols,	but	he	refers	of	course	to	Taurus	and	Aries.	In	Hebrew,	“lamb”	(seh)	is	not	the	name	for	Aries.	
That	would	be	taleh.			
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The	king	summons	all	his	dream-interpreters	but	none	can	interpret	this	dream.	The	king	
is	transformed	by	his	fear	into	a	paranoid	conspiracy	theorist:	There	is	a	great	secret,	he	
believes,	to	which	he	has	no	access.	All	he	has	is	the	knowledge	of	its	existence	and	the	
terror	of	its	fateful	significance.	The	ox	and	lamb	are	(to	borrow	Piglia’s	words)	“the	cipher	
of	a	destiny	he	will	never	comprehend.”102	Then	the	wise	man	enters	the	scene.					
	
The	wise	man	finds	a	dramatically	altered	king.	He	is	no	longer	the	fearless	ruler,	bent	on	a	
totalizing	project.	He	no	longer	looks	out	over	his	kingdom	and	sees	the	vast	public	his	
great	grandfather	began	constructing,	and	which	he,	in	great	wisdom	has	perfected	without	
war.	He	is	now	a	fearful	and	obsessive	ruler,	who	can	no	longer	see	far	enough	to	recognize	
“the	public”	that	has	been	his	dynastic	project.	Though	he	does	not	recognize	the	
connection	between	“the	secret”	and	the	secret	Jews	of	his	kingdom	(nor	does	the	reader	at	
this	point),	the	politics	of	secrecy	have	nonetheless	taken	effect	and	begun	to	strain	his	
grasp	of	reality—inserting	everywhere,	in	place	of	the	narrative	plot,	the	possibility	of	its	
overlap	with	a	complot.		
	
As	suggested	earlier,	R.	Nachman’s	story	charts	the	creation	of	those	non-spatial	
delimitations,	within	which	Borges’	story	attempts	to	identify	a	threshold.	In	this	sense,	the	
analogous	identity	between	the	two	stories	remains	indeterminate.	The	figure	of	the	king	
(whose	permanent	exclusion	the	narrative	must	reconcile)	recurs	in	the	character	of	
Glencairn	but	passes	finally	(in	the	post-independence	1952	frame)	to	Dewey.	In	that	sense,	
in	the	minister’s	interactions	with	the	various	kings	we	get	a	glimpse	at	the	tension	proper	
																																																								
102	Piglia,	"Teoría	Del	Complot,"	5.	
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to	life	at	“the	edge,”	a	life	(and	a	group)	that	is	rather	transparent	in	Borges’	tale.	It	is	at	this	
moment,	when	the	king	is	more	like	Dewey	than	Glencairn—searching	for	an	
interpretation	to	his	dream,	an	answer	to	the	riddle,	and	finding	only	indications	of	its	
inaccessibility—at	this	moment	he	is	invited,	unknowingly,	to	the	threshold.	
	
The	wise	man	will	boast	an	impressive	knowledge	of	what	R.	Nachman	calls	“our	
wisdom,”103—astrology.	He	tells	the	king	“there	are	365	courses	of	the	sun,	and	there	is	a	
place,	which	all	365	courses	shine	upon,	and	there	grows	an	iron	rod,	and	he	who	has	fear,	
when	he	comes	to	that	rod	he	is	saved	from	fear.”104	The	wise	man	would	make	a	fine	
leader	according	to	R.	Nachman’s	criteria.	He	reveals	his	knowledge	of	astrology’s	secrets,	
without	revealing	the	secret	of	his	knowledge.	“It	is	a	tradition	from	my	father,”105	he	tells	
the	king	four	times.	The	king	is	invited	to	this	place	where	the	iron	rod	grows.	
	
As	it	turns	out,	our	fourth	king	is	not	the	only	one	who	seeks	the	iron	rod,	or	(we	might	
surmise)	to	be	saved	from	his	fear.	The	road	to	the	rod	leads	through	a	great	fire,	and	there	
are	many	kings	walking	this	path,	accompanied	by	Jews	wearing	their	talit	and	tefilin.	
These	kings	are	all	walking	through	the	fire	unharmed,	on	their	way	to	the	rod.	This,	the	
tale	explains,	“since	those	kings	had	Jews	living	in	their	countries,	therefore	they	were	able	
																																																								
103	Braslav,	Likkutei	Moharan,	1,	61:3.	
104	Sippurei	Maasiyot,	23a.	What	this	iron	rod	refers	to	is	not	clear.	Braslav	interpreters	see	it	as	an	allusion	to	
Psalms	2:9.	Arnold	Band	(and	Schleicher	follows	his	interpretation)	notes	the	double	meaning	of	the	Hebrew	
word	“shevet,”	which	means	both	“rod”	and	“tribe,”	and	suggests	it	is	an	allusion	to	the	Jews	themselves,	as	an	
“iron	tribe.”	There	is	a	didactic	redundancy	in	the	tale	according	to	this	moralistic	interpretation,	since	the	
kings	are	already	walking	with	the	Jews	of	their	kingdom	on	the	path	towards	the	rod.	For	our	reading,	in	
which	this	rod-tribe	is	the	marker	of	the	threshold,	perhaps	we	must	accept	the	inaccessibility	of	a	
significance	that	lies	beyond	it.			
105	Ibid.	
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to	walk	through	the	fire.”106	The	wise	man	himself	seems	unaware	of	this	explanation,	or	at	
least	unwilling	to	disclose	it.	He	refuses	to	walk	through	the	fire,	because	this	too	is	part	of	
the	tradition	from	his	father.					
	
The	fourth	scene	ends	rather	abruptly.	The	king	and	the	wise	man	have	a	disagreement.	
The	wise	man	doesn’t	want	to	walk	through	the	fire	but	the	king,	seeing	other	kings	
walking	though	it	unharmed,	wants	to	proceed	towards	the	iron	rod.	The	king	is	too	
controlled	by	fear,	too	intent	to	overcome	it,	to	listen	to	the	wise	man’s	warning.	The	wise	
man	ends	the	disagreement	by	saying,	“I	do	not	want	to	go,	if	you	want	to	go,	go	
[whereupon]	the	king	and	his	seed	went,	and	the	fire	came	over	them,	and	he	was	burned	
with	his	seed,	and	they	were	all	felled.”107	The	astrologers’	warning	comes	true.	Clearly	he	
was	not	guarded	from	ox	and	lamb	correctly.	But	what	happened?									
	
Afterword	
	
The	king’s	death	marks	the	end	of	the	narrative.	But	the	riddle	is	still	unsolved.	There	is	a	
short	afterword	in	which	the	minister	explains	the	riddle,	in	case	the	reader	has	not	yet	
made	the	connection	between	the	ox	and	lamb	and	the	Jews	of	the	kingdom.	“By	me	was	he	
felled,	[explains	the	minister]	for	the	astrologers	saw	and	did	not	know	what	they	saw.”108	
In	the	riddle	of	the	ox	and	lamb	is	a	secret	that	precedes	the	inversion	between	“what	I	
alone	know”	and	“what	I	alone	don’t	know.”	In	a	sense,	the	solution	to	the	riddle	involves	
																																																								
106	Ibid.	
107	Ibid.		
108	Ibid.		
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the	determination	of	these	two	possibilities	of	secrecy,	and	the	privileging	of	the	latter.	As	it	
turns	out,	the	solution	to	this	riddle	is	something	of	a	public	secret,	as	it	is	known	to	all	
Jews.	It	is	the	ox	from	which	tefilin	are	made	and	lamb	from	which	a	talit	is	made.	These	
ritual	items	would	have	guarded	the	king,	but	he	chose	to	guard	against	them.		
	
This	explanation	by	the	minister,	“by	me	was	he	felled,”	also	marks	his	recognition	of	his	
own	error	in	thinking	there	could	be	no	such	thing	as	a	kingless	country.	Not	only	does	he	
now	live	in	such	a	country,	but	he	himself	was	the	instrument	of	its	formation.	The	question	
is	in	what	way.	The	kings	that	were	saved	from	the	fire	“had	Jews	living	in	their	
countries,”109	the	minister	explains	further.	But	this	late	king	had	Jews	living	in	his	country	
too.	They	were	just	not	allowed	to	practice	(that	is,	wear	talit	and	tefilin)	in	public.		
	
We	can	now	suggest	that	within	R.	Nachman’s	tale,	and	its	attempt	to	narrate	the	minister’s	
crossing	of	the	edge	into	the	opening	of	a	margin,	the	great	fire	functions	like	the	threshold	
in	Borges’	narrative.	It	marks	the	passage	into	another	order	of	secrecy,	an	in-between	
space	in	relation	to	“the	public.”	The	formation	of	the	secret	as	the	disruption	of	the	
public/private	complementarity	indicates	a	limit	that	threatens	the	survival	of	rulership	
under	such	conditions.	
	
“On	the	one	hand,	then,	Borges	poses	the	simplicity	of	the	circle;	on	the	other,	the	
complexity	of	the	infinitesimal.	These	fascinating	yet	hazardous	figures	will	emerge	in	his	
fictional	narratives	where	they	produce	the	effect	of	a	frustrated	narrative	project	which	
																																																								
109	Ibid.		
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nevertheless	allows	the	narrator	(and	the	reader)	to	experience,	however	furtively,	the	
frontiers	of	reality	(or	unreality),	of	the	world,	and	of	the	text.”110	What	lies	beyond	this	
frontier,	across	this	threshold,	is	not	the	otherworldly,	unreal	implosion	of	the	text.	It	is	the	
existence	of	a	margin,	which	is	simultaneously	the	margin	of	any	text	and	of	any	world	that	
is	(self-)conceived	in	terms	of	a	“public.”	We	should	thus	not	understand	these	analogous	
narratives	as	attempting	a	radical	decentralization	of	the	public.	Rather,	reading	these	
narratives	as	part	of	a	historia	universal,	we	see	the	manner	in	which	aligning	the	secret	
with	the	margin	reaffirms	the	public.	The	secret	of	the	margin,	which	excludes	the	public,	
the	king,	the	totality	of	empire,	is	an	inverted	secret.	It	excludes	the	heart	of	the	totality.	
The	absent	center	(in	the	form	of	a	missing	judicial	authority,	a	kingless	country)	is	what	
Dewey	must	set	out	in	search	of,	and	what	the	minister	is	left	with.	
	
It	may	be	that	historia	universal	is	the	history	of	the	different	
intonations	given	a	handful	of	metaphors.		
(The	Fearful	Sphere	of	Pascal,	1951	–	closing	sentence111)	
	
	 	
																																																								
110	Selnes,	"Borges,	Nietzsche,	Cantor:	Narratives	of	Influence".	6.	
111	Borges,	Labyrinths:	Selected	Stories	&	Other	Writings,	184.	
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In	Conclusion:	
The	Question	of	Jewish	Writing	
	
In	concluding,	I	would	like	to	return	to	the	title	of	this	study,	and	ask	about	“the	question	of	
Jewish	writing.”	I	have	attempted	to	outline	a	question	about	“modern	writing”	that	cannot	
be	reduced	to	discourse	or	poetics,	tradition	or	its	edge,	but	is	about	the	confluence	of	all	of	
these.	A	question	about	writing	that	emerges	trough	the	simultaneous	grounding	in	and	
dissociation	from	a	“tradition.”	For	both	R.	Nachman	and	Borges,	tradition	is	the	name	of	a	
lack.	A	lack	that	is	coming	or	that	has	come,	a	lack	that	detaches	one	from	“history,”	or	that	
is	the	mark	of	such	a	detachment.		
	
R.	Nachman	and	Borges	both	articulate	tradition	as	a	lack	that	is	paradigmatic	of	the	in-
between	space	beyond	the	limits	of	their	social	and	poetic	worlds,	as	a	“margin”	that	is	
opened	up	through	trespassing	the	limits	of	tradition.	Saying	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	are	
marginal	doesn’t	speak	to	their	significance.	It	speaks	to	their	relation	to	the	category	of	
Literature.	They	both	push	the	question	of	margin	and	tradition:	Can	there	be	a	literature	
beyond	tradition,	in	the	margin	that	opens	through	encountering	tradition	as	a	lack?	What	
writing	is	possible	at	the	edge,	when	the	edge	is	one’s	point	of	departure?		
	
To	the	extent	that	Borges	attempted	the	impossible	departure	from	an	edge	into	an	in-
between	space	that	was	unimaginable	at	the	outset,	I	have	considered	his	texts	in	relation	
to	categories	of	“modern	writing.”	And	to	the	extent	that	R.	Nachman	identifies	the	
possibility	of	an	opening—to	be	narrated	in	writing—onto	a	“Borgesian	margin,”	we	should	
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keep	this	critical	configuration	in	mind	as	a	constitutive	component	of	“modern	writing”	in	
its	Jewish	context	too—and	not	as	its	exception	(as	many	readers	of	R.	Nachman	have	seen	
it).	R.	Nachman’s	writing	is	a	key	moment	in	articulating	the	contradictory	nature	of	those	
rules	and	exclusions	that	would	later	come	to	define	“modern	writing”	in	its	Jewish	context	
as	well.	His	writing	also	highlights	the	constitutive	role	of	writers	who	would,	in	
subsequent	generations,	come	to	define	this	category’s	outer	limits.	
	
I	have	insisted	on	the	inadequacy	of	terms	such	as	“forerunner”112	or	“colonial”113	in	
describing	R.	Nachman	and	Borges’	location	and	departure. Instead,	I	have	suggested	Said’s	
discussion	of	“beginnings”	(in	spite	of	Said	himself	citing	Borges	as	an	exception)	as	a	more	
productive	way	to	think	about	intransitive	locations	and	their	literary	departures.	In	this	
sense,	Borges	can	be	thought	as	the	(intransitive)	beginning	of	“modern	writing”	in	a	post-
colonial	Argentine	setting.114	And	R.	Nachman	can	be	thought	as	the	(intransitive)	
beginning	of	“modern	writing”	in	an	Eastern	European	Jewish	setting.	In	this	sense,	to	think	
of	Borges	and	R.	Nachman	as	marking	an	“attempt	to	depart”	is	to	insist	on	a	further	
theoretical	intervention:	The	fault	lines	of	the	break	from	tradition,	vis-à-vis	which	modern	
writing	has	been	conceptualized,	already	existed	poetically	and	discursively,	in	the	terms	of	
that	same	tradition,	at	the	point	of	departure,	from	which	“modern	writing”	was	launched.			
	
What	is	the	role	of	the	persistent	reference	to	“the	Judaic”	in	this	observation?	References	
to	the	Judaic	in	R.	Nachman	and	Borges,	as	well	as	in	their	readers’	efforts	to	grapple	with	
																																																								
112	Schwartz,	"Rabbi	Nachman	of	Bratslav:	Forerunner	of	Modern	Jewish	Literature."	
113	As	in:	Fernández	Retamar,	Calibán:	Apuntes	Sobre	La	Cultura	En	Nuestra	América.	
114	See	also:	Edna	Aizenberg,	"Borges,	Postcolonial	Precursor,"	World	Literature	Today	66,	no.	1	(1992).	
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the	question	of	“modern	writing,”	highlight	their	firm	grounding	within	traditional	familial	
and	literary	lines,	while	simultaneously	producing	a	dislocation	from	such	traditional	
affiliations.	That	is	to	say,	the	Judaic	allows	them	to	create	the	displacement	in	terms	of	
which	a	departure—even	if	unimaginable—can	be	attempted.	“The	Judaic”	enables	
something	entirely	heterogeneous	to	“Judaism.”	It	reverberates	in	the	writing	of	R.	
Nachman	and	Borges	as	a	question	about	the	very	viability	of	the	concepts	of	“the	modern	
writer”	and	“modern	writing,”	as	constituted	by	a	break	from	tradition.	What	such	
conceptualization	is	possible	when	the	break	is	already	present	within	the	tradition?	And	
when	“tradition”	is	itself	constituted	through	a	series	of	breaks?		
	
Insisting	nonetheless	upon	such	a	notion	of	“modern	writing”—as	do	many	of	the	readers	
cited	throughout	the	present	study—would	frame	the	constitution	of	such	a	category	as	an	
exception.	One	break	in	a	series	of	breaks,	taken	as	an	exception	to	the	others	and	framing	
the	rule	about	exceptions.	Conceiving	of	“modern	writing”	in	terms	of	a	single	break	in	a	
series	would	thus	be	to	insist	upon	the	exception	itself	as	the	rule.	R.	Nachman	and	Borges	
pose	a	question	about	the	relation	between	the	rules	of	“modern	writing”	and	its	
exceptions.	Within	a	concept	of	“modern	writing”	as	an	exceptional	break	from	a	series	of	
breaks,	how	are	we	to	understand	the	same	readers	I	have	been	citing,	framing	R.	Nachman	
and	Borges	as	the	exceptions	to	the	rule?	The	contradictory	answer	would	be:	The	
exception	to	an	exception	can	make	up	“the	rule”	as	much	as	the	break	from	a	break	can	
make	up	a	“tradition.”	The	present	study	has	sought	to	undermine	both	the	exception	and	
the	rule	it	presumes.	This	has	been	a	contradictory	endeavor,	perhaps,	but	no	more	so	than	
the	rule	and	exception	it	has	thus	questioned.	
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